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ABSTRACT   
Millions of people across the globe invest in financial markets, hoping to increase their 
wealth or income. Investing is risky of course, but some investors seem to battle not 
only the market but also themselves. In recent decades behavioural economics has 
uncovered many patterns of trading behaviour which appear to work against the 
investors who display them, resulting in lower investment returns. For this reason, these 
patterns of behaviour are regarded as trading biases. 
This thesis investigates two main themes that follow from the observation of trading 
biases in financial markets, both ultimately related to helping investors make better 
investment decisions. First, to what extent do individual investors reliably demonstrate 
trading biases? Second, why do these biases occur and can their impact be mitigated? 
With respect to the first theme, is there evidence that some biases have trait-like 
characteristics, and predict investors’ behaviour across a range of situations? This theme 
is related to the “state vs trait” argument from personality psychology. Applied here, the 
question is whether variation in trading behaviour is better explained due to 
environmental differences when decisions are being made (state), or because people 
differ in their tendencies to behave in certain ways (trait-like). If the latter, investors 
who tend to express biases would benefit from understanding their own decision-making 
patterns. 
Note that the claim here is not that the biases are literally traits themselves, but that 
they have trait-like characteristics such as intra-individual stability and construct validity. 
The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the biases examined possess these 
characteristics because their expression depends on some underlying behavioural 
tendencies; these underlying tendencies may be traits, though they are not directly 
investigated here. 
With respect to the second theme, a suspected cause of many trading biases is the 
influence of irrelevant emotions on decision making. This thesis investigates evidence for 
the role of emotions in trading biases. It also investigates the use of cognitive 
reappraisal as a de-biasing technique (i.e. a method to reduce the level of bias displayed 
in trading decisions), which works by reducing emotions during trading. 
The main bias which this thesis examines is the disposition effect. This occurs when 
investors are more eager to sell gains than losses, or stated another way, when they 
hold losses longer than gains. So, it is a bias that affects decisions about selling, based 
on the profit or loss made on each stock. Although the disposition effect is widely studied 
in behavioural finance, it has not been demonstrated to be a persistent pattern of an 
investor’s trading behaviour. Experimental studies measure a mathematically defined 
disposition effect in the lab, but assume that this research can provide insight into the 
disposition effect observed in financial markets.  
Meanwhile cognitive reappraisal, a form of emotion regulation, has been shown to 
reduce the disposition effect, but only in students and only using lab conditions that lack 
ecological validity. Furthermore, the mechanism for reappraisal’s effect has not been 
investigated. 
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As well as investigating whether the disposition effect has trait-like characteristics, it also 
examines the “constituent biases” of the disposition effect, cutting gains and holding 
losses. Though the disposition effect is defined as a difference between selling gains and 
losses, the two are treated as two sides of the same behaviour rather than two separate 
trading patterns. This thesis argues that these constituent biases should be treated as 
separate biases, rather than two aspects of a unitary disposition effect. Building on the 
first theme, the constituent biases are also assessed for trait-like characteristics; 
building on the second theme, the effect of cognitive reappraisal on each constituent bias 
is examined. 
This thesis contains three studies, two involving retail investors and one with an adult 
novice sample. All three involve measuring trading biases with an ecologically realistic 
trading simulation, played multiple times. The two studies with retail investors also 
include a disposition effect scale. Cognitive reappraisal is tested in one of the two studies 
with retail investors and in the study with novices.   
I contribute to the literature in establishing that the disposition effect has trait-like 
characteristics aspects, by showing that it can be reliably measured in both an 
ecologically valid trading simulation and a self-report scale, and that these link to real-
world trading behaviour. Furthermore, I show that the disposition effect is not a unitary 
bias but that its two constituent biases, cutting gains and holding losses, are 
independent of each other. They too have trait-like characteristics, and can also be 
reliably measured using the same ecologically valid trading simulation. However, levels 
of each bias in investors are not associated with each other. This contrasts with the 
conventional approach to the disposition effect that treats them as opposite sides of a 
unitary bias. I argue they are independent biases which are measured together in the 
disposition effect. Furthermore, as independent biases they are likely to be underpinned 
by different underlying traits. 
I build on the existing literature by showing that the disposition effect occurs in retail 
investors using this trading simulation. I find that cognitive reappraisal reduces the 
disposition effect, while I make improvements in the external validity of this test in both 
the measurement of the disposition effect and participants used. I extend knowledge of 
emotion regulation and trading biases by showing that cognitive reappraisal reduces the 
disposition effect by decreasing the tendency to hold losses. Lastly, I show that cognitive 
reappraisal is not effective under the same conditions in novices (as opposed to retail 
investors). This reminds us of the merit of testing de-biasing techniques with greater 
ecological validity, and suggests that implementing de-biasing techniques in real world 
decision making may be more difficult than it first appears.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, there has been an explosion in research on decision making biases. 
Researchers in judgement and decision making have proposed many biases to explain 
behaviour and decisions which seem to be irrational of self-defeating. Some of the most 
economically important of these affect financial decisions, and one such bias is the 
disposition effect. 
This bias has been recognized in academia since the seminal paper by Shefrin and 
Statman (1985). As you would expect, it is also recognized by investors in financial 
markets (for example Gross, p.150, 1982) although it is not usually known as the 
disposition effect by investors. This terminology originates from Shefrin and Statman 
who note it is a disposition where investors “sell winners and ride losers”, meaning that 
they are eager to sell investments which have risen in value while being reluctant to sell 
investments which have fallen in value. The net effect is that investors are less likely to 
sell investments where they have made a loss than if they have made a gain. 
Since Shefrin and Statman’s paper, the disposition has been widely and robustly 
established in field studies, to the point where Barberis and Xiong (2009) note it is “one 
of the most robust facts about the trading of individual investors”. Behavioural finance 
has established that the disposition effect occurs in financial markets across a huge 
range of countries and market types. Unfortunately, the bias does not usually help 
investors who display it. The disposition effect does not make sense on logical grounds: 
the fact that an investor has lost money on an investment does not mean it is a good 
investment for that investor to hold now. Empirical evidence backs up this reasoning, for 
example Odean (1998) finds that the winners investors sell outperform the losers they 
hold. 
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These studies have provided researchers with an observed phenomenon to explain. 
Some researchers have used field studies to find demographic correlates or investor 
characteristics which are associated with higher or lower levels of the bias (Feng and 
Seasholes, 2005, Dhar and Zhu, 2006). Others have attempted to explain the underlying 
psychology that drives the effect, often using experimental studies (Camerer and Weber, 
1998, Summers and Duxbury, 2012). This thesis addresses two themes, which result 
from combining aspects of field studies and experimental studies. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Many biases have been proposed by researchers, but an underexplored area is the 
extent to which these biases can be viewed as trait-like phenomena, rather than state 
phenomena. This is the first theme: are some individuals more prone to biases than 
others, and would they continue to display this bias in a different context? This thesis 
applies this question to the disposition effect, and its constituent biases, cutting gains 
and holding losses. 
Although field studies have shown conclusively that a disposition effect does occur in 
financial markets, is this a consequence of the environments where it is measured, or is 
it because some investors are prone to that pattern of behaviour? Is it defensible to talk 
of an investor’s “trading personality”? This question also has implications for the 
conclusions we can draw from carrying out experimental work. Would individuals 
displaying a disposition effect in experimental studies also display one in financial 
markets: can the former shed light on the latter? 
A further qualification is necessary here, since the claim in this thesis is not that the 
biases are fundamental aspects of a person’s personality, in the way that traits such as 
extraversion and neuroticism are viewed by psychologists. The behavioural scope of the 
disposition effect is too narrow for it to be a fundamental aspect of someone’s 
personality. However, it is argued that these biases have some characteristics of traits, 
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and are manifested as stable behavioural tendencies in trading environments. This leads 
to the first research question and its associated hypotheses: 
RQ 1 - Does the disposition effect have trait-like characteristics? 
H 1.1 - The disposition effect will show intra-individual stability  
H 1.2 - The disposition effect will show convergent validity across multiple measures 
The same question is applied to the “two sides” of the disposition effect: cutting gains 
and holding losses. Do they also have trait-like characteristics, and can they also be seen 
as stable behavioural tendencies of investors, rather than simply a product of the 
particular environment decisions are made in? 
Although the disposition is defined and often measured as a difference in decision 
making between gains and losses, it may make more sense to treat these “two sides” as 
independent biases? So, this is also examined in the second research question and its 
hypotheses, which are: 
RQ 2 - Do cutting gains and holding losses have trait-like characteristics? 
H 2.1 - Cutting gains will show intra-individual stability  
H 2.2 - Holding losses will show intra-individual stability  
H 2.3 - There will be discriminant validity between cutting gains and holding losses in 
a realistic trading simulation 
H 2.4 - There will be discriminant validity between cutting gains and holding losses in 
the scale 
H 2.5 - There will be convergent validity for cutting gains between a realistic trading 
simulation and the scale 
H 2.6 - There will be convergent validity for holding losses between a realistic trading 
simulation and the scale 
H 2.7 - There will be discriminant validity between cutting gains and holding losses, 
between a realistic trading simulation and scale 
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The second theme investigates the role of emotions in decision making biases, and 
testing psychological interventions to reduce biases with an emphasis on greater 
external validity in an experimental context. Again, this is applied to the disposition 
effect and its constituent biases. 
Emotions have been shown to affect our decision making in many ways. In dual process 
theory, decision making is modelled as comprising two systems, system 1 and system 2 
(Sloman, 2002), contrasting rapid and often automatic reasoning against deliberative 
and objective reasoning. Emotions affecting decision making are a possible example of 
system 1 in action: they provide a rapid and psychologically salient heuristic on which to 
base decisions (Schwarz, 1990). 
The most common psychological explanation of the disposition effect is its derivation 
from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). However, more recent research 
casts doubt on this, and suggests that emotions may play a prominent role in the 
disposition effect (Lee et al., 2008, Summers and Duxbury, 2012) and other biases 
related to the disposition effect such as loss aversion (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). 
There is a large literature on interventions which can be used to mitigate biases, 
increasingly popularised in the last decade by books such as “Nudge” (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008) and prominent organisations like the UK’s Behavioural Insights Team. 
Consistent with a role of emotions in decision making biases, one effective technique 
that has emerged is the use of emotion regulation. This is hypothesized to work by 
controlling the level of emotions experienced when making decisions, so reducing the 
bias caused by emotions. Among emotion regulation techniques, cognitive reappraisal 
has been especially effective in improving decisions (Wallace et al., 2009, Sokol-Hessner 
et al., 2009, Lee et al., 2010). This involves reappraising a situation to change its 
significance or meaning, such that the new appraisal no longer gives rise to the 
unwanted emotion(s). 
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However, a drawback of many of studies testing emotion regulation is that the 
experimental demonstration of cognitive reappraisal takes place within an artificial lab 
setup. While this is practically helpful and aids experimental control, it may impair the 
external validity of findings. This is the case with Lee et al. (2008) who demonstrate a 
reduction in the disposition effect using cognitive reappraisal: the experimental task 
used to measure the disposition effect lacks ecological validity, and uses a student 
sample rather than participant with experience of trading. 
 This is achieved by increasing the ecological validity of the trading environment used 
experimentally, and using retail investors rather than students as participants. The third 
research question and its hypotheses follow from this: 
RQ 3 - Does cognitive reappraisal affect the disposition effect and its constituent biases, 
when tested in experienced traders under conditions of greater external validity? 
H 3.1 - Investors will show a disposition effect in a realistic trading simulation 
H 3.2 - Cognitive reappraisal will reduce the disposition effect 
H 3.3 - Cognitive reappraisal will reduce holding losses but not affect cutting gains 
Continuing with this theme, the last research question aims to directly test the 
involvement of emotions in the disposition effect, and the effect of cognitive reappraisal 
on the disposition effect. This is also done using the same instrument to measure 
trading, so the greater ecological validity of the trading environment is maintained. The 
fourth research question and its hypotheses are: 
RQ 4 - Does cognitive reappraisal affect the disposition effect and its constituent biases, 
by changing emotions during trading, when tested in novices under conditions of 
greater external validity? 
H 4.1 - Novices will show a disposition effect in a realistic trading simulation 
H 4.2 - Cognitive reappraisal will reduce the disposition effect 
H 4.3 - Cognitive reappraisal will reduce holding losses but not affect cutting gains 
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H 4.4 - Cognitive reappraisal will reduce negative emotions experienced during 
trading 
H 4.5 - Changes in emotions during trading will mediate the effect of reappraisal 
1.3 METHODS, LINKS BETWEEN STUDIES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
I adopt a positivist philosophy and quantitative methodology, following many previous 
studies of decision making biases, emotion regulation and the disposition effect. This 
thesis contains three experimental studies, two involving retail investors (the Milan and 
London studies) and one with an adult novice sample (the OU study). All three involve 
measuring the disposition effect with an ecologically realistic trading simulation (the two-
index game) which is played multiple times. The two studies using retail investors also 
include a disposition effect scale, which asked about their attitudes and behaviour in 
trading situations where a disposition effect may take effect, and there is also analysis of 
data linking the two-index to financial markets, supplied by Saxo bank who developed 
the game. Cognitive reappraisal is tested in one of the studies with retail investors, and 
in the study with novices.   
The studies are combined in different ways to answer the research questions above. The 
first theme, comprising the first and second research questions, is about whether these 
biases have trait-like characteristics. This is tested by showing that the biases 
demonstrate intra-individual stability, convergent validity and discriminant validity, 
across a realistic trading simulation, the scale, and the trading data. To test the validity 
of cutting gains and holding losses, the scale is also split into two subscales. 
In the second theme, comprising the third and fourth research questions, cognitive 
reappraisal is tested experimentally by comparing a reappraisal group and a control 
group. The effect of emotions is tested in the OU study using emotion scales before and 
after reappraisal is used, and again compares reappraisal and control groups. 
Figure 1.1 demonstrates how the studies are used to answer each research question, 
and in which chapter the material appears. Headings for each study (plus the Saxo data) 
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are at the top of the figure in ovals. Components of each study are shown vertically 
below each heading. The dashed boxes group together similar components across the 
studies. Finally, the arrows from each dashed group show which chapter they appear in, 
and which research question(s) and specific hypotheses they address in part or whole.  
For clarity, the individual tests used to test each hypothesis are not shown. The primary 
purpose of this diagram is to show how the four studies (plus the Saxo data) relate to 
the hypotheses tested in this thesis, by showing what type of data was produced from 
each study and how different types of data are used to answer the four research 
questions. However, complete tables of tests for each research question are included in 
the summary of findings in chapter 8, and show which chapter contains those tests. A 
table is produced for each research question near the beginning of its respective section 
in chapter 8. 
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Figure 1.1 Links between studies, chapters, research questions and hypotheses in the 
thesis 
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1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis makes a contribution with each of its research questions. It shows that the 
disposition effect has trait-like characteristics: it can be reliably measured in an 
ecologically valid trading simulation, the disposition effect from this simulation is 
consistent with one measured with a self-report scale, and it is also consistent with the 
disposition effect measured in real-world trading behaviour. This is strong evidence that 
the disposition effect is affected by a behavioural tendency in decision-making during 
trading which drives behaviour across a range of contexts. This implies it is not just a 
product of the situation. 
A similar contribution is made with cutting gains and holding losses, showing that they 
too have trait-like characteristics. Both can be reliably measured in the lab using the 
same trading simulation. Holding losses also shows consistency across the trading 
simulation and a self-report scale, though cutting gains does not. The last part of this 
contribution is to show that only do they have trait-like characteristics, but that they are 
independent of one another. This entails that the disposition effect is not a unitary bias 
but that it is the combination of two constituent biases, cutting gains and holding losses, 
which should be regarded and researched as separate behaviours. 
The third contribution shows that cognitive reappraisal can reduce the disposition effect, 
while testing this with increased external validity. This supports the work of Lee et al., 
(2008), who demonstrated cognitive reappraisal’s effect in a less ecologically valid 
environment. It also shows that cognitive reappraisal can be effective with people who 
have experience in financial markets. Finally, it includes the novel finding that cognitive 
reappraisal reduces the disposition effect by reducing holding losses, rather than cutting 
gains. This links back to the second contribution, where these constituent biases are 
shown to be independent behaviours. It also supports Richards (2012) who found that 
habitual reappraisal in investors may be associated with a lower disposition effect due to 
reduced holding of losses. 
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The fourth contribution is to raise questions about how psychological interventions may 
be tested with greater external validity, in contexts where expertise may be required to 
complete realistic tasks. There was no effect of cognitive reappraisal when tested with 
greater ecological validity, but with novices as participants rather than retail investors. 
Put another way, it may not be possible to use novices when attempting to study 
psychological biases with greater ecological validity, because the novices’ lack of 
expertise makes it impossible for them to complete tasks properly in this environment. 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews previous literature on the 
disposition effect, including proposed explanations for its occurrence such as an account 
based on prospect theory. It presents evidence that the disposition effect may be stable 
trading behaviour with trait-like characteristics. It goes on to critique the prospect theory 
account and suggest an explanation based on emotions during trading, which raises the 
question of whether cutting gains and holding losses are independent biases which also 
have with trait-like characteristics. 
The next section reviews the wider links between emotions and decision making, and 
how emotion regulation has been used to reduce decision making biases. It briefly looks 
at different approaches to judgement and decision making research, before discussing 
external validity in previous experimental studies, and how this could be improved. It 
ends by reviewing how the literature examined motivates the research questions being 
answered in this thesis. 
Chapter 3 begins by discussing the research philosophy which this thesis adopts. It 
proceeds to discuss the research design that is being used to investigate the research 
questions. For the first two research questions, this is the the multitrait-multimethod 
matrix (MTMM), developed by Campbell and Fiske (1959). This involves demonstrating 
intra-individual stability, convergent validity and discriminant validity, to establish the 
trait-like characteristics of the trading behaviours being explored. For the effect of 
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cognitive reappraisal in the third and fourth research questions, an experimental, 
repeated-measures comparison between reappraisal and control groups is used. This 
chapter concludes by reviewing some methods which are common across all three 
studies in the thesis. Paramount among these is an explanation of the realistic trading 
simulation (the two-index game), which is used to measure trading behaviour in the lab 
with greater ecological validity. 
Chapter 4 begins the reporting of empirical results. Evidence for research questions 1 
and 2 is split across chapter 4 and 5. Chapter 4 reports results of tests which use only 
the two-index game, or the two-index game with Saxo trading data. This chapter shows 
that all three biases are reliable, that the disposition effect shows convergent validity, 
and that cutting gains and holding losses have discriminant validity in the two-index 
game. 
Chapter 5 presents evidence for research questions 1 and 2, where tests use the 
disposition effect scale in addition to the two-index game. First the scale is correlated 
with disposition effect scores from the two-index game to show convergent validity. Then 
to investigate the second research question, the scale is split into two subscales 
representing cutting gains and holding losses, and these subscales are shown to be 
independent of one another. Holding losses also shows convergent validity between the 
scale and the game, while both holding losses and cutting gains show discriminant 
validity between the scale and the game. 
Chapter 4 and 5 combined show that the disposition effect, cutting gains and holding 
losses have trait-like characteristics. Furthermore, they show that the latter two should 
be treated as separate biases, independent of one another. 
Chapter 6 addresses the third research question, and relates to the Milan study. It shows 
that the disposition effect can be reduced by cognitive reappraisal in retail investors, 
while also increasing the ecological validity with which it is tested. It also includes 
evidence that cognitive reappraisal does this by reducing the holding of losses. 
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Chapter 7 address the fourth research question and relates to the OU study. It is similar 
in design to the Milan study; however, it uses novices rather than retail investors, and 
measures emotions during trading to investigate the mechanism of cognitive reappraisal. 
It does not find an effect of cognitive reappraisal, and so poses some questions about 
when it is possible to test psychological effects with greater ecological validity. 
Chapter 8 summarises the findings of this thesis. Each research question is dealt with in 
turn, and divided into the hypotheses which relate to it, and then finally the tests used to 
provide evidence for each hypothesis. The chapter draws conclusions for each research 
question. 
Finally, chapter 9 discusses the contributions relating to each research question in more 
depth, and the implications for further research. Limitations of the work presented here 
are discussed, and then implications for practitioners, and finally overall conclusions for 
the thesis are drawn. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review begins by reviewing the disposition effect. It discusses what the 
disposition effect is, why it matters, and evidence of its existence from field studies. 
Some common explanations for the disposition effect are examined, particularly one 
based on prospect theory, then the nature of the disposition effect is discussed and 
evidence is presented that suggests is may be stable trading behaviour which is 
expressed across time and contexts. 
Research which questions the prospect theory account of the disposition effect is 
discussed, and this research leads to an alternative explanation of the disposition effect 
based on emotions during trading. It also suggests that cutting gains and holding losses 
are independent biases, and are underpinned by different emotions experienced during 
trading, rather than being two sides of a unitary disposition effect. 
Building on the link to emotions during trading, the next section examines this area of 
research more widely. It reviews the relationship between emotions and decision 
making, introduces emotion regulation, and examines the effect of emotion regulation on 
decision making, focussing on how emotion regulation can be used to reduce decision-
making biases. 
Two opposing paradigms in judgment and decision making research are briefly reviewed:  
the heuristics and biases (HAB) approach, and naturalistic decision making (NDM). This 
locates the research in this thesis in the heuristics and biases paradigm; however, it also 
discusses the strengths of naturalistic decision making. A motivation of this thesis is to 
bridge the two paradigms, by testing hypotheses about the disposition effect 
experimentally like much heuristics and biases research, but with the greater external 
validity that research in naturalistic decision making often provides.  
Next, two aspects of external validity in experimental studies are discussed: the 
ecological validity of the experimental setup, and the participants used. These aspects 
14 
 
are explored in relation to previous experimental studies on the disposition effect, and 
how they could be improved. 
The chapter ends by drawing together on the literature reviewed in this chapter, and 
explaining how it motivates the research questions and hypotheses answered in this 
thesis. Later chapters expand on how these hypotheses are tested. 
2.1 THE DISPOSITION EFFECT 
2.1.1 Introduction to the disposition effect 
The disposition effect is a decision-making bias, which is chiefly studied and observed in 
a financial context. A simple characterisation of the disposition effect is a trading pattern 
where investors “sell winners and ride losers” (Shefrin and Statman 1985), that is, they 
are eager to sell stocks which have gained in value, while being reluctant to sell stocks 
which have fallen in value. This has several corollaries which can be measured: losses 
will be held longer than gains (on average); the base rate probability of a stock being 
sold, given that one knows an investor has sold a stock of some sort, will be higher for a 
stock in a loss position than a flat or gain position. Since Shefrin and Statman’s paper, 
the disposition effect has been documented extensively in empirical investor studies 
(e.g. Odean 1998; Dhar and Zhu 2006), and also experimentally (e.g. Weber and 
Camerer 1998; Lee, Park et al. 2008). 
Studies of the disposition effect use some financial terminology, which this thesis will 
also use. Buying a quantity of shares in a stock (i.e. shares of a company) is known as 
opening a position. Owning shares once they have been bought, but before they have 
been sold, is called holding a position. Selling those shares is called closing a position. 
Shares which are currently being held are an open position, while those that have been 
sold are a closed position. Shares which have risen in value since purchase are known as 
gains and those which have fallen in value are called losses. The money made or lost on 
a position is the payoff. Gains or losses which have not been sold yet are paper gains 
and losses, while those that have been sold are closed gains and losses. 
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During trading, there are two basic types of decisions to be made at any point: whether 
to purchase a stock, and following a purchase, whether to hold a position or close it. The 
disposition effect is a bias which affects the decision to hold or close positions. People 
who trade with a disposition effect tend to sell gains more quickly than losses, or 
conversely, they hold losses for longer than gains. This is also known as “cutting gains 
and holding losses”. A typical finding is that the relative probability of gains being sold is 
between 50% and 100% higher compared to losses (e.g. Odean, 1998). 
2.1.1.1 Why is the disposition effect interesting? 
There are two main motivations for studying the disposition effect. The first is that it is 
interesting, simply as a psychological and economic phenomenon. Why should investors 
consistently show a bias in how they treat gains versus losses? Economic theory dictates 
that this is an irrational bias, which should not occur. The second motivation has more 
practical application: people who trade with a disposition effect have lower returns than 
people who don’t (Odean, 1998), and this effect is usually greater in retail investors than 
professional investors. These two motivations are discussed in more detail below. 
The disposition effect breaks some basic assumptions in economics, and can be viewed 
as a persistent deviation from normatively rational models of decision-making. Investors 
are assumed to try to maximise their wealth. The strong form of the efficient market 
hypothesis (Fama, 1970) predicts that past price changes do not predict future ones: the 
market does not consider what a stock was worth, but only what it is worth now. 
If the market does not care about the cumulative price history of a stock, we can safely 
assume that the market does not consider whether an individual investor has made or 
lost money on a stock. Indeed, this perspective illuminates the irrationality of an investor 
allowing their previous purchase to affect their decisions about a stock. Investors with a 
disposition effect are asking “have I made money in the past?” when the question should 
be “what will make me money in the future?” Put simply, the disposition effect allows 
irrelevant information to influence trading decisions. Indeed, a loss position could be 
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seen as analogous to a sunk cost, and should have no input into decisions about holding 
or selling investments. 
Taking the past purchase price into account when making selling decisions should at best 
have no effect on trading performance. However, irrelevant information such as the 
purchase price may crowd out useful information, leading to inferior decisions and lower 
returns. It is also possible that focussing some attention on a purchase price will hinder 
the use of any beneficial information or strategy which an investor does have. We can be 
agnostic about an investor’s strategy: the key point is that whatever strategy an investor 
has, focussing on the ‘sunk cost’ of any money already lost should not be one of them. 
As mentioned, the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis assumes there is no 
predictive information in previous stock movements. In fact, there is much evidence that 
the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis is not completely correct. For 
example, effects due to momentum, weather, seasonality and many others have been 
found. However, in the case of momentum effects, these still adversely affect the 
disposition effect investor. By selling gains too quickly, they tend to miss out when 
stocks they have sold continue to rise. By holding losses too long, they incur further 
losses as the price of the stock they failed to sell continues to fall. In support of this 
argument against the disposition effect, Odean (1998) finds that stocks which investors 
sell outperform the ones they hold, and estimates a difference in performance between 
them of 3.4% per year – a substantial difference in annual return. Supporting this, Seru 
et al. (2010) find that trading with a disposition effect results in poorer investment 
returns, whereas investors without a disposition effect do not incur this penalty.  
The disposition effect is also recognised as problematic amongst financial researchers 
and professionals. For example Gross (p.150, 1982) quotes a stockbroker describing the 
behaviour of his clients: 
“Many clients, however will not sell anything at a loss… (this) has probably wrought 
more destruction on investment portfolios than anything else” 
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Glick (1957) commented on the discussion of this problem by professional traders. They 
note how gains that are sold soon after becoming gains will only ever yield small profits, 
whereas a small unsold loss can grow to a very heavy loss: 
“Small profits and large losses is an expression oft repeated by traders… (it) is control of 
losses which constitutes the essential problem” 
Despite some awareness of the disposition effect, it persists and has been demonstrated 
enough times and in enough contexts to be considered a reliable feature of investor 
behaviour. Given the economic cost to those it afflicts, an explanation of its causes 
would be welcome, and once its causes are understood, interventions to mitigate its 
occurrence might be possible. 
A disposition effect may also prevent an investor from taking advantage of other 
investment opportunities. Assuming they have limited capital, refusing to sell losses ties 
up capital which could otherwise by invested elsewhere. It was explained above that 
focussing on purchase prices could distract an investor’s attention from useful 
information they may have about when to close a position. This is another way in which 
a focus on purchase prices can be detrimental to investors, by distracting them or 
preventing them from opening positions in other stocks. 
Investors with a disposition effect may also lose by paying higher capital gains tax than 
necessary. This was first noted by Shefrin and Statman (1985). They reasoned that 
holding stock losses results in an increase in capital gains tax, since the unrealised losses 
cannot be used to offset gains on other stocks sold. Supporting this, Odean (1998) 
shows that in December (the last month of the U.S. tax year) the aggregate disposition 
effect reverses; he attributes this to strategic selling of losses to reduce capital gains 
tax. However, he still demonstrates a robust disposition effect overall. The conclusion is 
that immediately before the tax deadline, an imminent tax bill is enough to overcome 
whatever is driving the disposition effect, but not at other times during the year. 
18 
 
Another theoretical argument against trading with a disposition effect is an increase in 
the likelihood of going bankrupt, or at least ceasing to trade after losing all available 
trading capital. A disposition effect increases risk, due to prolonged holding of losses if 
they do not return to breakeven. These losses may grow ever larger, until they consume 
much or all available capital. Alternatively, a combination of intermittent large losses, 
resulting from holding each of them too long, may eventually consume all trading 
capital. 
The disposition effect may also have a detrimental effect in examples of gains and losses 
outwith a trading environment, for example selling a house. An important example 
relevant to most of the general population is Genesove and Mayer (2001), who found a 
disposition effect exists in the housing market. A house which has fallen in value will not 
increase in price simply to allow the home-owner to avoid a loss: the logic here is the 
same as the efficient market hypothesis in financial markets. Therefore, delaying a 
house sale due to a capital loss is irrational in the same way as delaying a stock sale 
because of a capital loss. (Genesove and Mayer also controlled for home owners who 
could not sell at a loss due to negative equity, so they only compared home owners who 
were able to sell for a loss, but chose not to.) Home owners who refuse to accept market 
price and delay selling may needlessly prolong their move, incurring financial costs and 
detrimental practical effects on their lives. 
This result suggests that financial markets may simply allow the disposition effect (which 
is a bias affecting how gains and losses are treated) to be expressed more often. In 
financial markets, it is common for assets to be bought with the intention of selling for 
profit later in the short or medium term, and the purchase price functions as a salient 
reference point from which to perceive gains and losses. However, whenever these 
characteristics apply to another situation, a disposition effect may also be expressed. 
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2.1.1.2 Field studies of the disposition effect 
The disposition effect is a very robust phenomenon in financial markets. Indeed, Barberis 
and Xiong (2009) note it is “one of the most robust facts about the trading of individual 
investors”. Field studies of the disposition effect typically analyse very large datasets of 
trading records, acquired from trading brokers or directly provided by trading exchanges. 
This effect has been demonstrated in many types of financial markets, such as stocks, 
bonds, mutual funds and commodities. It is seen in all types of investors (retail, 
financial, government, foreign), and across many countries, and in countries across the 
world. 
For example, Schlarbaum et al. (1978) analysed 2,500 retail investor accounts of mutual 
fund purchases and redemptions. They found that about 60% of redemptions were 
gains, and 40% were losses, meaning there were 50% more gains sold compared to 
losses. Their interpretation was that retail investors were skilled at picking stocks, 
resulting in more gains being available to close. However, Shefrin and Statman (1985) 
had a different interpretation. They hypothesised that retail investors had as many losing 
funds, but were less likely to redeem them, and they named this tendency the 
disposition effect, after the “disposition” to sell winners and hold losers. (The name has 
persisted in academia, despite being rather undescriptive of the bias). 
These studies drew attention to a possible effect in financial markets, but the effect was 
conclusively established by Odean (1998), who analysed some 10,000 accounts of share 
investors in the U.S. from 1987 to 1993. He analysed a very large number of trading 
accounts, over a long period of time and varying market conditions. While meticulously 
ruling out alternative rational explanations (discussed below), Odean still found that 
gains are around 50% more likely to be sold than losses. 
The disposition effect has been demonstrated many times since, in a wide range of 
geographical locations, markets and types of investor, for example: Barber et al. (2007) 
with individual and institutional investors in Taiwan; Brown et al. (2006) with individual 
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and institutional investors trading IPOs in Australia; Kaustia (2010) with private 
investors in Finland; and Locke and Onayev (2005) with commodity future traders. 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) analyse every stock market investor in Finland, and 
demonstrated the disposition effect not only in retail investors, but also professional 
investors such as financial and non-financial corporations, and in government bodies. 
Heisler (1994) finds the disposition effect in professional investors in US Treasury bonds. 
The disposition effect has also been demonstrated in emerging markets such as China 
(Feng and Seasholes, 2005), and Taiwan (Shu, 2005). 
Although the effect is usually studied in financial markets, there is evidence that the 
underlying bias has more widespread effects. The disposition effect may affect decisions 
whenever it is possible to frame scenarios in terms of gains or losses. A related financial 
example is Heath et al. (1999), who found a disposition effect in exercise of stock 
options. Exercise of stock options doubled when the stock price rose above its highest 
point in the preceding year. 
2.1.2 Refuted explanations for the disposition effect 
Several explanations of the disposition effect are consistent with a rational investor 
displaying one, despite the arguments set out above. These include: mean reversion of 
stock prices, portfolio rebalancing, and trading costs. These explanations are expanded 
on briefly below, with evidence that they cannot account for the disposition effect in 
practice. 
A belief in mean reversion entails that stocks will oscillate around a mean price. So, 
stocks which have recently gained in price are expected to fall, and stocks which have 
recently decreased in price are expected to rise. This implies that it is rational to sell 
gains before they can fall in value, and hold losses to benefit from their subsequent rise 
in value. However, Odean (1998) finds that analysing stock performance shows the 
opposite: stocks which investors sell outperform those they hold. This shows that, if 
these investors are making decisions based on a belief in mean reversion, their belief in 
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mean reversion is mistaken. The gains they sell would be more profitable to hold than 
the losses which they choose to hold. 
It could still be the case that investors believe, falsely, that mean reversion is true and is 
a good basis for a trading strategy. However, other studies have shown that the 
disposition effect still occurs even when participants know mean reversion is false. In an   
experimental study, Weber and Camerer (1998) inform participants that each stock has 
fixed probability of price rise or fall, consistent over many periods: the disposition effect 
still occurs. Lee et al. (2008) explicitly give participants forecasts about price 
movements, but the disposition effect still occurs.   
Portfolio rebalancing involves trading to maintain fixed percentages of capital in certain 
stocks or stock sectors. Stocks which have risen in price will take up a larger percentage 
of capital, while stocks that have fallen will take up a smaller percentage of capital. The 
action to remedy this is to sell some of the gains, while holding more losses. However, 
Odean (1998) controls for this investment strategy and still finds a disposition effect. 
Trading costs are a stepped cost: they are not completely proportional to the amount 
traded, having some fixed elements. This means that trading costs can be higher as a 
percentage of smaller trades, and selling stocks which have fallen in value will tend to be 
smaller trades. An investor may be reluctant to incur these higher percentage trading 
costs, so avoid selling losses as a result. However, after controlling for this explanation, 
Odean (1998) still finds a disposition effect too. 
2.1.3 A prospect theory account of the disposition effect 
The predominant explanation now given for the disposition effect was proposed by 
Shefrin and Statman in their seminal 1985 paper, and derives the disposition effect from 
the framework of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Note that this thesis is 
not seeking to support this explanation. It is presented as background knowledge to 
contrast with alternative hypotheses about the effect of emotions on the disposition 
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effect which will be introduced later. Evidence that calls into question a prospect theory 
explanation is discussed below in section 2.1.6. 
Prospect theory proposes that decisions are made in two parts. The first part is called 
the framing phase (originally called the editing phase in Kahneman and Tversky’s 1979 
paper), where the decision is set into context. The second part is the evaluation phase 
where different courses of action are evaluated and the one with the highest expected 
utility is chosen. 
The framing phase puts the possible outcomes into a form which simplifies evaluation 
and choice between them. In the disposition effect, framing occurs by mental accounting 
(elaborated by Thaler, 1985) which has two aspects. First, each stock is associated with 
its own mental account, which is “opened” at the time the stock is bought. This account 
is kept separately from other stocks and assets (i.e. non-aggregation of positions). 
Second, each account is judged relative to a reference price. This is initially the purchase 
price, and often remains at the purchase price until the stock is sold. For example, one 
stock is bought at £10; the mental account is zero and £10 is the reference price. If the 
stock falls to £9, the mental account of the stock will be a loss of £1. This is unaffected 
by any other investments held by the investor, and whether they have made gains or 
losses. 
Thus, the balance on a stock’s account is zero at the time of purchase and its future 
balance will reflect movements in the purchase price of the stock following purchase 
(assuming the purchase price remains as the reference price). As the price moves away 
from the purchase price by amount x or -x, the mental account is perceived as being in a 
gain or a loss position of magnitude x or -x. This has been implied in the introduction 
above without needing to be explicitly spelt out, since taking the purchase price as the 
reference price is an intuitive thing to do. Note also that this premise about mental 
accounting is not unique to prospect theory; however, what follows relies on mental 
accounting to take place, so mental accounting is a critical part of the explanation. 
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Once the position has been framed, courses of action can be evaluated. The decision the 
investor must make in this situation is whether to sell the stock immediately or to 
continue to hold it. However, instead of calculating expected value, prospect theory 
posits that expected value is transformed into expected utility, which is used as the basis 
for the decision. This transformation is called the value function and denoted “v(x)”. 
The expected utility from selling immediately is relatively simple to calculate, simply 
entering the gain or loss of the stock into the value function. This payoff will be achieved 
with 100% certainty if the stock is sold. Calculating the expected utility of holding is 
more complicated and requires an estimation of the probability distribution of possible 
future positions of the stock, and for the magnitude of those positions to be transformed 
by the value function to give an overall expected utility of holding which can be 
compared to selling. To simplify the example, in the standard explanation the only 
possible future outcomes are a future positive movement h or negative movement –h, 
both which have 0.5 probability of occurring. This mathematically embodies the 
assumption that future stock movements are independent of past movements. 
Figure 2.1 shows how the value function is concave for gain positions and convex for loss 
positions. The x axis is the actual gain or loss of the stock since purchase, while the y 
axis represents expected utility the investor will experience from selling the stock. The 
shape of the value function means a change in position of the same magnitude on the x-
axis     has a different effect on expected utility depending on where the change is 
situated relative to the reference point. For simplicity and to exaggerate the effect, h 
here has been set to equal x. Thus, a positive movement of x from an existing gain of x 
results in a new position of 2x. A negative movement of x returns the position to the 
origin (i.e. the purchase price). The reverse happens when starting from an existing loss 
position. 
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Figure 2.1 Evaluating a gain and loss using the value function 
 
The disposition effect is produced when we translate these possible outcomes into 
expected utility, and the investor chooses the option which results in the greatest 
expected utility. When starting at a gain position of x, a further increase of x to 2x 
increases expected utility, as seen from reading off the y-axis in figure 2.1; however, the 
increase is not as large the decrease anticipated from returning to the break-even point. 
If these outcomes are equally likely, the expected utility of selling immediately will be 
higher than the average of the two future possible outcomes.  
We have the reverse position for losses. A further movement of x back to the origin 
causes a larger increase in expected utility than the decrease in expected utility from an 
additional loss of x to an overall position of 2x. So, if the future possible outcomes of 
holding are equally likely, expected utility will be increased by holding a loss rather than 
selling it, and selling a gain rather than holding it. 
In practice, the model of binary outcomes of equal but opposite magnitude being known 
with certainty is obviously unrealistic. Investors may conceive of a probability 
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distribution of future movements, or they may just have an idea of what direction future 
price movements are likely to be, and estimate the probability of a further gain or loss 
from the current price. However, the prospect theory explanation is still applied despite 
these complications, as using the value function will still produce a higher expected 
utility for movements back to the origin compared to away from the origin, whether the 
position is originally a gain or a loss. The simplified version is usually presented as it is 
less complicated to explain. What matters however, is that there is a bias produced in 
favour of holding losses compared with gains, despite any complications, and that this is 
driven by the value function. 
While investors will obviously not always estimate future outcomes of holding to be a 
gain or loss each with equal value and equal probability, what drives the disposition 
effect is that the value function creates a difference in behaviour towards gains and 
losses. Thus, they will ceteris paribus be expected to be more reluctant to sell losses, 
leading to longer holding of losses and lower base rate probability that a loss will be sold, 
and vice versa for gains. Please refer to appendix 1 for a more detailed mathematical 
explanation of how the disposition effect is derived. 
2.1.3.1 Risk aversion and loss aversion terminology 
There can sometimes be confusion about the terminology used to describe investors’ 
behaviour. The tendency to sell gains in the disposition effect is sometimes referred to as 
risk aversion: investors forego potential further gains to avoid the risk of losing the 
existing gain (selling decreases risk since the payoff is known with certainty). The 
tendency to hold losses in the disposition effect is sometimes referred to as loss 
aversion: the investor takes on the risk of further losses for a chance to avoid having to 
take a loss at all (i.e. if the price increases back to the reference price, there will be no 
loss). 
However, loss aversion can also describe another aspect of the value function, which is 
that losses give rise to greater absolute changes in expected utility than gains (Thaler, 
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1999). Most people refuse a bet of a 0.5 probability of a £110 gain and a 0.5 probability 
of a £100 loss, despite the expected value clearly being positive. However, the ‘loss 
aversion’ in the disposition effect is a different effect with a different cause. The cause of 
the risk (/ loss) aversion in the disposition effect is the greater expected utility of selling 
(/ holding) the stock compared to vice versa. Using loss aversion to describe this 
behaviour in the loss domain conflates two concepts: the behaviour produced by the 
decision maker comparing expected utility of small prices changes from an existing 
position, and the absolute greater weighting of losses compared to gains. 
Instead, these might be better referred to as gain-framed risk aversion and loss-framed 
risk propensity, or simply risk aversion and risk propensity. These are variations in an 
investors’ risk appetite that are dependent on the value function, in conjunction with the 
framing of a stock’s position. Risk aversion and risk propensity are both caused by 
greater changes in expected utility being generated by movements back to the 
reference price than away from it, whether the original displacement away from the 
reference price was negative or positive. 
For gains, movement back to the reference price creates greater negative utility than the 
positive utility of movement away from the reference price, so the motivation is to 
prevent this by selling the gain. This decreases risk because the outcome of selling is 
certain. For losses, movement back to the reference price creates greater positive utility 
than the negative utility of movement from it, so the motivation of the decision maker is 
to encourage this by holding the loss. This increases risk because the certain outcome 
from selling is rejected. However, in neither case is the object to increase or decrease 
risk per se: the disposition effect as explained by prospect theory is driven by which 
option has the greatest expected utility. The effect on risk exposure is a consequence, 
not a cause, of this. 
Loss aversion is better reserved to describe the greater expected utility of losses versus 
gains which have equal objective value. This type of loss aversion is not a part of the 
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standard explanation of the disposition effect by prospect theory which is set out above. 
Please refer to appendix 2 for a more detailed mathematical explanation of this 
distinction.  
2.1.4 The disposition effect as a stable trading behaviour 
The sections above have introduced the disposition effect. They have explained its 
significance, ‘rational’ explanations for the effect which have been refuted by previous 
research, and detailed the most common contemporary explanation based on prospect 
theory. Section 2.1.5 continues this by looking at the prospect theory account in more 
detail and section 2.1.6 discusses some of its weaknesses. However, now that enough 
background knowledge of the disposition effect has been covered, this section is an 
appropriate point to discuss the psychological nature of the disposition effect. 
An interesting research question in behavioural economics is whether biases can be 
viewed as trait-like phenomena, rather than state phenomena, and this question can be 
applied to the disposition effect too. Is the disposition effect a stable behaviour which 
varies between individual investors? Put another way, does it make sense to refer to an 
individual as having a ‘high disposition effect’ or ‘low disposition effect’: if someone is 
found to express a high level of disposition effect in one context, are they likely to 
express a high level in a different context? 
The account of the disposition effect given above suggests that it could be a stable 
behaviour. Prospect theory is a model of decision-making which can be applied to any 
context, and it explains the disposition effect being driven by a difference in how gains 
and losses are treated. Therefore, it should apply to any context where selling decisions 
are made about gains and losses. The difference between selling gains and losses is 
explained by the shape of the value function, which is modelled by only two parameters 
- α and ß (refer to appendix 1 for more discussion of these). If these parameters vary 
between individuals but are stable within individuals, we would expect to see the 
disposition effect emerge as a stable behaviour across time and contexts. 
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Although most studies on the disposition effect involve stocks in financial markets, as 
discussed above, a few have shown its presence in other decisions. Heath et al. (1999) 
show it applies to stock options (admittedly not massively different from the trading of 
actual stocks). More persuasive is Genesove and Mayer’s (2001) demonstration that 
people display the disposition effect when selling their house. Also, as discussed, the 
position of holding a loss is very like a sunk cost, where a loss already incurred should 
be disregarded as irrelevant to the decision being made. So, these examples suggest 
that the disposition effect could be stable feature of an individual’s decision making, 
which is merely most recognisable in trading stocks. 
There is very extensive field research supporting the disposition effect in a wide range of 
financial markets and market participants. However, the nature of most of these studies 
is that they look at the behaviour of investors in only one market. This does not establish 
that the same investors would display a similar level of disposition effect in different 
situation. Meanwhile, Dhar and Zhu (2006) find significant variation in the disposition 
effect expressed in their population of investors. This is important for claiming the 
disposition effect to have a trait-like character; however, they do not establish that this 
variation is stable across contexts. 
Some field studies though, do raise the possibility that the disposition effect is stable 
feature of decision making in other ways. For example, Seru et al. (2010) show that over 
a 9-year period, the disposition effect of individual investors who are still actively trading 
declines. Prima facie this seems to be evidence that investors learn to avoid the 
disposition effect through their trading experience. However, the contribution of this type 
of learning to the decline is low. Most of the decline in disposition effect is in fact due to 
low ability (i.e. high disposition effect) investors ceasing to trade, which leaves 
predominantly investors with low disposition effects remaining in the population. They 
conclude that most of the ‘learning’ which takes place involves investors learning about 
their own trading ability. The implications for this thesis are that it provides evidence for 
stability of the disposition effect in investors over time, despite extensive opportunities 
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for investors to reduce their disposition effect through trading. This comes with the 
caveats that the disposition effect is only measured with one method and with one 
sample, so state (as opposed to trait) influences on the disposition effect could also 
persist over time. 
Other field studies suggest a stable disposition effect by making a link to other 
demographic or psychological variables which are already known to be stable. If the 
disposition effect is reliably correlated with some other stable variable, it suggests the 
disposition effect itself is stable. For example, Kadous et al. (2014) show that the 
disposition effect is correlated with two separate types of self-esteem. In addition, 
Richards (2012) shows that the disposition effect is correlated with cognitive style, as 
measured by the rational-experiential inventory (Norris and Epstein, 2009). 
Experimental work has also found associations between demographic and psychological 
variables. The locus of control is a stable psychological variable which relates to how 
much control an individual believes they have on external events. Chiu (2001) finds that 
an external locus partly explains the disposition effect observed in their experiment.  
Note that this thesis is not attempting to show that the disposition effect is a 
psychological trait. Kassin (2003) defines traits as ‘habitual patterns of behaviour, 
thought, and emotion’, which does imply that the disposition effect would qualify. 
However, in practice, the category of trait is reserved for more fundamental aspects of 
our psychological makeup. For example, Costa and McCrae (1992) use only 5 traits to 
define their Big Five model of human personality. Set against this, a difference between 
how gains and losses are sold in trading is not basic aspect of human psychology. 
However, what is explored is whether the disposition effect does display some qualities 
that traits have, namely: is it stable within individuals while varying between individuals, 
and is it is stable across different situation and contexts. These are referred to as ‘trait-
like characteristics’. If it does have these qualities, future research can investigate why: 
is it possible that more fundamental psychological variables which are traits underpin the 
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stable behaviour seen the disposition effect. However, even without this, answering the 
question of whether the disposition effect has trait-like characteristic will improve our 
understanding of how the disposition effect affects investors’ trading behaviour. 
2.1.5 Underlying mechanisms of the prospect theory account 
Section 2.1.3 presented an explanation of the disposition effect derived from prospect 
theory. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, and in many subsequent papers) 
holds that rather than evaluate the expected monetary value of payoffs when making 
decisions, payoffs are converted into expected utility. This utility represents the 
subjective value of a payoff to the decision-maker. In addition, in prospect theory the 
conversion of expected value into expected utility is done in two stages. Firstly, a payoff 
is converted to a relative value by comparison with a reference point, and secondly, that 
relative value is transformed into utility using the value function. The value function 
shows diminishing sensitivity to movements away from the reference point for both 
gains and losses. In other words, the further a payoff is from the reference point, the 
smaller the subjective effect (i.e. utility) of further marginal changes in the monetary 
value of a payoff. 
An explanation of the disposition effect based on prospect theory was first proposed by 
Shefrin and Statman (1985), and is commonly cited by other researchers studying the 
disposition effect. For example, Weber and Camerer (1998) begin their paper by 
demonstrating how the disposition effect could be produced using figures of the value 
function, and showing how payoffs from trading decisions would be evaluated with it. 
(This is similar to figure 2.1 in section 2.1.3). The effect of the value function 
transforming payoffs for gains and losses into expected utility is that, when future 
positive or negative movements are equally likely, the expected utility of selling a gain 
will be greater than holding a gain, and the expected utility of holding a loss will be 
greater than selling a loss. This combination results in a preference for selling gains and 
holding losses: in other words, it results in a disposition effect. 
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However, the account of the disposition effect from prospect theory is based on several 
underlying mechanisms, which will be discussed in further detail now. I also discuss 
experiments which disrupt these underlying mechanisms, so which are in turn expected 
to also disrupt the disposition effect. 
2.1.5.1 Calculation of expected utility 
A consequence of the difference between expected value and expected utility is that 
expected value treats all future price movements of equal size and equal likelihood as 
equally valuable, whereas the expected utility of a price movement depends on its 
relationship to the reference point. For example, as explained above, when an investor 
considers selling a gain, future further gains have less expected utility than future price 
falls, even if they are of equal size.  
Although the value function transforms expected value into expected utility, decisions 
should still be sensitive to the likelihood and magnitude of future price movements. For 
example, in a gain position the magnitude and / or likelihood of a further gain would 
have to be somewhat greater than for a future loss to overcome the built-in bias in 
favour of selling gains. However, basing decisions on expected utility does not mean that 
the magnitude and likelihood of future price movements is ignored. (For a loss position, 
the likelihood and / or magnitude of a further loss would have to be greater than for a 
future gain, to overcome the built-in bias to hold losses). 
Supporting this, Lee et al. (2008) found that negative expectations of future stock 
performance led to a greater probability of selling a loss. They manipulated participants’ 
expectations of the future performance of a stock by using recent trend information and 
‘expert recommendations’. When ‘experts’ thought a loss would fall further in price, 
participants were more likely to sell the loss, as predicted by expected utility 
calculations. In addition, participants’ beliefs about future performance mediated this 
effect. However, this still did not eliminate the disposition effect. So, this shows that 
decisions are sensitive to the changing likelihood of gains and losses, like calculations of 
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expected utility would be. However, beliefs about future performance cannot explain the 
disposition effect, since it still occurs when these beliefs change.  
However, Lee et al. (2008) found that several experimental interventions did eliminate 
the disposition effect. One experimental group was given an expected value exercise 
before playing the investment game. This required participants to calculate the expected 
monetary return of various gambles, i.e. considering value (as in money) rather than 
utility, bypassing the putative value function and its transformation of value into utility. 
The disposition effect was eliminated in the experimental group as predicted, and this 
elimination was independent of stock trend and forecast of future performance. 
Manipulation checks implied a straightening of the hypothesised value function, so 
participants were making judgements corresponding more closely to choosing maximum 
expected value, rather than maximum expected utility. This suggests that it is the value 
function’s transformation of expected value into expected utility that drives the 
disposition effect, which is consistent with the prospect theory explanation. 
2.1.5.2 Mental accounting 
The prospect theory explanation rests on the differential treatment of gains and losses, 
and mental accounting is necessary for the perception of gains and losses. This implies 
that mental accounting is necessary for the disposition effect to occur. Mental accounting 
in the disposition effect depends on using the purchase price as the reference price, and 
the non-aggregation of a stock position with other stock positions in an investment 
portfolio (and non-aggregation with an investor’s net worth). 
Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) found that instructing participants to treat decisions as one 
of a series of trades that a professional trader may take, rather than treating them 
individually, significantly decreased loss aversion. This experimental manipulation may 
have had its effect by disrupting the non-aggregation requirement of mental accounting. 
While the dependent measure was loss aversion rather than loss-framed risk appetite 
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(i.e. holding losses), this also relies on mental accounting for framing to ‘create’ the 
losses that loss aversion is directed towards. 
Kaustia (2010) found there is an abrupt jump in the likelihood of a stock being sold just 
at the point the stock breaks-even or becomes a small gain. This jump may appear to be 
consistent with the prospect theory account of the disposition effect, since it predicts an 
asymmetry in how gains and losses are treated. However, invoking the value function is 
not the simplest explanation. Mental accounting and qualitative differences in reactions 
to gains and losses could account for Kaustia’s result without invoking the value 
function. For example, if people are more averse to selling at a loss, and sell at break-
even or a small gain once they are given the chance, the jump found by Kaustia could 
also be predicted. 
2.1.5.3 Reference price adaptation 
Disrupting the use of the reference price should eliminate the disposition effect. 
Adaptation describes the hypothetical movement of the reference price to take into 
account changes in the market price, either partly or fully. The prospect theory account 
above assumes that there is no adaptation so gain and losses are always calculated by 
referring to the purchase price. 
Adaptation should change the choices made by changing the expected utility of the 
options. However, the effects of partial adaptation (i.e. the reference price only moves 
part of the way to the current price) are more complicated than simply eliminating the 
disposition effect. Incomplete adaptation will preserve the position of a stock as a gain or 
loss, but will have the effect of shifting the curve of the value function towards the 
current price, effectively steepening whatever gradient the curve had before. As the 
difference in expected utility between holding and selling is greater the greater the 
gradient of the curve, this would result in an increased propensity to hold loses / sell 
gains, and an increase in the disposition effect. Thus, incomplete adaptation is predicted 
to increase the disposition effect, whereas complete adaptation should eliminate it. 
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Lee et al. (2010) find that adaptation to losses is correlated positively with 
agreeableness and intellect, and negatively with conscientiousness (there was no 
relationship between adaptation to gains and any personality traits). Their work suggests 
that propensity to adaptation, of losses at least, is a stable personality feature. 
Personality traits thus could have a relationship with the disposition effect, mediated by 
the extent of adaptation. The correlation between personality traits and adaptation to 
losses but not adaptation to gains also reinforces the idea that reactions to gains and 
losses are categorically different. Of course, a difference in how gains and losses are 
treated is part of the disposition effect by definition. 
2.1.5.4 The distinction between realised and unrealised positions 
The prospect theory explanation assumes that utility is not experienced by an investor 
until a stock position is closed. That is, unrealised losses and gains produce utility when 
they are realised, but until this point they are only considered as a source of expected 
utility in the future. Removing the distinction between realised and unrealised positions 
should negate the disposition effect. 
Barberis and Xiong (2009) developed a model showing that when there is no division 
between the utility gained from a realised loss and an unrealised one, prospect theory 
cannot account for the disposition effect except in some specific limited circumstances. 
The purpose of their paper was to establish whether the mental accounting assumption 
is necessary. Since it appears to be, future models need to include this premise and it 
needs to be verified experimentally. 
A reservation about their model is that they assume stocks must have high expected 
returns when they are bought. They state that, given the inflection point of the value 
function (which produces loss aversion), investors should not buy a stock if this is not 
the case since they are averse to 50/50 “fair” gambles. However, what is actually 
necessary is that investors believe there are high expected returns (this doesn’t have to 
be true, only that they believe it). Since investors have a large selection of stock to 
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choose from when buying, it seems possible that many or most stock purchases can be 
explained by random variation of subjective valuations away from the true value. Where 
investors overvalue a stock enough they will want to buy it. It is not clear if the results 
of their model would change by relaxing this assumption about high returns. 
2.1.6 Questioning the role of prospect theory 
The evidence above about the underlying mechanisms of a prospect theory account of 
the disposition effect are broadly supportive of this account. However, more recent work 
has undermined the prospect theory explanation by producing results that are 
inconsistent with it. In particular, they question the role of the value function in driving 
the effect by showing that selling decisions respond to a distinction between gains and 
losses, but do not respond to changes in their magnitude in the way prospect theory 
predicts. An alternative explanation proposed is that there is a qualitative difference in 
emotional reactions to gains and losses, which drives the disposition effect. 
Kaustia (2010) shows that the probability of closing a stock position rises rapidly around 
the breakeven point, where a loss changes to a gain. The probability of selling is very 
insensitive to how large the loss is: what matters is whether it is a loss or it is not a loss. 
Similar results were found for gains, which are insensitive to the size of a gain over a 
large range of profits. 
Prospect theory predicts a more gradual response as the position changes from a loss to 
a gain, which matches the S shaped curve of the value function. However, the conclusion 
drawn by Kaustia is that there is a sharp distinction between losses and gains, rather 
than a gradual one. The distinction between gains and losses does not appear to arise 
from the transformation of gains and losses by the value function, but from a qualitative 
difference between gains and losses. 
Lehenkari (2012), Summers and Duxbury (2012) and Lee et al. (2008) have also 
undermined an explanation based on prospect theory, by finding results that should not 
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occur if prospect theory can fully account for the disposition effect. Prospect theory 
implies that any potential gain or loss should be assessed in the same way, regardless of 
how an investor came to hold that position. However, Lehenkari found that investors 
who inherited positions had smaller disposition effects than those who had opened the 
positions themselves. A tentative conclusion is that responsibility for having a gain or 
loss position is necessary to induce a disposition effect. This is inconsistent with prospect 
theory: there is no psychological input in prospect theory which could represent why an 
investor is presented with the trading options they have, or in what context. 
Summers and Duxbury (2012) build on this work in an experimental study, and make a 
link to the involvement of emotions in trading decisions. They show that participants who 
are not responsible for holding a stock do not show a disposition effect when selling that 
stock. They conclude that simply having a gain or loss is not sufficient to produce the 
disposition effect, but that investors need to be feel responsible for holding that stock in 
the first place. Again, this is inconsistent with prospect theory, which should apply to all 
gains and losses regardless of context. 
Furthermore, Summers and Duxbury show that responsibility for trading decisions is 
associated with the experience of specific emotions, and conclude that these emotions 
are also necessary for the disposition effect to occur. Participants who were responsible 
for losses felt more regret than those who incurred losses but were not responsible for 
them. (Disappointment was also higher when incurring losses but did not vary with 
responsibility). For gains, experiencing elation was associated with more selling gains; 
however, the experience of elation was not linked to being responsible for a gain.   
Summers and Duxbury conclude that an increase in regret, in response to being 
responsible for a loss, is what drives the disposition effect. In addition, experiencing 
elation is necessary to drive the selling of gains. Their work echoes another explanation 
proposed by Shefrin and Statman (1985), that the disposition effect is associated with 
investors seeking pride from selling gains, and avoiding regret by not selling losses. 
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Summers and Duxbury extend this by linking the experience of regret to responsibility 
for the loss incurred. Building on the work of Summers and Duxbury, Rau (2015) finds 
that two-person teams exhibit a higher disposition effect than individuals and rarely sell 
losses. Specifically, teams reporting high levels of regret leads to this behaviour. 
In another experimental study which prospect theory cannot account for, Lee et al. 
(2008) found that instructing participants to use a form of emotion regulation to reduce 
the disposition effect.  Participants were asked to assume the role of a stock broker, 
making selling/holding decisions on behalf of customers. This almost completely 
removed the disposition effect compared with a control group. Prospect theory cannot 
account for this as trading for another person should make no difference to how 
prospects are evaluated when compared to the reference price. 
The type of emotion regulation used by Lee et al., cognitive reappraisal, is defined by 
Koole (2009) as ‘changing the subjective evaluations during emotionally significant 
events’. This often occurs by reframing a situation by changing its context. If emotions 
are involved in producing the disposition effect, improved emotion regulation by 
investors would be expected to reduce the effect, by controlling or reducing the influence 
of those emotions. So, this could explain the results of Lee et al: trading on behalf of 
someone else may reduce the emotions experienced in trading. Richards (2012) has also 
found tentative evidence that cognitive reappraisal affects the disposition effect by 
reducing holding losses. 
The results above suggest two things. First, prospect theory cannot account for these 
manipulations of the disposition effect and therefore it cannot produce a full account of 
how the effect is produced. Second, an account of the disposition effect is likely to 
include an explanation of how emotions during trading are involved, for example that a 
difference between the emotional response to gains and losses drives the difference in 
trading behaviour towards gains and losses. 
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2.1.7 Cutting gains and holding losses as stable trading behaviours 
and independent components of the disposition effect  
The possibility that the disposition effect is driven by different emotional responses to 
gains and losses allows further exploration of the nature of the disposition effect, raised 
earlier in section 2.1.4. 
The disposition effect has traditionally been viewed as one bias, identified by measuring 
a difference in the frequency that an investor sells gains compared with losses. Prospect 
theory predicts that it is a unitary bias, because the behaviour towards gains and losses 
are both driven by the curve of the value function. The more curved the value function, 
the higher disposition effect someone will express; however, the value function will be 
curved in both gain and loss domains, so both cutting gains and holding losses should 
increase. 
In contrast, recent research suggests that cutting gains and holding losses could be two 
independent biases with distinct causes, which in combination can produce a disposition 
effect. In other words, two investors could have a similar disposition effect overall, but 
the disposition effect in one investor could be due to greater cutting gains then average, 
while in another it could be due to greater holding losses than average. These two 
investors would appear to have the same disposition effect when only that was 
measured, but are found to have different patterns of trading behaviour when gains and 
losses are measured separately. 
Summers and Duxbury (2012) found that different emotions are associated with selling 
gains and losses respectively. If the causes of these biases are different, then the biases 
themselves should be different. Richards (2012) finds tentative evidence that reappraisal 
affects selling losses but not gains; again, this difference is not predicted in the account 
from prospect theory. Furthermore, Richards also finds that using stop losses reduces 
the disposition effect by reducing holding losses, but leaves cutting gains unaffected. 
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Rau (2014) finds that women have higher disposition effects. However, this difference is 
driven by greater holding of losses, and there is no difference in the treatment of gains. 
Weber and Welfens (2007) present significant evidence that the two sides of the effect, 
holding losses and closing gains, should be treated as two independent biases. They 
include one field and one experimental study. The field study includes trades of a 
population of investors from online broker, and they find wide variation in disposition 
effect in the population of investors, as per Dhar and Zhu (2006). However, in addition, 
they find that cutting gains and holding losses are not correlated (after controlling for 
portfolio size). They also show medium-size correlations when analysing cutting gains 
and holding losses when measured annually. 
Their experimental study consists of two tasks: one like Weber and Camerer (1998), and 
another using a simpler lottery task framed as timing a house sale. Participants repeated 
both tasks of the experiment again a month later. As with the field study, the correlation 
between cutting gains and holding losses was not significant. To measure stability of the 
biases, scores were compared across repeated rounds of the experiment, and in 
addition, when the experiment was repeated the following month. There were moderate 
but significant correlations for cutting gains, supporting its status as a stable bias, and 
the same was found for holding losses. 
All the studies above point to gains and losses being treating differently in a way which 
prospect theory cannot capture. They suggest that cutting gains and holding losses may 
be separate biases rather than two expressions of a unitary disposition effect. 
2.2 EMOTIONS, EMOTION REGULATION, AND DECISION MAKING 
The next section of this literature review evaluates the wider field of how emotions affect 
decision making, to assess whether similar effects have been found on other decision-
making biases. It also introduces emotion regulation and particularly cognitive 
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reappraisal, and examines research which alters decision making by using emotion 
regulation. 
2.2.1 The impact of emotions on decision making 
Emotions can affect our decision makings in many ways. This section begins by 
examining how emotions can affect decisions within the context of calculations of 
subjective utility, such as detailed in prospect theory. Emotions can substitute partly or 
entirely for objective calculations of value. Emotions may lead to quantity insensitive 
valuations, and to exacerbate the tendency to overvalue certainty in outcomes when 
making decisions. Surprisingly emotions can also alter the estimation of the likelihood of 
an outcome itself. Stepping back from the inputs into decision making calculations, 
emotion may act as a meta-factor in what kind of decision making process is carried out. 
The section continues by discussing physiological evidence that emotions are used as a 
heuristic in decision-making, and may be necessary for normal levels of performance. It 
is not clear though whether the physiological arousal produced is the causal mechanism 
for this, or an artefact used for proxy measurement of emotion by researchers. In 
addition, it seems likely that using emotion in this way is a rather blunt tool for decision 
making: for example, emotions can signal the presence of high risk but not to weigh 
whether the risk is worth taking. 
The section ends by examining findings from neuroscience. Using several experimental 
setups such as the ultimatum game, hyperbolic discounting and moral dilemmas, studies 
have shown that when emotion is driving decisions, different areas of the brain are 
active compared to when deliberative decision are made: roughly, the limbic brain and 
insula for emotions, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex for deliberation. This gives 
credence to the distinction between system 1 and system 2 drawn in the literature to 
define different types of decision making. In addition, the anterior cingulate cortex 
appears to play a role in mediating conflict between the two systems. 
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2.2.1.1 Emotion as a direct input in decision-making 
Schwarz (1990) sets out his “How-Do-I-Feel-About-It” heuristic for decision making. To 
value an outcome, we simply reflect our feelings towards it, also known as affective 
valence, rather perform some kind of rational analysis to arrive at an objective valuation. 
The latter would require us to have at least one criterion for its value, and assess how 
well that criterion is met, so using affective valance as an estimate for its value is much 
quicker. 
There is a well-known theoretical distinction between two means of decision making, 
named system 1 and system 2 (Sloman, 2002). System 1 is characterized as rapid, 
automatic, and often unconscious, in contrast to system 2 which is deliberative, 
objective and rational. Schwarz’s model would seem to fit into system 1: by using 
“feelings as information” as he puts it, it is possible to make decisions much more 
quickly than a deliberate valuation process. However, this is at the cost of increased 
likelihood of a wrong decision, since feelings may not accurately reflect the objective 
value a decision maker should attribute to an outcome. 
We can put this into wider context of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979), a 
theory of normative decision making where the subjective utility of each option with i 
possible outcomes is assessed as: 
Σ w(pi)v(i) 
where (pi) is the probability a specific outcome will occur, v is its value to the decision 
maker (the value function), and w is the decision maker’s reaction to the probability (the 
weighting function). 
Prospect theory itself does not prescribe any method of assessing value. In Schwarz’s 
heuristic, instead of deliberating over the factors that contribute to an outcome’s value, 
the decision maker simply reflects on their emotional reaction to it and takes that as the 
value to be used in the subsequent decision making process (Finucane et al. 2000). 
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A problem with this approach is where an emotion being felt at the time has been 
generated from a source other than the target of the current decision, and should be 
disregarded as irrelevant. For example, when people are in a positive mood, they can 
misinterpret this as being indicative of an emotionally favourable response towards the 
target, and vice versa with negative moods. Han et al. (2007) present ATF (appraisal-
tendency framework), which predicts how and why this process of emotions ‘carrying 
over’ will occur to affect future decisions. They focus on applying this to judgements of 
risk and monetary value, both of which are very relevant to trading in financial markets. 
There is evidence that people are sometimes aware of the distracting role emotion can 
play. Kelley (1973) showed that when attention is drawn to the experimental elicitation 
of an affective state, participants disregarded its importance in their decisions. Thus, the 
effect of emotion on decision making is a function of its perceived informational value: 
people can adjust for emotions when those emotions are consciously identified as not 
indicative of their valuation of an outcome. Unfortunately, background emotions are not 
always explicitly identified as such. 
Another problem is that our emotional reactions to an outcome may not be a good 
estimate of the objective value which that outcome has. In other words, the correlation 
between emotional and objective valuation is often moderate, leading to over-or under-
valuation and subsequent erroneous decisions. 
Emotion can also have more subtle effects on valuation. Instead of an emotional reaction 
substituting entirely for the value function, it can moderate the effect that other relevant 
factors in valuation should have. Kahneman, et al. 1999, found that emotion-laden 
outcomes can lead to quantity insensitive decisions, where people largely respond to the 
affective valence of the mental image elicited. Similarly, the prospect of losing hedonic 
goods (those with high affective valence) can lead to greater loss aversion (Dhar and 
Wertenbroch 2000). They explain this as a result of higher value being placed on those 
goods because something like Schwarz’s heuristics is being carried out to assess the 
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value of the prospective loss: we “feel” the loss of high affective goods more than low 
ones. Of course, this makes no rational sense. 
2.2.1.2 Emotion as a moderating factor in decision-making 
A well-known implication of prospect theory that people and overvalue certainty in their 
estimates of utility (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), such that w is more than 1 where p 
is close to zero, and less than 1 where p is close to 1. Rationally there should be no 
weighting at all. Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) found that these effects are exacerbated 
for affect-rich outcomes, suggesting that the emotional pull of an outcome also impacts 
on the w term in the subjective utility calculation, as well as on v. 
In addition, emotion appears to affect not just the reaction to probabilities (w), but the 
perception of probabilities themselves (pi). Affect-congruent events are judged as more 
likely (Kahneman and Tversky 1983) and incongruent ones less likely (Mayer, Gaschke 
et al. 1992), even if the affect is elicited by non-task manipulations (and so is an 
irrelevant factor). There is also a strong negative correlation between the risk attached 
to a target and the value attached to it (Ganzach 2000), whereas no relationship would 
be predicted a priori; this is hypothesised to be caused by the emotional response to 
risky outcomes. 
2.2.1.3 How emotions are manifested physiologically to affect decisions 
Bechara et al. (1994) (also detailed in Damasio (1994)) claimed to have found 
physiological evidence for using emotions as a heuristic. Their seminal study associated 
damage in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area involved in emotion processing, 
with poor performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The evidence for the role of 
emotion, or lack of it, was the simultaneous failure to produce physiological arousal 
(measured by skin conductance response - SCR) when contemplating risky and 
ultimately ruinous choices. The claim is that this physiological arousal is the physical 
manifestation of emotional arousal in response to future outcomes: emotions function 
subconsciously to signal tacit knowledge about the choices not available to 
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consciousness, by representing this on a psychologically available one-dimensional scale 
(i.e. positive to negative). The one-dimensional scale allows decisions to be made by 
comparing different options easily. In a similar study, Werner et al. (2009) demonstrated 
that the ability to perceive viscero-sensory feedback is associated with making better 
decisions. 
2.2.1.4 Using emotions as a more successful means of decision making than 
rational analysis 
Returning to Bechara et al., a third issue is that the conflation of risky decisions with 
unfavourable ones. The emotional response is not signalling some nuanced and 
subconscious weighing up of the benefits and risks of picking certain packs, to make the 
objectively best decision, but simply a reaction to risky potential outcomes. The effect 
produced is not optimal decision making from reading the signals produced by 
subconscious information processing, but simply risk aversion. Since the experimental 
setup correlates risk avoidance with better performance it appears as if using emotions 
as rules of thumb could be a better strategy in general. Emotion signalling risky options 
is a much more basic cognitive mechanism than emotions signalling the optimal 
gambling strategy in a complex task. 
The same group of researchers used a different experimental setup to test how subjects 
behave when the optimal strategy and risk aversion conflict with each other. They found 
that that reliance on emotions in this case leads to poorer decision making. (Shiv et al., 
2005). Subjects with brain damage in several areas related to emotion (the orbitofrontal 
cortex, the insula, and the amygdale) risked significantly more in an investing task than 
normal subjects who had lost money on the previous gambling round. The key difference 
was that $1 was invested each round with a 50% chance of winning $2.50, thus a 
rational investor should gamble every time regardless of previous results. However, only 
40% of normal subjects, held back by acquired negative emotional responses, invested 
immediately after losing money; this compares with 80-95% for subjects with the 
various types of brain damage.  
45 
 
Interestingly, subjects who had gained in the previous round also only invested around 
60% of the time, compared to 80%-95% for the brain-damaged subjects, even though it 
is clear that further gambling would on average lead to further gains. This avoidance of 
risky decisions once wealth has increased accords with the risk aversion effect detailed 
by prospect theory Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Whatever the reasons, a connection 
between emotion area damage and persistent gambling is intriguing. Those who make 
financial decisions chronically such as investors and traders want their decision to be 
unaffected by their previous gambles, and it seems emotions may somehow be an 
obstacle to that goal. 
Prospect theory also predicts that given previous losses, people will gamble to make up 
those losses (i.e. become loss averse), not gamble less as found by Shiv et al. However, 
in prospect theory decisions are determined by whether decision makers are at an 
overall gain or loss, rather than the outcome of the previous round. Thus, future 
research could analyse the choices in terms of whether a subject had gained or lost 
money overall when they made a decision about investing, instead of only what the 
outcome of the previous round was. It is unclear from Shiv et al. what the results would 
be if analysis were carried out this way. 
This study supports the interpretation of Bechara et al. that emotions were signalling 
risky strategies, not optimal strategies. People who lost money may have stopped 
gambling, despite the clear rational motivation to continue, because of the negative 
viscero-somatory feedback they received when contemplating gambling which was 
produced due to their previous loses, overriding the long-term benefit of playing. It also 
supports the broader point that emotion mechanisms in the brain can influence decisions 
about risk. However, note that the task used in Shiv et al. is not logically equivalent to 
that in Bechara et al., since in the latter subjects were dealing with uncertainty (they did 
not know what the packs contained) whereas in the former subjects only dealt with risk 
(they knew the probabilities of the potential outcomes). 
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2.2.1.5 The neuroscience of emotional decision making 
Brain imaging has allowed us to see which parts of the brain are active when we make 
“emotional” decisions, and contrast this with rational thinking; to phrase it another way, 
is there any neurophysiological basis to the system 1 and system 2 distinction? Several 
areas of decision making have been reviewed by McClure et al. (2007) where emotional 
and rational decision making come into conflict. 
It appears that emotional responding leads to a different decision than rational 
deliberation. Sanfey et al. (2003) found significantly higher activity in the insula of the 
responder when the ultimatum game offer was rejected. At the same time, dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (dLPFC) activity was higher when playing the game but activity was not 
dependent on offer rejection. The insula was also associated with anger by Phillips et al. 
(1997). It suggests that activation in the insula is associated with higher levels of anger, 
and the higher levels of anger “override” the rational deliberations about decision 
making. 
Sanfey et al. also found a correlation between activity in the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) and the acceptance of unfair offers. They suggest this area is needed to override 
the strong behavioural impulses which anger gives rise to. 
Hyperbolic discounting occurs when people ascribe more value to outcomes closer in 
time to the present; more formally, there is an inverse relation between the value of an 
outcome and an exponential function of the period between the decision and the 
outcome. McClure et al. (2004) found the greater limbic and paralimbic areas (involved 
in emotion and reward systems in the brain) showed greater activation for choices 
involving immediate rewards. The hypothesis produced is that when an outcome (e.g. a 
reward) can be taken very soon in the future, emotional responding is activated more 
than usual. Then just as when playing the ultimatum game, the emotional response can 
lead us to overlook rational assessment of an outcome’s value. 
47 
 
Again, reminiscent of the ultimatum game findings, the dLPFC and ACC showed greater 
activity during difficult choices, and activity levels in those areas correlated significantly 
with choosing a delayed reward. This suggests that they are necessary to resist the pull 
of the emotion-rich, immediate reward option. 
The studies point to a separation in the brain of deliberative and emotional motivations 
behind behaviour. The relative levels of activation in the dLPFC, dACC, insula and limbic 
system often correlate closely with what decision is made. It is possible that the 
distinction between system 1 and system 2 is not just theoretical, but has some basis in 
the neurocognitive implementation of these types of decision making, at least when 
system 1 is characterised by using an emotional response as the basis for making 
decisions. System 1 here is driven by emotion-related activation in the insula and limbic 
system. 
This hypothesis is supported by comparative phylogeny. The human cortex has 
expanded greatly during our evolution and is much larger than would be expected: even 
compared to other primates our brain is approximately three times as large as would be 
expected from body size (Schoenemann et al. 2005). The prefrontal cortex, particularly 
implicated in system 2, is even more disproportionate. Other animals appear to have 
automatic reactions and emotions to stimuli, but they lack (to various degrees) the 
ability to reason about novel problems and override their natural reactions. Thus, the 
major innovation in human cognitive ability would be to counteract the automatic 
response produced by system 1 and consider the output of system 2 as an alternative. 
It is known that other factors can influence the strength of the effect of emotion on 
decision making. For example, increasing time restraints causes individual to seek 
cognitive shortcuts (Siemer and Reisenzein 1998), such as using emotions as a method 
of valuation (as described in Schwarz’s heuristic above). Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) 
found increasing cognitive demands has the same effect: high memory load caused an 
increase in the likelihood of choosing chocolate cake over fruit salad. It is reasonable to 
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hypothesise that memory load is not changing the emotional response to the cake, but 
interfering with the ability to counteract the emotional response. If so, we would expect 
to see high memory load time restraints decrease activity in the dACC where this conflict 
mediation takes place. 
2.2.2 What is emotion regulation? 
Given the pervasive effect which emotions can have on our decisions when experienced, 
it would be highly desirable to be able to control them or mitigate their effects. This is 
known as emotion regulation. Individuals use a variety of techniques to regulate their 
emotions. This section defines emotion regulation, and identifies the form of emotion 
regulation used in this thesis. 
Koole’s review of the area (2009) has the aim of developing a classification scheme for 
the many types of emotion regulation which exist. His taxonomy of emotion regulation 
sorts strategies into a 3 x 3 matrix using the emotion-generating system targeted, and 
the function of the regulation, as criteria.  
Koole defines emotion regulation as “the set of processes whereby people seek to 
redirect the spontaneous flow of their emotions”. Thus, this definition encompasses only 
how a person can leave an emotional state already existing, and excludes emotional 
sensitivity which relates to how a person may affect their entry into an emotional state. 
His definition coincides with the layman concept of how people “deal with” their emotions 
once they have already arisen. Also note that his definition excludes the regulation of 
one person’s emotions by another person, for instance a parent trying to regulate their 
child’s emotions; these instances would be intuitively excluded too. For the purposes of 
this paper emotion regulation will refer only to how a person regulates their own 
emotions. 
Koole notes that emotion regulation strategies vary by the emotion-generating system 
they target. This targeting includes: redirecting our attention (Rothermund, Voss et al. 
2008), changing emotion-relevant knowledge (Gross 1998), and changing the 
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physiological consequences of emotion (Porges 2007). Strategies can also vary by the 
function of the regulation, and he notes three functions: hedonic needs, specific goals, 
and facilitating the global personality system. Combining these two criteria gives a 3 x 3 
matrix for the categorisation of emotion regulation strategies (shown in figure 2.2 below 
with an example for each element). Note that Koole does not preclude the existence of 
other targets of emotion regulation and other functions, but merely notes that his 
schema covers most of the common ones that have been researched. I discuss his 
categories briefly below. 
Figure 2.2 Emotion-regulation strategies (from Koole, 2009) 
 
2.2.2.1.1 Emotion-generating systems 
The first emotion-generating system which can be targeted is attention, the process by 
which incoming information is selected for further processing This has been widely 
studied in cognitive psychology in areas other than emotion regulation, and is now 
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featuring within it too (Derakshan et al. 2007). The emotion regulation takes place by 
withdrawing attention from information causing an undesired emotional response; the 
lack of further processing from the reduced attention lessens or removes its influence on 
the emotional state experienced. 
The second is changing emotion-relevant knowledge. Several methods can be used to 
achieve this; however, the one most frequently studied is cognitive reappraisal. A 
cognitive appraisal is where information received is used to deduce knowledge (i.e. 
opinions) about the world, and these appraisals may lead to an undesirable emotional 
response being elicited. Emotion regulation proceeds by reappraising the available 
information, to change its significance or meaning, such that the new appraisal no longer 
gives rise to the unwanted emotion. 
The last system targeted is the embodiment of emotions such as: facial expressions, 
bodily positions, motor movements and psycho-physiological responses (Mauss and 
Robinson 2009). There may be some scepticism that the body is an emotion generating 
system rather than only the expression of emotions. However, Esch et al. (2003) have 
provided evidence of the “reversed” causal route by showing that techniques such as 
progressive muscle relaxation can be effective in altering emotions; other studies by 
Niederthal (2007), Zajonc (1998) and others have also demonstrated similar evidence. 
In addition, bodily intervention may the method by which another emotion-generation 
system is targeted, for example eating enjoyable food can distract our attention from an 
undesirable emotion, or from emotion-relevant knowledge causing an undesirable 
emotion. 
2.2.2.1.2 Functions of emotion regulation 
The most intuitive of Koole’s three functions of emotion regulation is hedonic regulation: 
the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. The second function is goal-
orientated regulation: when the emotion is regulated a means to some other end. Tamir 
et al. (2007) argue fear may be encouraged to promote avoidance of a stimulus. 
Alternatively, we may feel that some situations require an unemotional approach, in 
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which case all emotions may be down-regulated (Erber, Wegner et al. 1996). An 
important example of goal-orientated regulation in the literature is expressive 
suppression, for example someone dealing with a customer may attempt to suppress 
any signs of their anger to avoid revealing it to the customer (e.g. Wallace et al., 2009) 
Koole’s final type of function is “person-orientated” regulation. Here emotion regulation 
is employed to “promote flexibility in personality functioning” (Rothermund, Voss et al. 
2008) and to “promote coherence and long-term stability within the overall personality 
system (Baumann, Kaschel et al. 2005). Koole notes that compared with hedonic and 
goal-oriented regulation, person-oriented regulation is holistic in its focus, sensitive to 
context, and integrative of potentially antagonistic aspects of the personality system. 
This is the least intuitive of his functions: what would it mean if the overall personality 
system was unstable in the long-term, or if personality functioning was inflexible? Figure 
2.2 above shows some examples such as meditation, mindfulness training, and 
controlled breathing. A layman’s term for the concept might be the promotion of mental 
wellbeing and the absence of neuroticism (indeed neuroticism is associated emotional 
reactivity and low emotional intelligence).  
2.2.2.2 The impact of emotion regulation on decision making 
There are two main ways that emotion regulation could affect decision making. The first 
is by mitigating or removing the effects that emotions have on decision making. Using 
emotion regulation to change or remove emotions will thus indirectly change the 
decisions those emotions would have affected. A second way is by the process of 
emotion regulation itself competing with decision making for cognitive resources. The 
brain has limited processing capacity and performing emotion regulation takes up some 
of that capacity, leading to a fall in performance for simultaneous cognitive activities. 
While there are many methods of emotion regulation, most research has studied the 
effects of either reappraisal or expressive suppression, often by comparing the two, so 
they will also be the focus of this section. 
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Heilman et al. (2010) compared the effects of reappraisal and suppression on risk-taking 
and dealing with uncertainty. Their first study involved experimentally induced fear and 
disgust, and instructions for participants to reappraise, suppress, or do neither. 
Reappraisal, but not suppression, led to reduced levels of fear and disgust; suppression 
had no significant effect on either dependent measure with either fear or disgust, 
whereas reappraisal increased risk-taking and dealing with uncertainty for both 
emotions. This result was expected as fear had previously been shown to increase risk 
aversion (Lerner and Keltner 2001), while suppression has been poor at reducing how 
strongly an emotion is experienced. Behavioural suppression appears to stop the 
outward of expression of an emotion, but leaves the phenomenological experience and 
presumably its effect on decision making intact. 
Their second study involved incidental emotion regulation (measured retrospectively) in 
response to naturally occurring positive and negative emotions (subjects were recruited 
and tested immediately after receiving exam results). As predicted, negative emotions 
reduced risk-taking while positive emotions increased it. Reappraisal (but not 
suppression) caused an increase in risk-taking with negative emotions, while both 
suppression and reappraisal were effective in negating the increase in risk-taking 
produced by positive emotions. The studies taken together support the view that 
emotion regulation can affect decision making by changing the emotions experienced; 
for negative emotions, reappraisal but not suppression is effective, while both are 
effective for positive emotions. 
Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) found that reappraisal was effective in reducing loss 
aversion. Prima facie, this does not involve emotions, as the instruction was to 
reappraise gains and losses by changing one’s perspective to mimic a professional 
trader. However, loss aversion is hypothesised it is caused by negative emotional 
reactions to the prospect of a loss crystallising when closing a trade, which encourages 
unwarranted risks to avoid it. To test this hypothesis, Sokol-Hessner et al. carried out a 
second study which replicated the first, but also measured subjects’ skin conductance 
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response (SCR) to their gains or losses as they played the game. The relative effect of 
reappraisal on loss aversion was similar to the first study; however, they also found that 
losses were more arousing (as measured by SCR) than gains, and the difference 
between an individual’s arousal to loss versus gains correlated with their degree of loss 
aversion (about r = 0.4 for both perspectives taken). 
In both studies, there were between-subjects differences in the extent of reduction in 
loss aversion when using reappraisal. When split into two groups based on whether 
subjects showed a significant decrease in loss aversion when reappraising, only the 
group that did so showed a significant decrease in the difference between SCRs to losses 
and gains when using reappraisal. This result suggests that loss aversion is not a 
cognitive error in judgement as some have argued, but a consequence of using 
automatic reactions to losses (versus gains) to make decisions.  
However, since this study is only correlational, there remain questions about the etiology 
of these differences in arousal. It could be that losses cause emotions, emotions cause 
higher arousal, and subjects use their arousal level as a cue to make decisions, as also 
suggested with heart rate by Werner et al. (2009). Alternatively, emotions cause the loss 
aversive behaviour somehow while simultaneously producing higher arousal, which the 
experimenters have effectively used as a proxy for measuring the emotion, thus arousal 
would have no causal role on decisions. Additionally, since emotions were not specifically 
measured here, the arousal may be produced in the absence of any emotion and used as 
a cue for decision-making. This is the same issue found in Bechara et al. discussed 
above, which also used SCR. SCR was taken a measure of emotion without emotion 
being directly measured. The work was then used to justify emotions as being an 
integral part of decision making, though only SCR had been shown to be associated with 
decision making experimentally. 
The study by Shiv et al. (2005) (discussed in part 1) provided further evidence that 
effective emotion regulation could increase performance where emotions have a negative 
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effect. On a task where risk-taking was beneficial in the long-term, subjects performed 
better if they had normal cognitive reasoning skills but brain damage in areas connected 
with emotion (orbitofrontal cortex, insula or amygdale). Normal subjects decreased 
gambling in response to both losing and winning money. The exact role of emotion in 
affecting the decision is again unclear. However, the study suggests that if emotions 
could be nullified using emotion regulation, functionally analogously to the neurological 
damage in emotion-related areas, performance could be improved when emotions are 
detrimental to decision making. It also, of course, has the advantage that emotions can 
be allowed to return and affect decisions in more propitious circumstances. 
2.2.2.2.1 Emotion regulation competing for cognitive resources with decision making 
Emotion regulation requires cognitive effort itself, so increases cognitive load. Wallace et 
al. (2009) found that performing emotion regulation altered performance on another 
simultaneous cognitive task that did not involve emotion regulation for its performance, 
and this effect is caused by the effect of emotion regulation on task focus. Suppression 
correlated negatively with performance, but reappraisal correlated positively. Both 
effects were statistically mediated (Shrout and Bolger 2002) by their task focus during 
the task, as previous work had suggested (Kanfer et al. 1994). When the indirect effect 
via task focus was removed, the correlations were no longer significant, confirming that 
the effect of emotion regulation was through its cognitive competition with task focus, 
rather than through emotional influence on performance as in the previous section. The 
sizes of these correlations were small (r = -0.23 for suppression and r = 0.19 for 
reappraisal); however, we would not expect a huge effect given the many sources of 
variation in subject’s task performance. 
These results were expected: the cognitive work required for reappraisal only needs to 
be done once for each piece of emotion-relevant knowledge, while suppression requires 
constant monitoring and suppression of expressive behaviour so will be continually 
competing for cognitive resources. Cognitive dissonance created during suppression (see 
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footnote 4) from the mismatch between internal feelings and outward behaviour could 
also interfere with task performance. 
With the success of the initial lab study, Wallace et al. carried field work in a retail 
environment and a call centre. Suppression reduced task performance in both (r = -0.31 
in both), whereas reappraisal had no effect in the former (though it did improve task 
focus, which itself improved task performance) and improved task performance in the 
latter (r = 0.28). Again, when the mediating effect of task focus was controlled for, 
neither strategy significantly predicted task performance. Effects sizes were larger in the 
call centre, a possible explanation being that call centre work involves more interaction 
with customers so will be more emotionally arousing; the greater amount of emotion 
gives more scope for emotion regulation to cause a significant difference between the 
groups. 
Future work could examine decision in real-time, while simultaneously measuring their 
emotional arousal, and relating this to their emotion regulation strategies. For instance, 
traders and investors have a cognitively very demanding profession, with high levels of 
working memory required, but which is also a very emotionally arousing environment 
too. Traders vary widely in the methods they use to deal with their emotions: given the 
emphasis within trading culture of being unemotional and detached, many resort to 
using techniques resembling suppression, such as trying to ignore one’s emotional state, 
or simply behavioural expression to appear unemotional to colleagues. The work of 
Wallace et al. implies will lead to lower task focus and thus lower performance. 
However, a problem is the conflation of the two ways emotion regulation may affect 
decision: altering emotions directly or competing for cognitive resources. Wallace et al. 
avoided this problem by using a task purportedly unaffected by emotional state. This is 
not always possible and conflation occurs in some of the most interesting areas to study 
such as trading. Decisions are also prone to emotional effects (indeed much of the work 
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showing as much has been carried out by behavioural economists), thus any emotion 
regulation would be expected to have strong effects via both routes described above. 
2.2.3 Conclusions about emotions, emotion regulation and decision 
making 
In contrast with conceptions of man as a rational utility maximiser (‘homo economicus’), 
emotions are known to affect decision making in a multitude of ways. Emotions can be 
used as a proxy for the value of a choice, they may bias the objective estimation of a 
choice’s value or probability of occurring, or they may act as a meta-factor in affecting 
the balance between automatic and deliberate cognition, often referred to as system 1 
and system 2. However, there is much potential for research in the effect of specific 
emotions on specific types decision making. The most basic division between emotions is 
between positive and negative emotions, e.g. happiness versus, fear or disgust, and 
most research has been carried out on this basis so far. However, it is likely that every 
type of emotion has specific effects on decision making. 
There is evidence that not only can emotions affect decision making but that in many 
cases emotions, or the viscero-somatory feedback taken to be a manifestation of them, 
appear to be essential for it to be proficiently carried out. Damasio (1994), Bechara et 
al. (1994), and others have shown that brain damage to areas involved in emotional 
responses to gambling impairs performance compared to normal subjects. In addition, 
this coincides with the production of high skin conductance responses (SCRs) to risky 
decisions. Indeed, performance improved in line with increased SCR even before normal 
subjects were consciously aware of the strategy they were following. Werner et al. 
(2009) also provided evidence that another type of viscero-somatory response, heart-
rate, can be used to improve decision-making. 
It could have been that viscero-somatory feedback is signalling the output of some 
extraordinary and subconscious ability to work out the best option, as modelled by a 
normative theory such as subjective utility theory. Instead however, these results 
appear to be the result of the feedback signalling risky or uncertain outcomes, where 
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their avoidance coincidentally improves performance in the tasks used by experimenters. 
Where risk-taking results in improved performance such as in Shiv et al. (2005), brain 
damage to emotion-related areas of the brain actually results in better performance than 
normal subjects. This is presumably caused by the lower levels of risk-averse emotional 
reactions in the brain damaged subjects, resulting in more risk-taking. Whether the 
viscero-somatory feedback is perceived directly to make decisions, or is simply a by-
product of emotion which is useful as a proxy measurement of emotion in experiments, 
is also unclear. 
Studies in neuroscience have found that choices eliciting emotions activate different 
areas of the brain to ones which involve only deliberative thought. Not only that, but the 
strength of the activation in the emotion areas is correlated with the probability that a 
subject will choose the “emotional” response over the rational one. This dissociation 
between brain areas responsible for deliberate and automatic (in this case emotional) 
responses to decision making is reminiscent of the models of decision making dividing it 
into the rapid, heuristic based system 1, and the slow, deliberative and rational system 
2. 
Emotion regulation may affect decision making by changing the emotion experienced, 
thus indirectly mitigating the effects the emotion targeted would have had on decision 
making were it not regulated. Little is known about the full range of effects of emotion 
regulation because most research has focussed on only two regulatory strategies: 
behavioural suppression and reappraisal. However, where the effect of an emotion on 
decision making is already known, differences in effects between these two strategies 
have been robustly demonstrated. Both in studies using verbal instructions to subjects to 
reappraise their emotions, suppress them or neither; and in studies measuring subjects 
on their natural tendency to suppress or reappraise. Both for lab-induced emotions, and 
those which occurred naturally and were retrospectively measured. 
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Emotion regulation affecting decision making indirectly through emotions is supported in 
the case of both reappraisal and suppression. However, for negative emotions 
suppression is an ineffective strategy, and does not alter decision making. This is 
unsurprising since despite Koole’s inclusion of body-targeting strategies, suppressing the 
outward expression of emotions, does seem prima facie an unpromising candidate for 
effective emotion regulation. By its nature it suppresses just one aspect of emotion 
expression, rather than dealing with the root cause of the emotion as reappraisal does. 
For positive emotions, both strategies appear effective in down regulating the emotion. 
Future research could look at the many other types of regulatory strategies which exist, 
their efficacy, and their effects on decision making, and the factors affecting both these 
features. 
Emotion regulation can also affect decision making by competing for the cognitive 
resources used to make decisions. Wallace et al. (2009) have found good evidence that 
this effect occurs: good decision making (measured by work performance) was affected 
negatively by suppression and positively by reappraisal, and in both cases the effect was 
mediated by the effect of emotions on task focus. Again, there is little research into the 
effect of other types of emotion regulation via task focus. There may also be other ways 
in which emotion regulation can influence decision making other than mitigation of effect 
of emotions, and cognitive resource competition. What form these would take is an open 
question. 
In conclusion, there is ample evidence that emotions do affect decision making. This 
strengthens the argument raised in section 2.1.6 that an account of the disposition effect 
based on emotions would be appropriate, given the literature in the wider field of 
decision making and emotions. The successful use of cognitive reappraisal (a form of 
emotion regulation) to affect decision making in previous research supports its use as a 
de-biasing intervention to change the disposition effect in this thesis. 
2.3   APPROACHES TO JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING RESEARCH 
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This section critically examines paradigms in decision making research. It locates the 
research in this thesis as in the heuristics and biases paradigm. However, in reviewing 
the advantages of the naturalistic decision making paradigm, it explains why this thesis 
aims to improve ecological validity in the research it undertakes, and attempts to study 
experimental interventions in experienced investors as well as novices. 
2.3.1  Two paradigms of decision making research 
Normative theories of cognition, for example formal logic and probability calculus, set 
out how we should reason. However, it has been recognised for some time that humans 
do not always make decisions in accordance with normative theories (Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne 1991), especially under uncertainty. The two main obstacles are that the realities 
of real life preclude all the necessary information for doing so, which normative theories 
assume is available, and that humans rarely process information (complete or not) as 
prescribed by normative models. This can be due to external factors (e.g. lack of time) 
or internal ones (some facet of their psychology). Most economic models continue to 
assume normative decision makers at their heart in the form of expected utility theory 
(EUT), which holds that people act to maximise the utility they expect to experience by 
choosing from a variety of options with known consequences and likelihoods. It is 
demonstrably false that people do this; however, in aggregate behaviour does often 
accord with its predictions, giving some credence to its continued use. I will look here 
only at individual behaviour. 
Instead of the prescriptions of normative theories, people often make judgements much 
more quickly. This is variously described as intuition, insight, heuristics, rules of thumbs, 
and others, in contrast to deliberation or formal analysis. The dual process model labels 
these two methods as system 1 and system 2. System 1 is a rapid, usually automatic 
method of making judgements, while system 2 is slow and conscious process, which 
includes working through whatever normative theory may be applicable to the problem 
at hand. On reflection, it is obvious that system 2 is not used for all judgements and 
decisions as it would be far too time-consuming.  
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Evidence for these two systems working in parallel comes from simultaneously held 
contradictory beliefs, with system 2 supplying the correct belief, and system 1 supplying 
the incorrect one but being automatically activated (Sloman 2002; Evans 2003). For 
example, the infamous Linda problem (Kahneman and Tversky 1983) demonstrates the 
conjunction fallacy, where participants judge P(A + B) > P(A). Once the fallacy is 
highlighted, people can recognise their error. However, they are still unable to inhibit 
system 1 suggesting it. In this case we would argue system 1 is employing the 
representative heuristic described by Kahneman and Tversky, while system 2 is applying 
probability calculus. A perceptual analogy is the Muller-Lyer illusion, or indeed any 
optical illusion: knowing that a perception is deceptive and even measuring the lines 
does not prevent the illusion appearing. 
2.3.1.1 The two paradigms 
The paradigms of decision making differ in the conceptualisation of system 1. The 
heuristics and biases approach (HAB) attempts to explain deviations from normative 
models as the result of heuristics employed in system 1, such as the representativeness 
heuristic mentioned above. Where system 1 produces inaccurate beliefs, they are often 
referred to as cognitive illusions or biases. Though there is a positive side to the HAB 
research program in viewing heuristics as useful shortcuts which approximate the output 
of normative models, it tends to focus on biases instead. Thus, it usually portrays a 
negative view of human reasoning abilities as prone to errors (Kahneman and Klein 
2009), though this is not a necessary conclusion from its premises and research findings. 
The initial work in the field (Tversky and Kahneman 1973; Tversky and Kahneman 1974) 
found that people are frequently unable to apply probability calculus correctly to 
calculate probabilities. Subsequent work has discovered a wide range of heuristics and 
biases, some adding to initial findings in economics-related areas such as preference 
reversals caused by framing (Tversky and Kahneman 1981), with others extending the 
approach to other areas such as social cognition (Nisbett and Ross 1980; Taylor and 
Brown 1994). Experimental data often comes from lab studies, and is only applied to 
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situations where normative models are applicable and participants responses can be 
compared against them. 
The other paradigm is natural decision making (NDM). This takes an entirely different 
approach: it dispenses with normative models in all but very high-level goals (e.g. fire-
fighters should aim to rescue people while avoiding dying themselves) and tries to 
describe how decision-making takes place in real life, particularly focussing on how 
experts make decisions in time-pressured, informationally noisy, high risk and high 
stakes environments. Clearly these situations do not give opportunities for extensive 
information analysis: some other form of decision-making is necessitated. Despite the 
pressures they face, many experts, such as firefighters, medics, and army officers, can 
make highly effective decisions using intuitive judgements. Though they are frequently 
unaware of the basis for these decisions, intuition is obviously not magic, and the 
judgements are somehow made using a combination of tacit knowledge and alternative 
decision-making processes. The primary goal of NDM is to identify what these are and so 
“demystify intuition” (Epstein 2010). 
Though the two paradigms are loosely connected on the theme of judgment and 
decision-making (JDM), they have quite different focuses. HAB looks for deviations from 
normative theory and seeks explanations of it, while NDM studies areas where normative 
theories are impractical or inapplicable, and seeks to document the alternative methods 
which are used. This difference frames their approaches to expertise: HAB assumes that 
ideally everyone one will adhere to normative models, and indeed the examples normally 
used are not intellectually complex to work through (such as the Linda problem). HAB 
starts from an answer to a problem prescribed by normative theory and demonstrates 
that most people are susceptible to deviations from it, offering the explanation that 
biases are a fixed part of our psychology; some research even shows that experts make 
the same errors as others despite their greater expertise in the specific areas which they 
are being questioned about. NDM on the other hand starts from the premise that novices 
will be extremely poor at decision-making, since good decision require domain specific 
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knowledge which can only be gained from experience. These two paradigms are often 
portrayed as alternatives; however, the differences in descriptions of JDM they espouse 
appear to stem from the differing scope and focus of each paradigm. They do not make 
competing predictions that could be tested against each other, so much as talk past each 
other much of the time; one can accept both and treat them as complements rather than 
alternatives. Which paradigm is relevant will depend on the situation the judgement is 
made in, and the aims of the researcher. 
That human reasoning is prone to biases from normative theory is interesting itself for 
HAB. The important fact is that normative theory gives a correct answer, and we 
sometimes get the wrong answer by following various shortcuts. NDM is interested in 
whether experts can pursue their goals in challenging environments. Normative models 
are practically impossible to implement, and essentially irrelevant. We could take an 
instrumental view of rationality – “do they achieve their goals in the context?”, but the 
minimal goals prescribed by instrumental rationality are assumed anyway (save lives, 
win battles, etc). What is interesting for NDM is people can make very good decisions 
despite the chaos around them. 
2.3.1.2 The heuristics and biases approach (HAB) 
There are two aspects to this approach, heuristics and biases, which are often treated 
together. However, they refer to distinct aspects of JDM. Heuristics are descriptions of 
the process of cognition; they can be thought of as mental ‘shortcuts’ which are often 
effective at reducing the mental load required to solve a problem, since humans only 
possess limited processing capacity and usually limited time. This is the positive agenda 
of the HAB paradigm referred to above. Biases are result of cognition where output is 
systematically suboptimal (compared to normative models); these can be the result of 
the operation of heuristics when the shortcuts do not work, but can have other causes. 
Keren and Teigen (2005) provide an interesting analogy to these two phenomena. 
Heuristics can be thought of as similar to fallacies in deductive reasoning: they are both 
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errors in drawing conclusions from processing information. Though heuristics are usually 
seen as operating automatically instead of consciously, fallacies can also be semi-
automatic, where conclusions are drawn without full deliberation. For example, the ad 
hominem fallacy is irrelevant to whatever is being discussed, but we automatically tend 
to take it into consideration.  
Biases are more akin to perceptual illusions, which like visual illusions appear in the 
mind effortlessly and “pop” into the mind, regardless of whether they are correct or not 
(Epstein, Lipson et al. 1992). “The mind has its illusions, like the sense of vision”, as 
noted as far back as 1814 (Laplace 1951). In the Linda problem, the feeling that Linda is 
more likely to be a feminist bank-teller than simply a bank-teller is compelling even once 
people have had the problem explained to them and agreed their intuition is wrong. In 
the background, the representativeness heuristic judges the similarity of Linda’s 
description to the options; the resultant feeling that the feminist bank-teller is the 
correct option leads the tendency to choose it. 
2.3.1.2.1 Dual process functioning in HAB 
As noted above, the simultaneous contradictory beliefs produced in response to these 
problems are seen by many as strong evidence that there must be two separate systems 
of human reasoning (Sloman 2002). System 1 works by the automatic operation of 
association in the memory, while system 2 requires effortful thought and linear 
reasoning. System 2 can be used to work out a problem from first principles (i.e. from 
normative theory); however, it is more often used to evaluate the output of system 1. 
Having these two systems allows us to make inferences based on the statistical structure 
of the environment in system 1, but also have the flexibility to monitor its output, and if 
necessary to disregard it altogether. Indeed Kahneman (2000) has indicated that this is 
how he and Tversky envisaged the heuristics and biases approach to cognitive working 
in practice. 
The ability or tendency to use system 2 appears to be correlated with cognitive ability as 
Stanovich and West (2000) found significant negative correlations between cognitive 
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ability and susceptibility to many biases. However, in later work Stanovich and West 
(2008) have found that this relationship holds for some biases but not others. To 
paraphrase, their updated work proposes that the intervention by system 2 to avoid 
biases requires the ability, recognition, and cognitive capacity to carry it out. Although 
they do not assess the disposition effect, they do test framing and sunk-cost effects, 
which are related to the disposition effect, and find that neither is attenuated by 
increased cognitive ability. 
2.3.1.3 Naturalistic decision making 
NDM is about how real-life decisions are made given environmental constraints, and 
particularly researching how experts perform at a higher level than others. Combining 
the two, the core of NDM is about how experts manage the environmental constraints 
and make good decisions despite them.  NDM, in a phrase, “puts the expert at the center 
of the investigation” (Rosen et al. 2008), and this focus on experts is a major difference 
with HAB. Whereas in HAB judgements are compared to a normative model, normative 
models are rarely even considered in NDM. How can one prescribe a normative model for 
a firefighter when each fire each unique – in a different building, with causes, layouts 
and combustible materials, and perhaps a different fire crew each time too? The same 
could be said for an army officer, facing an enemy whose own actions add complexity to 
the situation, and whose reactions to his decisions will likely vary too. 
What NDM proposes is that experts perform better by acquiring tacit knowledge about 
their domain of expertise. This knowledge is non-transferable across domains, for 
example, an expert chess player does not have any advantage over other people when 
playing poker (Ericsson and Lehmann 1996). This knowledge also takes a long to time to 
accumulate: normally at least ten years. Unlike susceptibility to some biases in HAB, 
general mental capacities are not valid predictors of expertise. Likewise, despite a 
general cognitive decline in older people, expertise can be maintained until at least 
seventy with regular practice in the specific domain of expertise (Horton, Baker et al. 
2008). 
65 
 
The methodology of NDM usually involves studying experts and trying to work out how 
they make decisions. For example, asking experts to “think aloud” as they are working 
to capture their thought processes. Lab experiments are not precluded: they may be 
used to test ideas about identified facets of their expertise that have been identified, for 
example chess masters have been shown to have much better memory for chess 
positions from real games, but are little better at remembering random configurations of 
chess pieces (Chase and Simon 1973). However, NDM lab experiments do not work out 
what the “correct” way to approach a problem should be, and test participants for 
accurate reproduction of this. Quantitative research is still possible by measuring 
outcomes. By comparing experts' performance not to a normative model but to novices, 
it has been demonstrated that in some fields experts' performance is no better (Camerer 
and Johnson 1991)! However, in the absence of normative standards, the benchmark for 
performance becomes the experts themselves. Either exceptional individuals can be 
identified and studied, or experts can be compared to novices on a continuum of 
competence. 
Whereas HAB sees laymen working through system 1, with better performers working in 
system 2, NDM has the opposite view. It models novices as attempting to use system 2, 
as they have no experience to use, while experts operate mainly through system 1. 
However, the nature of system 1 envisaged is very different between the two 
approaches. Instead of a series of heuristics, decisions in NDM are made using tacit 
knowledge of their domain with has been acquired with extensive experience. Since they 
have seen so many scenarios before, they are able to recognise the relevant cues within 
a scenario (Spilich et al. 1979). Over time, experts learn what is important, and this 
allows them to make comparisons across many other situations in that domain based on 
the key variables within it. Eventually they can discern the ‘bigger picture’ in any given 
situation. From this recognition, they can model what is likely to happen and thus what 
is the best course of action. NDM is most applicable where environments contain 
information but are noisy, such that it is not easily apparent what to pay attention to. 
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2.3.2 The implications of the two approaches for the role of emotions 
in financial decision making 
2.3.2.1 In Naturalistic decision making 
The first way that affect can be involved is as the conscious output of system 1 in NDM. 
When we think about how “good” a possible decision would be, system 1 can summate 
the expected consequences as valenced affect, that is, label it as attractive or aversive. 
Indeed Bechara et al. (1994) found that when prefrontal cortex damage prevented 
participants from attaching affect to possible consequences, they were unable to make 
adaptive decision using rational though alone. Not only was affect necessary for avoiding 
costly losses in the game they played, but affect appeared to change their playing 
behaviour prior to them being able to consciously articulate what they were doing. This 
suggests that without affect, subconscious processing of tacit knowledge would not be 
able to signal what decisions to make, or to allow us to compare decisions based on a 
psychologically available one-dimensional scale (i.e. their valence). 
A less strong position would be to claim not that affect is necessary to make decisions, 
but that it can be used as a cue if desired. This view is advanced by Schwarz (1990) in 
his “feelings as information” heuristic. Instead of weighing up all the relevant information 
in planning, we may simply reflect on our affective reaction to it. The problem is that 
affect can be generated from sources other than the subject of the current decision 
being considered. When people are in a positive mood, they can misinterpret this as 
being indicative of favourable affect towards the subject, and vice versa with negative 
moods. Indeed, the impact of the affect is a function of its perceived informational value; 
when attention was drawn to an experimentally elicited affective state, participants 
disregarded its importance in their judgements (Kelley 1973). However, background 
affect is frequently not adjusted for if it is not consciously labelled as such. 
Slovic et al. (2007) put forward a very similar idea named the “affect heuristic”. The 
examples they give involve affect playing a mediating role to explain some biases 
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already established, such as evaluability of numbers and proportion dominance. In these 
cases, the causal role of affect is a possibility. 
2.3.2.2 In Heuristics and biases 
The HAB paradigm is still based on an amended version of normative theory, where 
decision makers make judgements about the value and likelihood of each outcome. 
These are called the value and weighting functions, i.e. “how much do I value an 
outcome and how likely is it to occur?”. Affect can influence expected subjective utility 
by altering either of these terms. The value function is quite straightforward, being 
similar to the effects discussed for NDM. Instead of deliberating over the factors that 
contribution to an item’s value, the decision maker simply reflects on their affective 
reaction to it (Finucane et al., 2000). When affect is used, we become very insensitive to 
the numbers involved in a situation and largely respond to the affective image of one 
example brought to mind (Kahneman et al., 1999). Similarly, the prospect of losing 
goods with high affective impact leads to greater loss aversion (Dhar and Wertenbroch 
2000). In terms of expected subjective utility this makes some sense, since our 
subjective utility will suffer more from the loss of a good which makes us feel happier. 
However, from a rational point of view it does not, as goods which cost the same amount 
to replace should be valued equally. 
Surprisingly, affect can also affect our judgements about likelihood. It is already known 
that people place more importance on probability differences close to 0 or 1 than they do 
for differences near 0.5. Rationally there should be no weighting at all of course – a 0.01 
increase in probability should matter the same regardless of the initial probability. 
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) found that these effects are exaggerated for affect-rich 
outcomes. In addition, affect appears to affect the perception of probabilities 
themselves. Affect-congruent events are judged as more likely (Johnson and Tversky 
1983) and incongruent ones less likely (Mayer, Gaschke et al. 1992), even if the affect is 
elicited by non-task manipulations (and so is an irrelevant factor). 
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2.4 IMPROVING EXTERNAL VALIDITY IN EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 
As discussed above, naturalistic decision making is about studying how real-life decisions 
are made given environmental constraints, and how experts manage environmental 
constraints and make good decisions despite them.  This focuses on experts and real-life 
decisions is a major difference with the heuristics and biases approach. This section 
discusses previous experimental work on the disposition effect, and how this thesis 
seeks to improve on. This thesis aims to bridge a gap between the two paradigms, and 
make a contribution, by increasing the external validity of the experiments carried out in 
two ways: by increasing the ecological validity of the trading environment used in 
experiments, and using experienced traders as participants rather than naïve students. 
2.4.1 Methods of studying the disposition effect 
There are two main methods for researching the disposition effect, as discussed above. 
The first is analysis of secondary data from trading records, for example in the seminal 
study by Shefrin and Statman (1985), and latterly the key study of Odean (1998). The 
other method is experimental, as demonstrated in the classic study by Weber and 
Camerer (1998). 
Using trading records has the advantage of directly measuring the behaviour of interest, 
so conclusions can be drawn about the behaviour of investors in real markets. This can 
establish whether a disposition effect exists in a specific country or market, and how it is 
affected by context (e.g. market conditions, time of year). Odean (1998) uses secondary 
data to replicate the finding that the disposition effect does occur in real markets, and to 
demonstrate that many proposed explanations of the effect cannot account for it. 
This is sometimes combined with a cross sectional design (e.g. a questionnaire) which 
adds data about demographic and psychological traits, to test the association between 
them and the disposition effect. For example, Richards (2012) uses this method to 
produce tentative evidence that investors who engage in reappraisal more often have a 
lower disposition effect using this method. 
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The measurement of the disposition effect in secondary data is usually at the level of the 
individual investor. Trading records identify all the trades attributable to an individual; to 
calculate a disposition effect for each participant many trades of both gains and losses 
are required, to compare their likelihood. Some experimental studies sometimes lack this 
functionality due to the division of participants into gain and loss groups, or an 
insufficient number of trades being made by each participant, for example Lee et al. 
(2008). 
The downside of using secondary data is a lack of internal validity. Internal validity is 
about whether the causal relationship that is claimed in a study is true (Bryman & Bell, 
2015). Descriptive and observational studies may not want to make causal claims, but 
many do, and those that do are limited by only being able to show association between 
the hypothesised cause and the effect. 
To get strong evidence for causal hypotheses, experiments allow much greater control 
over manipulation of variables of interest and thus are the ‘gold standard’ for producing 
evidence about causality. Participants can be randomly allocated to experimental groups, 
then inferences made about the effect of experimental conditions. This study aims to test 
whether applying reappraisal can reduce the disposition effect, so it is well suited to an 
experimental research design. Richards (2012) has produced cross-sectional evidence 
for this, and an experimental test is the next logical step. 
An experimental approach is particularly appropriate because the aim is not merely to 
show that investors who use reappraisal have lower disposition effects. It is also to show 
that investors can be instructed to use reappraisal, and that it is an effective de-biasing 
intervention which can be implemented by investors who previously did not use 
reappraisal when trading. Richards (2012) found that people who habitually use 
reappraisal have some reduction in holding losses. In an experimental setup however, 
participants will be randomly allocated to groups, and the experimental group will be 
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instructed to begin using reappraisal while playing the game. So, this is closer to the 
situation the experiment is trying to model. 
The trade-off for the increased internal validity achieved by experiments is a potential 
reduction in external validity. External validity is concerned with whether the results of a 
study will generalise to other situations, people and times (Bryman and Bell, 2015). In 
this case, would the results of an experimental study on the disposition effect also be 
found when applied to investors trading in financial markets? 
One contribution of this thesis focusses on improving the external validity of 
experimental work, while still benefitting from the improved internal validity that 
experiments offer. It focusses on the threats to external validity from different situations 
and different people. It argues that previous experimental studies of the disposition 
effect have been carried out using simplified experimental protocols that are significantly 
dissimilar to the real trading environment. In addition, the participants used have not 
been representative of investors in financial markets. The studies in this thesis build on 
previous work by making improvements in both these areas. 
2.4.2 Ecological validity of experimental studies 
Ecological validity refers to the extent that the experimental setup is the same as natural 
settings.1 In this case, this means whether the decision environment where the 
disposition effect is measured in an experiment matches the decision environment in 
financial markets which it is intended to generalise to, in aspects relevant to the 
decisions made. The more this is true, the greater confidence we have in applying 
inferences made from an experiment to financial markets, and that the generalisations 
made are valid. I now discuss some aspects of the decision environment in experimental 
                                           
1 Hammond (1998) and others have argued that ecological validity is an unhelpful 
misappropriation of a term that originally meant something else, and that the term 
“representative design” is more appropriate. Ecological validity was originally defined by 
Brunswik (1956) in the way Hammond favours. I find the thrust of Hammond’s argument 
convincing. However, as Hammond notes, many prominent psychologists now use 
ecological validity in the more recent sense, and have done so for several decades. For 
clarity I adopt the modern sense here. 
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work which often differ from that in financial markets. These are opportunities to make a 
contribution by improving previous work. 
2.4.2.1 Continuously changing prices and forced decision points 
In financial markets prices change continuously, and decisions to hold or sell are made 
by investors in real-time against the background of these changing prices. Investors can 
buy and sell at any time they choose, as little or as often as they please. As well as 
buying and selling stocks, investors can also ‘short-sell’ stocks, which is equivalent to 
betting the price will fall in the way that buying stocks is a bet that the price will rise. 
Experimental studies usually omit some or all these aspects of the decision environment, 
and constrain the options available to participants, so that they can achieve their 
experimental objectives in a practical manner. This may be to force participants to make 
decisions about gains and / or losses, or to force participants to make trading decisions 
in a standardised way which can be compared to other participants in the same study.  
Experimental studies restrict decisions to a set number made at specific times in the 
experimental protocol, and the choices are limited to buying, holding and selling stocks. 
Of course, in financial markets there are no such restrictions no forced decisions about 
when to trade. Investors can buy, not buy, sell, or not sell at any time, knowing that the 
option will always be available later (though the price may have changed). Investors can 
trade as many times as they wish on financial markets. Investors can also choose to 
short-sell rather than buy. 
Experimental studies also simplify decisions for participants by presenting them with a 
current and fixed price, and asking participants to make decisions only at that point 
based on that fixed price. This is obviously unrealistic compared with the decision 
environment investors face with continuously changing prices. 
In addition, this approach may be more likely to produce a disposition effect since it 
focuses attention on the current price, and perhaps the comparison to the previous 
purchase price. This may encourage participants to think about their current gain or loss 
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on the position more than they would when trading for real. So, the disposition effect 
measured with this method may not be representative of the disposition effects that 
occur in financial markets. 
So, there are concerns about a reduction in the ecological validity of the experimental 
setup, and whether decisions made in this setup are representative of decisions made in 
financial markets. The simplification of trading decisions that has facilitated studying the 
disposition effect in the lab is also one of the main criticisms when trying to generalise 
from those studies to financial markets. 
2.4.2.2 Using predictive information about stock movements in trading decisions 
To make decisions, investors may consider historical price information and their own 
personal gain or loss on the position (which is assumed to drive the disposition effect). 
However, they may also consider information relating to whether prices will rise or fall 
from their current value. Indeed, neo-classical economic theory suggests this is the only 
relevant information relating to the decision. This predictive information can come from a 
wide variety of sources, may change in real-time, and has uncertainty around its 
reliability. 
In financial markets then, decisions are not just about the current price and price 
history, but thinking about future price movements and the uncertainty associated with 
them. Using both price information and predictive information, which both change 
continuously, is a considerably different decision environment to the ones participants 
are exposed to in experimental studies. So, this presents more concerns about the 
ecological validity of experimental studies which provide little or no predictive 
information. Indeed, studies that only provide price information may artificially induce a 
disposition effect. By asking participants to make decisions about selling stocks, by 
giving them no basis to make decisions except price information, they may infer that 
they are meant to use this information. Decisions in financial markets are not made with 
so little information. 
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2.4.2.3 Emotions during trading 
Due in part to these dynamic features and context of uncertainty, emotion is often 
reported as being a prominent part of the experience of making trading decisions 
(Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011). Physiological evidence also indicates that decision 
making during trading is emotionally arousing (Lo and Repin, 2002). Summers and 
Duxbury (2012) argue for the necessity of emotions in producing a disposition effect, 
based on experimental findings and self-reported emotion levels. Given the hypothesised 
role of emotions in the production of the disposition effect and the ability of emotion 
regulation to mitigate it, it seems important to make decisions as emotionally engaging 
as possible for the participants when conducting research in the lab. 
However, an experimental setup where prices and decision points are fixed may be less 
emotionally arousing than the full experience of financial markets. A more engaging 
decision environment which is more representative of real-life trading should improve 
this, and improve ecological validity for testing hypotheses about emotions during 
trading decisions. 
2.4.2.4 Method of Lee et al. (2008) 
In the study most closely related to those reported in this thesis, (Lee et al., 2008), 
students were told they owned stocks at one price, asked to imagine 4 weeks had 
passed. Then participants were given the “current” prices and asked to decide whether 
they wished to sell or hold their positions. Sometimes they were given fixed (and pre-
determined) “analyst forecasts” indicating whether the stock was likely to increase or 
decrease in value. Even so, this setup is considerably less cognitively demanding than 
one where the prices and forecast information are continuously changing. 
Stock movements were presented as random but were actually determined in advance, 
with half the participants being asked to make a hold/sell decision when presented with 
a gain, and the other half asked to do so when presented with a loss. Since participants 
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made decisions about only gains or only losses, the disposition effect was demonstrated 
by showing that the loss group was more likely to hold their stocks than the gain group. 
This is a good, simple design to operationalise the variables necessary for experimental 
testing in a convenient manner. It allows trading behaviour to be observed in the lab 
within a short timescale by forcing participants to make decisions at specific times. It 
allows manipulation of whether participants were trading gains or losses, to facilitate 
making a comparison between gains and losses. It also controlled the predictive 
information participants received, to test hypotheses about the impact of this 
information on trading decisions. However, this setup lacks ecological validity when 
applied to how decisions are taken in financial markets, as discussed above. 
There is some evidence that simplifying the decision environment too much can even 
remove the disposition effect. In Brown and Kagel (2009), the disposition effect did not 
occur when trading only one stock at a time when the optimal trading strategy was 
simple. They attribute this failure to their simplified experimental setup not triggering 
the framing effect which is presumed to be involved in causing the effect. Again, this 
suggests that to generalise from experiments on the disposition effect, experiments 
should be carried out in conditions which are as ecologically valid as possible. 
2.4.3 Participants in experimental research 
Most experimental studies use students as participants. As with the concerns about 
ecological validity discussed above, this raises issues about the external validity of these 
studies. Specifically, the issue is whether experiments carried out on one set of people 
can be generalised to another set of people. These studies are usually motivated by a 
desire to give some insight into why the disposition effect is displayed by investors in 
real trading. So, whether explicitly stated or not, it is assumed that a sample of naïve 
subjects are a good model for experienced investors and make decisions in the same 
way as financial investors. For example Lee et al. (2008) used undergraduate business 
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students as participants to test the disposition effect and the effect of reappraisal on the 
disposition effect. 
In the case of this thesis, I address not only the assumption that students’ decisions will 
be representative of investors’ decisions, but also the assumption that students will 
respond to cognitive reappraisal in the same manner as experts. It may be the case that 
cognitive reappraisal is only effective on naïve participants, unfamiliar with technical 
trading techniques. 
There are many reasons for thinking that the decision making of naïve subjects may 
differ from experienced investors. Many studies have produced evidence that 
demographic characteristics can predict the level amount of disposition effect displayed 
by investors. Both experience (Seru et al., 2010) and age (Dhar and Zhu, 2006) have 
been shown to reduce the disposition effect displayed. 
Investors have knowledge of common stock-trading techniques and strategies. They 
have personal experience of trading, and retail investors have experience of actively 
trade their own capital. Not only this, but most investors are aware of the disposition 
effect itself, and that it is not a good pattern of investing. Advice such as ‘all big losses 
begin as little losses’, ‘sell at the first loss’, and ‘sell losers and ride winners’ all implore 
investors to implement the opposite of the disposition effect. 
How precisely reappraisal changes emotions is not known, and would require a full 
account of how emotions are produced by conscious thoughts, which of course we don’t 
have. However, in making claims about reappraisal it seems better ceteris paribus to use 
participants who are as similar psychologically as possible to the population the results 
are being generalised to. Student samples are far from ideal for representing financial 
market investors. 
2.4.3.1 Practical issues with participant samples 
The reason that studies typically use students is clear. It is much easier to recruit a 
sample of students to take part in a study then a group of retail investors. Student 
76 
 
participants bring the benefits of large numbers, on site availability, and plentiful free 
time. They can typically be persuaded to participate with the promise of small amounts 
of money. In some institutions, participants even receive credit towards their degrees in 
exchange for their time. (Given the strong motivation many students have to avoid 
additional work, I understand this can be very appealing). Of course, these are all 
convincing practical benefits to taking such an approach, but the trade-off is greater 
caveats against the external validity of the studies. 
Retail investors on the other hand have many characteristics which make them difficult 
to use as participants. They are unlikely to be available in person, and difficult to find in 
large numbers. They are unlikely to be persuaded to spend their time taking part in long 
experimental protocols for nominal sums of money. Indeed, the contrast with other uses 
of their time is particularly apparent for them – they could use the same amount of time 
trying to make money trading their own portfolio. 
The use of student participants in experimental psychology, and other research which 
adopts its methods such as behavioural economics, is very widespread. It is an accepted 
compromise in the process of carrying out experimental research; thus, it is not usually 
seen as a weakness of research, to the extent that using such participants makes a piece 
of research invalid. However, this thesis argues that using representative participants is 
still an important improvement on such studies, which forms part of the contribution of 
this thesis. To make improvements in the external validity of testing reappraisal, this 
thesis will attempt to use participants who represent the same people that results will be 
generalised too.  
2.4.3.2 Heterogeneous adult samples 
If expert participants cannot be recruited, a smaller improvement in the 
representativeness of participants is to use a sample which comprises a range of adults. 
Using only students means that the participant sampling is confined to a narrow age 
range, which is more homogenous than the wider population. Importantly for this 
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research, it will not match the age distribution of investors either, which is significantly 
older than a student population profile. As noted above, age has been found to impact 
the disposition effect displayed (Dhar and Zhu, 2006). 
Students will also tend to be more clustered than the population in a whole in range of 
psychometric variables, such as cognitive ability. If participants are drawn from only one 
institution, which is often the case, this clustering will even greater than within the wider 
student population. In fact, students are often drawn from a single degree program, 
increasing the clustering further still. Therefore, where a specific participant sample is 
not possible, this thesis will attempt to use heterogeneous adult samples rather than 
student samples. 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The literature reviewed above does not lead linearly to the research questions, so the 
purpose of this section is to map out what motivates the research questions by drawing 
together material from the literature review. Material covered earlier is briefly explained 
and referenced, since the aim is not to repeat the material above but to develop the 
logic leading to each research question and its associated hypotheses. Methods used to 
test the hypotheses will be described in more detail in chapter 3, and further detail is 
given on the individual tests for each hypothesis in chapters 4-7, which report the results 
of the studies carried out. 
2.5.1  Research motivations shared by all 4 research questions 
Although all four research questions have different focuses, they all address the 
disposition effect in some way. This section sets out three research motivations related 
to the disposition effect which apply to all 4 research questions. These are: the pervasive 
nature of the disposition effect and its economics effects; its status as an error or bias in 
decision making; and increasing the external validity of experimental studies used to 
research it. 
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To establish why the disposition effect is an interesting topic to research, this chapter 
began by explaining in section 2.1 what the disposition is, arguing why it is important, 
and reviewing some field studies from the voluminous literature on the disposition effect. 
In brief, the disposition effect is a very robust phenomenon in financial markets, having 
been demonstrated many times across a wide range of countries, market types and 
investor classes. It is important to investors primarily because investors who trade with 
a disposition effect tend to perform worse than those who don’t (e.g. Odean, 1998).     
It is interesting for researchers in judgement and decision making because it is a 
persistent deviation from normatively rational models of decision making, which seek to 
maximize expected returns. The disposition effect contravenes basic economic 
assumptions, for example Fama (1970) argues that stock markets are efficient, whereas 
investors with a disposition effect act as if markets are not. Despite this, rational 
explanations for disposition effect have been proposed, such as stock price mean 
reversion, portfolio rebalancing, and minimizing trading costs (discussed in more detail 
in section 2.1.2). 
However, Odean (1998) tested and demonstrated that trading based on mean reversion 
does not work in financial markets: stocks which investors sold performed better than 
stocks which they held. Furthermore, Weber and Camerer (1998) showed experimentally 
that participants still had a disposition effect, even when they were explicitly given 
information which ruled out mean reversion as a strategy. Odean (1998) also 
conclusively refuted portfolio balancing and trading costs as explanations for the 
disposition effect. Since there appear to no rational explanations for the effect, 
researchers have proposed psychological explanations instead, and this thesis builds on 
some of this work.  
The last shared motivation, the desire to increase external validity, comes from 
contrasting the approaches of the two main research paradigms in judgment and 
decision making (discussed in more detail in section 2.3). The heuristics and biases 
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approach looks for biases in human reasoning abilities that arise because of our reliance 
on heuristics when making decisions (Kahneman and Klein 2009). The study of the 
disposition effect is very much in this tradition: investors hold losses too long because 
they rely on the heuristic of not selling at a loss, and don’t hold gains long enough 
because they rely on the heuristic of ‘banking’ (i.e. selling) gains before prices can fall. 
However, the alternative paradigm, naturalistic decision making, is relevant too. This 
approach focusses on how experts make decisions in (informationally) noisy 
environments. Trading is certainly a noisy environment, where experts have a significant 
advantage over novices, so this paradigm can also be applied. A weakness of much 
previous experimental research on the disposition effect is that it neglects this expertise 
aspect and attempts to study biases in a way which sacrifices the external validity of the 
research: this threatens whether its findings will generalise to real-world contexts. So, 
this thesis attempts to increases the external validity of the studies it contains by 
addressing two issues: the ecological validity of the experimental setup, and using naïve 
rather than experienced participants. These issues were first discussed in section 2.4 
above. 
Lab experiments allow much greater researcher control of what is being measured, and 
therefore typically achieve high internal validity of their conclusions; however, using an 
artificially simple decision environment can reduce the ecological validity of the 
experimental setup (ecological validity refers to whether an experimental setup has the 
same features as the real-world environment which it is studying). For example, real-life 
trading involves continuously changing prices, and investors are free to buy or sell as 
many stocks as they wish, at any time they choose. However, to simplify data analysis in 
experimental studies, and make one participant’s decisions directly comparable with 
another’s, experimental studies often use a ‘forced choice’ method for decisions, where 
participants must make decisions at fixed and pre-determined times, and have limited 
trading options to choose from. The is the type of method used in Lee et al. (2008), a 
study which this thesis specifically attempts to build on. 
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Another limitation of experimental work on the disposition effect is the omission or 
reduced complexity of predictive information for participants about future price 
movements. In real-world trading, there is a huge amount of information which could be 
used to inform an investor’s view of likely price movements so affect their selling 
decisions, and this information could change at any time. Often this aspect of the 
decision-making process of absent altogether. In other studies, such as Lee et al. 
(2008), such information is provided but it is simple and fixed. 
These simplifications reduce the ecologically validity of the studies, and in doing so, 
make the decisions made by participants much less cognitively demanding. So, the 
decisions made in these experimental studies may not be accurate reflections of the type 
of decisions made by real-world traders. This thesis improves these limitations of 
experimental work on the disposition effect by using a realistic trading simulation (the 
two-index game), which measures trading behaviour in the lab with greater ecological    
validity. Chapter 3 explains how this instrument improves on previous methods of 
measuring the disposition effect in the lab. This game is used in all three studies which 
produce data for the four research questions, to its impact is relevant to all four 
questions.  
There is evidence that emotions can be a   prominent part of the trading experience, but 
it is also possible that participants do not find making decisions in simplified 
experimental setups as emotionally engaging as real-life trading. Research questions 3 
and 4 are concerned with the role of emotions in the disposition effect; the increase in 
ecological validity may be beneficial for these research questions not only when 
measuring the disposition effect, but also when eliciting emotion responses in an 
experimental setting. 
The other issue this thesis addresses is the use of naïve rather than experienced 
participants. Naïve participants are easier to recruit than experts, but the use of 
unrepresentative participants can also weaken generalisation of the results. Studies on 
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the disposition effect which want to generalise results to real-life implicitly assume that 
naïve participants are a good model for experienced investors. Again, this was the case 
in Lee et al. (2008), which this thesis seeks to build on. To improve on this, two of the 
three studies presented here use retail investors instead of student samples: these 
provide the bulk of the data in answering questions 1 and 2, and all the data for question 
3. 
2.5.2 First research question 
Although the disposition effect is widely studied in the field, this research doesn’t allow 
us to distinguish between whether the disposition effect is simply a ‘state’ phenomenon, 
being simply a product of the environment where it is observed, or whether it has a 
trait-like dimension. What is meant by trait-like is that the bias shows reliable 
differences between investors, so that there is variation across the population, but that 
the bias is relatively stable within each investor, for example when measured across a 
range of contexts and across time. If the bias has a trait-like dimension, an investor with 
a high disposition effect in one environment would be more likely to display a high level 
in another environment, or when measured again at a later time. Unfortunately, field 
studies cannot show this directly because they only measure investors expressing a 
disposition effect in one context. 
A common contemporary explanation of the disposition effect is based on the application 
of prospect theory, which was presented in section 2.1.3. Although research questions 3 
and 4 and are more focused on the actual causation of the disposition effect, this 
explanation also has implications for the trait-like nature. It proposes that the disposition 
effect emerges from the shape of an individual’s value function. Since this value function 
differs between individuals (Schunk and Betsch, 2006), the disposition effect individuals 
express should also differ. So, this is a theoretical argument for the disposition effect 
having a trait-like character. 
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There is also empirical evidence that the disposition effect has a trait-like character, first 
discussed in section 2.1.4.  Many studies have found variation between individuals in 
financial markets, for example, Dhar and Zhu (2006); however, these studies do not 
establish that the effect is also stable within individuals over time and situations. 
Building on this, Seru et al. (2010) do provide strong evidence for stability over time 
within investors (though only with one sample and in one market). They show that over 
a nine-year period, while the average disposition effect in a sample of investors 
decreases, most of the change in disposition effect within the trading population is 
attributable to investors with a high disposition effect ceasing to trade. The disposition 
effect of each individual changes little over this period, despite a long time to adapt their 
trading style. This both demonstrates stability over time, and suggests that the 
disposition effects of individual investors may not change because it has a trait-like 
nature. Other researchers have found correlations between the disposition effect and 
other stable traits, which again suggests it may have a trait-like nature too. For 
example, Kadous et al. (2014) have shown correlations with aspects of self-esteem, and 
Richards (2012) has found correlations with cognitive style.  
Building on this prior work, this thesis aims to provide direct evidence for trait-like 
characteristics of the disposition effect. First, the intra-individual stability of the 
disposition effect is assessed, by measuring it repeatedly. Then, convergent validity 
across different measures of the disposition effect is tested. Convergent validity means 
that variables which measure the same underlying factor are associated with each other 
when measured. To establish this, convergent validity is tested using three types of 
data: field data, experimental data, and survey data. These aims lead to the first 
research question and its hypotheses: 
RQ 1 - Does the disposition effect have trait-like characteristics? 
H 1.1 - The disposition effect will show intra-individual stability over time  
H 1.2 - The disposition effect will show convergent validity across multiple measures 
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As noted above, the research question not only investigates the trait-like characteristics 
of the disposition effect, but also does so while improving the external validity of the 
experimental data supporting the hypotheses. 
2.5.3  Second research question 
The second research question addresses similar ground to the first question, and 
investigates the trait-like characteristics of trading biases. Rather than the disposition 
effect itself though, it is concerned with the two ‘sides’ of the disposition effect: cutting 
gains and holding losses. Do they also have trait-like characteristics: are they also stable 
behavioural tendencies of investors, rather than simply a product of the particular 
environment in which decisions are being made? 
RQ 2 - Do cutting gains and holding losses have trait-like characteristics? 
As mentioned above, a common contemporary explanation of the disposition effect is 
based on the application of prospect theory, and was presented in section 2.1.3, and 
evidence which challenges this account was discussed in section 2.1.6. In doing so, 
many studies point to the role that emotions could play in producing the bias, and how 
the behaviour towards gains and losses may be underpinned by different emotions. For 
example, Kaustia finds find that investors often treat positions categorically, rather than 
being sensitive to their relative size. A loss, of any size, is much less likely to be sold; 
not only does this contradict a prospect theory account, but it could suggest that the 
disposition effect is specifically related to responses to losses. If this was case, it would 
be incorrect to treat both cutting gains and holding losses as two expressions of a 
unitary disposition effect bias. 
This possibility was developed further in section 2.1.7. For example, Summers and 
Duxbury demonstrate that different emotions are associated with the two sides of the 
effect, and Richards (2012) found tentative evidence that reappraisal affects losses but 
not gains. These findings suggest that different emotions may be responsible for the two 
‘sides’, which implies that they are independent biases. 
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Weber and Welfens (2007) have carried out promising work in this area, by 
demonstrating the separation of the two biases using two experimental tasks. However, 
while Weber and Welfens used a trading task and a housing task, both were relatively 
simple lab experiments. In particular, their ‘housing task’ was simply a series of gambles 
given a housing theme, and so is very artificial. This thesis expands and improves on this 
study by measuring the disposition effect with greater ecological validity, and by 
comparing the disposition effect using a much more diverse range of methods. 
In this thesis, convergent validity will be tested between data from a realistic trading 
game, and a self-report scale. The trading game has greater ecological validity 
(discussed in further detail in chapter 3); therefore, using data from the game 
strengthens the evidence for the research question. The game and scale are also very 
different from each other, so the demonstration of convergent validity is more forceful. 
Finally, retail investors are used as participants rather than students, again creating 
more powerful data to address the research question. 
Like the first research question, evidence for intra-individual stability and convergent 
validity of the two biases is assessed, which leads to the first four hypotheses associated 
with this research question: 
H 2.1 - Cutting gains will show intra-individual stability  
H 2.2 - Holding losses will show intra-individual stability  
H 2.3 - There will be convergent validity for cutting gains between a realistic trading 
simulation and a scale 
H 2.4 - There will be convergent validity for holding losses between a realistic trading 
simulation and a scale 
In addition to demonstrating intra-individual stability and convergent validity, additional 
hypotheses which can be tested. Since cutting gains and holding losses are suspected to 
be independent biases, they can be tested against each other to provide evidence for 
discriminant validity. Discriminant validity is the opposite of convergent validity: that 
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variables which are driven by the different underlying factors will not be associated with 
each other. Cutting gains and holding losses are compared against each other three 
ways: with data for both from the trading game, with data for both from the scale, and 
finally crossing data for cutting gains from the game and holding losses from the scale, 
and vice versa. This leads to a further 3 hypotheses: 
H 2.5 - There will be discriminant validity between cutting gains and holding losses in 
a realistic trading simulation 
H 2.6 - There will be discriminant validity between cutting gains and holding losses in 
the scale 
H 2.7 - There will be discriminant validity between cutting gains and holding losses, 
between a realistic trading simulation and a scale 
2.5.4 Third research question 
The third research question relates to explanations of the disposition effect, argues 
against an explanation based on prospect theory, and explores an alternative based on 
emotions during trading. In addition, it also examines how reappraisal may affect 
expression of the disposition effect through its effects on emotions, and also affect its 
constituent biases (cutting gains and holding losses), which were discussed in more 
detail above in section 2.5.3, in the conclusions for the second research question. 
A common current explanation of the disposition effect, based on prospect theory. This 
account applies prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) to the position of an 
investor deciding whether to sell or hold a stock they own. First, an investor must 
compare their position to a reference point, usually the purchase price. This creates a 
mental account of their position as a gain or loss. Second, an investor considers possible 
outcomes if they choose to sell or hold their gain (or loss). Third, these outcomes are 
converted from a monetary value into subjective expected utility, using the value 
function. Lastly, the subjective expected utility of holding a gain (or loss) is compared 
with the utility from selling it. The value function is curved, flattening over time in both 
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the gain and loss domains. However, this has the opposite effect in gain and loss 
domains. This curvature results in expected utility being greater when selling (rather 
than holding) a gain, whereas expected utility is greater when holding (rather than 
selling) a loss. The combination of these entails an investor is more likely to hold a loss 
than a gain, which is observed in the disposition effect. This account was presented in 
more detail in section 2.1.3, and its underlying assumptions discussed in section 2.1.5.  
Section 2.1.6 proceeded to question whether an explanation based on prospect theory 
could account for recent empirical findings. For example, Kaustia (2010) appears to find 
that a disposition effect is better modelled as an ‘all-or-nothing’ response to holding a 
loss, rather than being driven by the value function as prospect theory suggests. The 
fact that a position is a loss means it is treated qualitatively different from a break-even 
position or a gain. Lehenkari (2012) finds that not being responsible for a loss reduces 
the disposition effect. Again, prospect theory has no role for responsibility: decisions 
should be driven by expected outcomes and their conversion into subjective utility by the 
value function. Whether someone is responsible or feels responsible should have no 
effect on these factors. 
Building on both these findings experimentally, Summers and Duxbury (2012) found that 
responsibility for positions was necessary for a disposition effect. Furthermore, 
responsibility for losses produces an increase in feelings of regret. Again, this is not 
consistent with a prospect theory account. Rau (2015) also supports this: investing as a 
pair rather than individuals produced greater feelings of regret, and coincided with 
greater levels of the disposition effect. 
So, in findings evidence against prospect, many of these studies suggest indirectly or 
indirectly that emotions are involved whether a disposition effect is expressed, and 
particularly that negative emotional responses towards losses lead to more holding of 
losses. Situations which give rise to certain emotions will lead to a disposition effect 
being produced. In contrast, situations or interventions which reduce or eliminate the 
87 
 
experience of emotions (for example when investors do not feel responsible for their 
trading positions) mean the disposition effect will be reduced or eliminated. 
Lee et al. (2008) tested a different method of disrupting the disposition effect. They used 
a cognitive reappraisal instruction (a form of emotion regulation) and asked participants 
to imagine they were trading for someone else, and found this also reduced the 
disposition effect. Though they did not directly measure emotions, an explanation is that 
cognitive reappraisal can reduce the emotions associated with trading with a disposition 
effect. They speculated that by imagining trading for someone else, participants felt 
more distant from the situation, and did not experience the emotions associated with 
trading as strongly. Supporting this, Richards (2012) found tentative evidence that using 
cognitive reappraisal decreases the disposition effect by reducing the holding of losses. 
As background to this alternative explanation of the disposition effect, this literature 
review has also reviewed the wider literature of emotions, emotion regulation and 
decision making, in section 2.2.  Section 2.2.1 looks at how emotions have been found 
to affect decision making, and finds that the effect of emotions is widespread: this 
makes an emotion-based explanation of the disposition effect plausible. For example, 
dual process theory has modelled decision making as comprising two systems, system 1 
and system 2 (Sloman, 2002), contrasting rapid and often automatic reasoning against 
deliberative and objective reasoning. Emotions affecting decision making are a possible 
example of system 1 in action: they provide a rapid and psychologically salient heuristic 
on which to base decisions (Schwarz, 1990). 
Emotions during trading could produce the disposition effect in a similar way. The 
prospect of selling a loss could produce negative emotions. These emotions lead to 
system 1 reasoning: investors are motivated to avoid these unpleasant emotions, and 
some chose to do so by not selling the loss. In other words, they prioritise hedonic goals 
over economic ones: by treating a paper loss as temporary they delay the emotional 
pain of selling the loss, hoping that the loss will reverse. This would explain the large 
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increase in the probability of selling Kaustia observed when a position moves from a 
small loss to a small gain. A small change in price produces a large increase in selling, 
which can be explained by a large change in the emotions experienced when considering 
selling it. 
Section 2.3.2.2 discusses the role of emotions in the heuristics and biases paradigm. 
Previous research has shown that when using system 1, affect can cause people to 
become insensitive to the numbers involved in decision and simply respond in line with 
the affect experienced. This appears to be a good explanation for the findings of Kaustia, 
for example. 
Richards (2012) also supports a potential explanation based on the balance of system 1 
and system 2 when making trading decisions. He found that investors with higher 
reliance on system 1 have higher disposition effects, and tentative evidence that 
investors with higher reliance on system 2 have lower disposition effects. A higher 
reliance on system 2 could moderate the impact of system 1 by allowing investors to 
override the effect of negative emotions. 
Emotion regulation is the main intervention used in this thesis, and is a key part of 
research questions 3 and 4. It is introduced in section 2.2.2. If the hypothesis that 
emotions affect the disposition effect is accepted, there are a variety of types of emotion 
regulation which could be used to target it experimentally. Koole (2009) has many 
categorised different types of emotions regulation based on psychological function and 
the emotion-generating system targeted. However, cognitive reappraisal is the form 
chosen here: Lee et al. (2008) used cognitive appraisal as an intervention to affect the 
disposition effect, which thesis builds on, and in addition cognitive reappraisal has also 
been used to successfully mitigate other decision-making biases. For example, Sokol-
Hessner et al. (2009) found that cognitive reappraisal reduced loss aversion. In fact, not 
only did cognitive reappraisal reduce loss aversion, but this reduction was correlated 
with a reduction in physiological markers of negative emotion. This strongly supports the 
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argument that emotions during trading could underpin the disposition effect, and that 
cognitive reappraisal is a promising intervention to target these emotions. 
So, the third research question addresses whether cognitive reappraisal can reduce the 
disposition effect. Lee et al. (2008) have previously shown this, but their demonstration 
lacked external validity. This thesis tests whether their result still holds when external 
validity is improved, leading to the third research question: 
RQ 3 - Does cognitive reappraisal affect the disposition effect and its constituent biases, 
when tested in experienced traders under conditions of greater external validity? 
Note this increase in external validity is relevant to all four research questions, as 
discussed above in section 2.5.1 earlier. However, it is most important for the third 
research question since the increase in external validity is a key motivation for building 
on the previous work of Lee et al. (2008). 
The first hypothesis for this research question establishes that a disposition effect is 
expressed in the study, since without it the intervention cannot reduce the disposition 
effect. 
H 3.1 - Investors will show a disposition effect in a realistic trading simulation 
The second hypothesis aims to replicate the result of Lee et al. (2008) but with greater 
external validity as discussed above. 
H 3.2 - Cognitive reappraisal will reduce the disposition effect 
The final hypothesis builds on the finding of Lee et al., together with other evidence 
discussed above pointing to the role of behaviour towards losses in driving the 
disposition effect, and changing them using emotion regulation. So, the third hypothesis 
tests whether cognitive reappraisal produces its effect by reducing holding losses 
specifically. 
H 3.3 - Cognitive reappraisal will reduce holding losses but not affect cutting gains 
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2.5.5 Fourth research question 
The last research question follows directly from the third research question, and the 
motivations leading to the third research question also motivate the fourth research 
question. The exception to this is improving external validity by using retail investors as 
participants: to allow more complicated experimental procedures, it was necessary to 
use lay participants rather than a further sample of retails investors. However, external 
validity is still improved by using the realistic trading simulation.  
RQ 4 -  Does cognitive reappraisal affect the disposition effect and its constituent biases, 
by changing emotions during trading, when tested in novices under conditions of 
greater external validity? 
Since many aims were shared between the third and fourth research questions, the first 
three hypotheses mirrored those for the third research question: 
H 4.1 - Novices will show a disposition effect in a realistic trading simulation 
H 4.2 - Cognitive reappraisal will reduce the disposition effect 
H 4.3 - Cognitive reappraisal will reduce holding losses but not affect cutting gains 
However, the fourth research question goes further, since it aims to directly test the 
involvement of emotions in the disposition effect and the effect of cognitive reappraisal 
on emotions and the disposition effect. So, the fourth hypothesis tests that cognitive 
reappraisal is having the expected effect on emotions:      
H 4.4 - Cognitive reappraisal will reduce negative emotions experienced during 
trading 
The last hypothesis tests the proposed mechanism for how cognitive reappraisal reduces 
the disposition effect. Since higher negative emotions are expected to lead to a higher 
disposition effect, reducing them should also reduce the disposition effect. The final 
hypothesis tests whether this causal chain is supported:  
H 4.5 - Changes in emotions during trading will mediate the effect of reappraisal 
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3 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND METHODS 
The previous chapter has discussed literature relevant to the research questions in this 
thesis. This chapter begins discussing the research philosophy that underlies this thesis, 
and justifies the methods adopted given that philosophy. Research philosophy comprises 
the philosophical positions a researcher takes about the nature of reality (ontology), the 
kind of knowledge we can hold about reality and how to generate that knowledge 
(epistemology). Three broad research philosophies will be discussed: subjectivism, 
positivism, and realism. This thesis adopts realism. This is the mainstream position taken 
in psychological science and experimental behavioural finance, the fields this thesis 
contributes to. 
Chapters 4-7 include discussions of methods which relate specifically to the results in 
those chapters. However, the second part of this the chapter discusses some methods 
which are shared by all three studies in this thesis (the Milan, London and OU studies). 
This includes a discussion of the realistic trading simulation (two-index game), and how 
it improves ecological validity.  
Also, some methods which differ across studies are dealt with together here and 
compared across studies, rather than have short standalone sections in later chapters. 
This includes participants, protocol and participant incentives. 
3.1 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
There are, very broadly, two main schools of thought in research: subjectivism and 
empiricism. They differ, again in very broad terms, in their beliefs about whether 
research in the social sciences should emulate the approach taken in the natural sciences 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015). Each has their own different associated beliefs about ontology 
and epistemology. Ontology deals with beliefs about the nature of reality. What exists in 
the world, for researchers to study? Epistemology concerns our theory of knowledge, 
93 
 
and how we obtain that knowledge. What kind of knowledge is an acceptable product of 
the research process? 
Note that subjectivism is used here as a general term for many related research 
philosophies. This account is only a brief treatment, so only seeks to sketch out what 
they have in common, to demonstrate that they are inappropriate for the research 
carried out here. 
Subjectivism typically holds a constructionist ontology. Constructionism believes that 
reality consists only of the perceptions and interpretations of social actors, who negotiate 
the meaning of their actions and environment. Reality is socially constructed within the 
mind of each person: this does not mean that each person has their own interpretation 
of an underlying objective reality, but that reality is those interpretations. Each person 
constructs their own reality through their interactions with and interpretation of their 
social environment. 
In contrast, empiricism holds an objectivist ontology like the natural sciences. Reality is 
external to social actors, and it is beyond the perceptions of the individuals that are 
involved in studying it (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The purpose of research is to uncover and 
understand this reality. 
Subjectivism usually has an interpretivist epistemology. Interpretivism sees humans as 
fundamentally different to the topics studied by the natural sciences, so the methods 
used and knowledge gained are fundamentally different to those in the natural sciences. 
It attempts to study human behaviour by understanding how people interpret the world 
around them. Its goal is to understand the concepts and meanings used by people, and 
how they shape their reality. These are elucidated by penetrating the “frames of 
meaning”, which social actors draw upon when they construct their reality. The 
researcher’s role is to discover what these socially constructed meanings are, then 
describe them in academic language (Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
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On the other hand, empiricism’s epistemology holds that since there is an external 
reality (following objectivism) research should proceed by measuring it. Knowledge is 
obtained by gathering data about this external reality through our senses, to form 
theories or test hypotheses about it. Usually it favours deductive theory, where theory is 
used to form hypotheses, which are tested using these data. Research should be carried 
out objectively, simply observing the data and drawing conclusions from it. 
Empiricism corresponds with the philosophy usually associated with natural sciences. A 
popular view is that “science is a structure based on facts” (Davies, 1968); however, an 
epistemology is more than this, because it needs an account of what constitute facts. 
Empiricism takes the view that facts are generated by objective observation of the 
external world. Interpretivism opposes this and holds that facts are constructed by 
people: facts cannot be simply observed, but can only be understood by engaging with 
how each person interprets their reality. 
This thesis adopts an empiricist approach. Trading biases are conceived as stable 
patterns of behaviour that people objectively possess, similar to personality traits. One 
purpose of the research is to build evidence that these tendencies do indeed exist and 
affect trading behaviour. This demonstrates an objectivist approach to ontology. 
Trading behaviour is measured directly from trading decisions made within experiments, 
and these measurements are considered to be objective facts. In contrast, a subjectivist 
approach might ask participants about their trading behaviour or their interpretation of 
it. This thesis does not seek to interrogate people’s understanding of their disposition 
effect, but is interested in measuring their trading behaviour and making objective 
comparisons between participants and between different experimental conditions. 
The effect of cognitive reappraisal on trading is calculated objectively, as changes in 
measurable variables that independent observers will always calculate identically. 
Changes in trading behaviour do not depend on whether participants perceive their bias 
as having been reduced. Indeed, participants are not asked whether they think they 
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have a disposition effect, to avoid prejudicing the decisions they make in the game. Nor 
are they asked whether they think their disposition effect has been reduced after the 
intervention of reappraisal. Again, the approach taken here is clearly objectivist. What 
matters is the direct observation of trading patterns, not how participants perceive or 
interpret their trading patterns. 
3.1.1.1 Positivism versus realism 
Although the research philosophy adopted is empiricism, there are different approaches 
within empiricism. I will briefly distinguish two main schools of thoughts, positivism and 
realism, and explain why realism is adopted. 
The distinction between positivism and realism is not always clear. The term positivism is 
used in a variety of ways, and is sometimes used as a synonym for what I have termed 
here as empiricism. Many writers criticise “positivism”; however, it is often not clear 
whether they mean to refer to positivism as set out below, or are critical of any 
methodology which resembles a scientific approach (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Similarly, 
researchers may identify as positivist, when meaning that their research broadly follows 
a natural sciences approach such as using quantitative methods to measure phenomena 
and test hypotheses about them. I draw a distinction between positivism and realism 
here below based on the position of the researcher towards unobservable theoretical 
entities. 
Strictly speaking, positivism is concerned with describing the relationship between 
observable objects and events. Knowledge is gained by generalizing from our 
observations. Positivism holds that phenomena which cannot be observed are not the 
proper objects of scientific research. It rejects the aim of producing a description of 
unobservable phenomena, and positivist methods do not seek to explain behaviour 
(Outhwaite, 1987). 
This kind of approach is common with economics, and particularly econometrics. 
Econometrics is not concerned with the actual processes involved when individuals make 
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decisions. It is usually not interested in establishing the realism of the theories, i.e. 
whether theories are an accurate description of reality, but only whether they predict the 
outcomes they should. Can a theory accurately predict whether X follows Y? This is the 
kind of approach argued for by Friedman (1953): all that matters about a theory is its 
predictive power. The researcher attempts only to specific quantitative relationships 
between observable phenomena. This approach applied to the disposition effect would 
define it, study the conditions under which it occurs, and perhaps under what conditions 
it remained constant or changed. However, it would not attempt to explain why this 
behaviour occurred. 
Realism differs from positivism in that it holds that unobservable phenomena are also 
appropriate objects of research. We can gain knowledge about them by testing 
hypotheses using observable phenomena connected to them. The aim of realism is to 
explain observable phenomena in terms of the underlying real objects and mechanisms 
which produce them. Its epistemology is that we gain knowledge by building models of 
structures and objects which can account for the observable phenomena (Bryman and 
Bell, 2015). (Constructive empiricism (van Fraasen, 1980) takes a similar approach, but 
without the principle that these models are a true description of reality). 
In the first two research questions, this thesis seeks to establish that the disposition 
effect, cutting gains and holding losses have trait-like characteristics, which can be 
studied through their expression in observable trading behaviour. In positivist research, 
the trading behaviour itself would be the subject of interest. Instead, here the trading 
behaviour is the expression of underlying behavioural tendencies. The purpose of this 
research is to gain knowledge about the causes of trading behaviour by building models 
of behavioural tendencies which account for the observed trading behaviour. 
These behavioural tendencies are not used as intervening variables, but as trait-like 
characteristics that people possess (MacCorquodale and Meehl, 1948). They are 
assumed to really exist and are a cause of trading behaviour. This view of the production 
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of behaviour is analogous to personality traits. Actual behaviour varies depending on a 
person’s current mental state and surrounding environment, but personality traits are 
real psychological phenomena that produce differences in behaviour between people. 
Therefore, this thesis adopts a realist position regarding behavioural tendencies in 
trading. 
In the second two research questions, the expression of trading behaviour is 
manipulated using emotion regulation. This tests how observable trading behaviour is 
changed by different experimental conditions. However, this is associated with a model 
where emotions experienced during trading play a casual role in producing these trading 
behaviours. It is proposed that the effect of cognitive reappraisal is mediated by these 
emotions: a reduction in emotions experienced is the mechanism by which cognitive 
reappraisal is hypothesised to function. The claim is that changes in unobserved 
emotions are causally responsible for changes in trading behaviour, and the OU study 
attempts to indirectly measure emotions to test this hypothesis Again, this is a realist 
perspective. 
As mentioned above, the approach adopted here is also adopted within mainstream 
psychological science. This “seeks to discover, describe, and explain psychological 
phenomena and processes through the logic and method of science”2. Thus, it broadly 
adopts the same philosophical stances as the natural sciences in seeking to explain and 
understand psychological phenomena. Unobservable psychological phenomena are 
understood as having an objective existence, and are amenable to study by empirical 
and experimental methods to understand their relations to the observable world. 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
                                           
2 http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/publications/observer/2013/may- 
june-13/the-eitheror-of-psychological-science-a-reflection.html 
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Methods used to study the disposition effect were reviewed in the previous chapter. 
However, they will be revisited here, to explain how the methods used in this thesis link 
with the research philosophy described above. 
As discussed above, an interpretivist approach has not been adopted. This thesis does 
not attempt to gain a qualitative understanding of how investors interpret or relate to 
the disposition effect. Qualitative approaches such as interviews, case studies, 
ethnography etc. are common when an interpretivist approach is adopted, but not as 
commonly used without it. Most research on the disposition effect is quantitative, and 
uses one of two methodologies: analysis of secondary data, or experiments. Both 
methodologies tend to follow the scientific method: forming hypotheses with deductive 
reasoning, then testing them by operationalising the variables in hypotheses. This thesis 
adopts the same approach. 
Secondary data usually involves analysing trading data from real world financial 
markets. Its strength is that it directly measures trading behaviour in an environment 
where it occurs. If the research question is simply to prove that a disposition effect 
occurs in a specific market, then this can be demonstrated easily by interpretation of the 
observed behaviour. However, one weakness of this approach is when research is 
interested in the association of the disposition effect with other independent variables. 
These variables often must be estimated with proxies, weakening the external validity of 
the conclusions of the study. 
A greater weakness of secondary data though, for this thesis, is that the researcher 
cannot directly manipulate variables. Even if independent variables are measured with 
100% accuracy, secondary data can only show association rather than causation. So, 
using secondary data lacks internal validity in the conclusions drawn. Richards (2012) 
used a mixed method of secondary data and questionnaires to show that investors who 
habitually use reappraisal have some reduction in disposition effect. The use of 
questionnaires is an improvement on solely secondary data; however, it still only shows 
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association between variables. There could be some other reason why investors who 
habitually use reappraisal also show a difference in disposition effect. 
The third and fourth research questions test the effect of cognitive reappraisal on the 
disposition effect. To improve the internal validity of this test an experimental design is 
adopted. An experimental group is compared with a control group to assess the effect of 
reappraisal. Pre-intervention and post-intervention measurements of trading behaviour 
are used to measure any change in behaviour. Using this design, there is strong internal 
validity in attributing causation of changes in the disposition effect to reappraisal. 
This design also has an additional benefit, related to the motivation for researching 
reappraisal’s effect on the disposition effect. The main motivation is theoretical, to 
investigate whether and how reappraisal changes the disposition effect. However, a 
secondary motivation is to show that reappraisal is a practical method that investors can 
use to improve their decision making. An excellent way to demonstrate this is by asking 
investors with no experience of reappraisal to begin implementing it.  
The compromise the increased internal validity from the experimental design is 
decreased external validity. Trading behaviour is measured using a realistic stock market 
simulation game (the two-index game), rather than measuring it from trading decisions. 
However, to mitigate this, this thesis makes additional improvements in the external 
validity of the experiments carried out. In addition, the Milan study used to support the 
third research question uses retail investors as participant, rather than students or 
laymen. This increase in external validity while maintain internal validity from an 
experimental design is one of main the contributions the thesis aims to make, as 
explained in the previous chapter. 
The first and second research questions also use the experimental data, but by 
combining it with data from the scale and trading data. The first research question aims 
to demonstrate that the disposition effect is a stable bias which shows convergent 
validity. The aim to show the existence of the disposition effect as a bias is motivated by 
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the realist perspective adopted: to show that the disposition effect is not merely a 
pattern of behaving, but is driven by an underlying trading bias. 
To demonstrate intra-individual stability, the trading biases are measured multiple times 
in the research design. However, to demonstrate convergent validity, two methods of 
measuring trading biases are needed, so that variables driven by the same proposed 
bias can be compared. So, in addition to the two-index game, participants also 
completed the disposition effect scale. This asks about their behaviour and attitudes 
when trading in financial markets. Further discussion of this method is included in 
chapters 3 and 4. 
The second research question aims to demonstrate that cutting gains and holding losses 
are stable biases, which show convergent and discriminant validity. Again, the aim to 
show the existence of these biases is motivated by the realist perspective adopted. The 
method used is an extension of that used for the first research question, in that it 
combines data from the two-index game and the disposition effect scale. In addition, 
factor analysis is performed with the scale to produce separate variables for cutting 
gains and holding losses. 
This research design is based on the multitrait-multimethod matrix (MTMM), developed 
by Campbell and Fiske (1959). Intra-individual stability, convergent validity and 
discriminant validity are demonstrated by producing evidence for three assertions. 
Variables produce stable scores when repeatedly measured. Constructs which are 
theoretically related to each other (by latent traits) are observed as related to each 
other. Constructs which are not theoretically related to each other (because they 
measure different latent traits) are not observed as being related to each other. This is 
demonstrated by assessing the pattern of correlations between the same and different 
constructs, and comparing these patterns to those expected from theory. 
In summary, two research designs are adopted in this thesis. Both are empirical and test 
research questions developed in the previous chapter. The first and second research 
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questions combine experimental data with a scale and trading data, and are based on 
the multitrait-multimethod matrix (MTMM). The third and fourth research questions use 
an experimental design that combines high internal validity when testing reappraisal, 
with increased external validity of that test. 
3.3  METHODS 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a main contribution of this thesis is to test 
cognitive reappraisal with greater external validity. This section describes how this is 
achieved. External validity is increased in two ways. Firstly, by increasing the ecological 
validity of how trading behaviour is measured in the lab. Second, by testing cognitive 
reappraisal using more representative participants. This section discusses how these 
improvements are made. 
The main focus is the two-index game: this is the main method of measuring trading 
behaviours in the thesis and is used extensively in all three studies. This provides a key 
improvement compared with previous research on the disposition effect. The game is 
described, and it is explained why using it increases the ecological validity of the studies. 
The measurement of the disposition effect, cutting gains and holding losses is explained 
using it is also discussed. 
The second part of improving the external validity of the studies is using more 
representative samples of participants in experimental work. This thesis includes two 
samples of retail investors, and one working adult sample. Further details of participant 
samples, recruitment and incentives are provided. 
The experimental protocols are similar between all three studies. These are sketched out 
and contrasted, though more detail is given in later chapters. Participant incentives 
across the studies are also discussed. 
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3.3.1 The Two-Index Game 
In the previous chapter, concerns were raised about the ecological validity of previous 
research on the disposition effect, which uses unrealistic environments for decision 
making. To build and improve on previous research, this thesis uses a stock market 
trading simulation called the two-index game (“the TIG”). The two-index game was 
developed as part of the xDelia project, an EU FP7 project which also studied the 
disposition effect, and adapted to suit the purposes of this thesis. This trading simulation 
significantly increases the ecological validity of the decision environment where trading 
decisions are made by participants. The nature of the game and how it achieves this is 
discussed further in this section. 
The TIG presents participants with two moving indices (thus the name). One index 
shows the current price of a stock, and the other gives predictive information about 
future price movements. These are called the value index and predictor index, 
respectively. Figure 3.1 below is a screenshot of the game during play. 
Figure 3.1 Screenshot of the two-index game 
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One drawback of previous experimental work is that participants had to respond to fixed 
prices: the price at the point they made a selling decision did not change while they were 
deciding what to do. Even in the case of Weber and Camerer (1998), who had 14 
decision points, they were still fixed. This meant that participants do not have to deal 
with continuously varying prices. The two-index game improves on this by continuously 
changing the price of the stock being traded in real-time: the value index changes 
continuously as it would in real financial markets. 
A related drawback of previous experimental research is that participants had to make 
decisions about holding or selling positions at fixed points. This experimental design is 
easier to administer, since there is no need to allow participants to make trades at any 
point. It is easy to setup a comparison of decisions about gains and losses, when choices 
are limited and the researcher can control whether a participant faces a gain or loss. It 
also simplifies data analysis, if the options participants consider are known in advance.  
However, this approach reduces ecological validity, compared with trading in financial 
markets. Investors can trade markets in real time and can make decisions at any point. 
The two-index game attempts to capture this flexibility by also allowing participants to 
buy and sell positions at any time during the game. This allows them to consider buying, 
holding and selling shares in response to a continuously changing price. This is intended 
to be more cognitively demanding and emotionally arousing, because there is never a 
point in the game where participants can stop attending to the game: every moment of 
the game can be spent thinking about whether to hold or sell shares (or to buy shares if 
they are not currently being held). 
Other features which increase ecological validity are the ability to short-sell and to take 
positions of varying sizes. Positions can be bought in sizes of 1, 3, 5 or 10 units (though 
some other studies do allow positions of different quantities to be taken). Short-selling 
allows investors to make money when the current price falls, by short-selling stocks at 
one price then closing that position at a lower price. This is a mirror image to how 
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investors make money by buying stocks at one price then closing that position (i.e. 
selling them) at a higher price. Short-selling has not been incorporated into previous 
experimental papers on the disposition effect. Although short-selling is not analysed 
separately from conventional trading, the fact that participants could trade this way, and 
these decisions were included when calculating a disposition effect, is itself is a novel 
feature of the studies in this thesis.  
3.3.1.1 The predictor index 
In addition to a lack of available options when making trading decisions, another 
significant drawback of previous experimental work is the information participants are 
given when deciding whether to hold or sell stocks. This has been much simpler than in 
financial markets, reducing the ecological validity of those studies. The cognitive 
demands on participants have been much lower than investors in financial markets, so 
decisions in experiments are not made in the same environment that investors face. 
Often participants have only price information to use in making decisions. This arguably 
encourages participants to display a disposition effect. Participants know that an 
experiment of this kind involves them making decisions using the information available. 
However, when little information is provided by the researchers, it implies that they 
should use the information they have available, which includes whether they have made 
a gain or loss. So, the less information that is provided, the more the setup encourages 
them to act on information about gains and loss, generating a disposition effect. A 
disposition effect may be produced by participants, but it may lack external validity (i.e. 
would not be replicated in real trading) since it is produced in a situation that lacks 
ecological validity. 
Even studies which provided some form of predictive information have simple setups 
compared with financial markets. For example Lee et al. (1998) used ‘analyst forecasts’ 
which indicated that a stock was likely to rise (or fall) in the next period. These were 
presented as fixed predictions at each decision point. In Weber and Camerer (1998) 
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participants had a selection of stocks to trade, and were told that stocks had pre-existing 
probabilities of rising or falling in each trading period.3 This is certainly a more 
complicated setup, but this information still did not change in real-time: the probabilities 
were fixed at the beginning of the experiment and were unchanged over the 17 discrete 
trading periods participants observed. Since the probabilities were known and fixed, it is 
also a scenario about dealing with risk, rather than uncertainty, using the definitions 
from Knight (1921). Financial markets involve dealing with uncertainty rather than risk, 
and so does the two-index game. 
The TIG improves on this by presenting participants with a prediction index. This has two 
features that greatly increase the cognitive demands of using this information. First, it 
changes in real-time like the price index does. Second, the relationship between the two 
indices is not revealed to participants, so there is high uncertainty about how to use the 
information in the predictor index to make decisions. This predictor index conceptually 
represents the many sources of information (in addition to the price history) which 
investors use when they make trading decisions. These sources of information also 
change continuously and have high levels of uncertainty in their implications for stock 
prices.  
Movements in the value index are generated with a combination of random processes 
and information from the predictor index described below (though this was not revealed 
to participants) and are designed to mimic the movements found in financial markets. 
Participants were told (truthfully) that the predictor index provided some information 
about future movements of the price index, but that it was up to them to decide how to 
use it. In practical terms, using the predictor index was extremely difficult, increasing 
the complexity of the task given to participants. So, the predictor index makes the game 
                                           
3 Participants were not told which probabilities related to which stock. This was left for 
the participants to estimate, by analysing the price movements of each stock over 
successive fixed trading periods. 
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more cognitively demanding; it also increases its similarity to a real trading 
environment, both of which improve ecological validity. 
The basic relationship between the indices is that the value index copies previous 
movements of the predictor index with some delay, so that the predictor index moves a 
little ahead in time of the value index. However, there are several complications added 
to this trend to mask this relationship and make it more cognitively demanding to use.4 
The time delay between indices changes in duration using a sinusoidal function, so that 
participants cannot anticipate future price movements simply by looking a fixed time 
ahead in the predictor index. 
The value index does not always mirror changes in the predictor index. The game engine 
uses 10 “ticks” per second. On each of these ticks, the predictor index may rise, fall, or 
stay the same. Whether the value index copies the predictor index movement on each 
tick is based on a binomial distribution (to copy or not copy). This produces unreliability 
in the predictive signal that the predictor index generates. 
The movement in the predictor index is also multiplied by a constant when that the 
direction is copied but not the same magnitude. Periodically, the value index moves in 
the opposite direction to the predictor index. In addition to all these, random noise 
(Brownian motion, Merton (1971)) is added to both indices. 
Overall, the relationship between the two indices is difficult to follow with any accuracy. 
The main purpose of the predictor index was to make participants think about 
incorporating information other than the purchase price into their decisions in real time. 
This much more closely represents how decisions are made on stock markets. 
                                           
4 Full details of how the indices behave are given in Lins & Yee (2011) and Yee & Lins 
(2011). 
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3.3.2 Measurement of the disposition effect 
Playing the game produces a record of all the trades made during the game. Using this 
‘trading record’ a disposition effect can be calculated for each participant for each play of 
the game. In effect, it allows a sample of each participant’s trading patterns to be 
measured in a short space of time in an experimental setup. This allows experimental 
interventions to be tested experimentally, whilst still maintaining a high degree of 
ecological validity. 
To demonstrate a disposition effect, it is necessary to show a difference in the selling of 
gains versus losses. There are two main methods of doing so in the literature. Odean’s 
(1998) PGR-PLR method is commonly used in both field and experimental studies, and 
compares the relative frequency of selling in gains and losses. The main alternative to 
Odean’s method is survival analysis. These methods are sketched out, before discussing 
how Odean’s method is adapted for use in this study. 
3.3.2.1 Survival analysis 
A disposition effect, meaning cutting gains and holding losses, will result in losses being 
held longer than gains, since they are less likely to be sold at any given time. Survival 
analysis is a regression-based method used by Feng and Seasholes (2005). It models 
how long a stock will be held for; Feng and Seasholes use the number of days a stock is 
held from its initial purchase until it is sold entirely. 
Parameters in the model adjust the probability that a stock will be held on any given 
day. Dummy variables code whether a stock is being held at a gain or loss, compared 
with the purchase price. The trading gains indicator (TGI) takes a value of 1 on any day 
where a stock is trading at a paper gain, or is sold at a gain. Conversely the trading loss 
indicator (TLI) takes a value of 1 on any day that a stock is trading at a paper loss, or is 
sold a loss. These are compared to the baseline, when a stock is deemed to not be 
trading at a gain or loss (when the purchase price falls between the daily high and low 
market prices). The disposition effect is demonstrated when these parameters 
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significantly affect the probability that a stock is held on any given day, in the direction 
expected with a disposition effect. So TGI decreases the probability a gain is held (i.e. it 
is more likely to be sold) and TLI increases the probability a loss is held (i.e. it is less 
likely to be sold). 
This method is useful when the focus of a study is either controlling for or testing the 
influence of individual continuous variables, which are more easily dealt with in a 
regression model; however, this is not the case here. 
3.3.2.2 PGR-PLR 
Odean’s PGR-PLR method compares the proportion of gains realised (“realised” meaning 
sold) with the proportion of losses realised. These are abbreviated to PGR and PLR. Each 
proportion is calculated as the number of observed sales at a gain or loss, as a 
proportion of the potential sales at a gain or loss. So, PGR and PLR represent the 
frequency of selling gains and losses, after adjusting for the opportunity to make those 
sales given the stocks in an investor’s portfolio. 
A stock which is sold is compared with the purchase price and classified as a realised 
gain or loss. For other stocks in the portfolio, their purchase price is compared to the 
daily market high or low price. A stock purchased for a price below above the daily 
market low is classified as a paper gain. A stock purchased for a price above the daily 
market high is classified as a paper loss. Using market high and low prices is a 
simplification to avoid having to use real time price data rather than daily data for stock 
prices. 
PGR and PLR are defined as: 
𝑃𝐺𝑅 =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 + 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠
 
 
𝑃𝐿𝑅 =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
 
109 
 
The disposition effect implies that losses will be held more than gains. It follows that if 
losses are held longer, they must be sold less frequently on average. However, an 
investor with many more losses in their portfolio than gains would be more likely to sell 
any one loss than any one gain. Using information about potential gains and losses takes 
this into account. A disposition effect is demonstrated when the proportion of available 
losses sold is lower than the proportion of available gains sold. This occurs when a loss is 
likely to be sold then again, ceteris paribus.  
The disposition effect can be reported as a difference (PGR minus PLR) or a ratio (PGR 
divided by PLR). If a difference, PGR should be greater than PLR. A ratio shows the 
relative likelihood in selling a gain versus a ratio. A ratio of 1 means that gains and 
losses are equally likely to be sold. A ratio above 1 demonstrates that gains are more 
likely to be sold than losses. A ratio below 1 shows a “reverse disposition effect” where 
losses are more likely to be sold than gains. 
In field studies, these ratios are usually calculated on each day during a trading record 
that stocks are sold (since on days that no trades take place, both proportions will be 
zero). Individual investors’ disposition effects can be calculated by taking the average of 
each ratio over the whole period of a trading record. Alternatively, ratios can be 
aggregated over different periods of time, different classes of investors etc., as the 
research questions for each study require. Experimental studies usually make this 
comparison between groups. Participants are split into groups trading gains or losses, 
and disposition effect is demonstrated by showing a difference between those groups.  
3.3.2.3 PGR-PLR adapted in this thesis 
Odean’s PGR-PLR terminology is used in this thesis for measurements calculated with the 
two-index game. However, PGR and PLR need to be adapted to be applied to the two-
index game. The game produces a “trading record” analogous to the records used in field 
studies, but only one stock is traded. So, gains or losses sold as a proportion of the 
number of stocks available in a portfolio does not make sense. 
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As discussed earlier, the conceptual basis of PGR and PLR is to measure how frequently 
gains and losses are sold, after adjusting for the opportunity investors have to sell them. 
In the two-index game, the opportunity to sell them is measured by the total holding 
time for gains / losses, rather than the number of paper gains / losses. The holding time 
is measured in “ticks” during the game, which represent tenths of a second. 
So, PGR and PLR are defined in this study as: 
𝑃𝐺𝑅 =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 (𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑠)
 
 
𝑃𝐿𝑅 =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 (𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑠)
 
The disposition effect is defined as a ratio of these variables: 
𝐷𝐸 =  
𝑃𝐺𝑅
𝑃𝐿𝑅
 
This measurement of holding time is possible because of the flexible options that 
participants have when playing the game. Unlike other experimental studies, participants 
could hold positions for as long as they wished, and the holding period can be precisely 
measured and compared to other participants. One criticism that Feng and Seasholes 
(2005) makes of Odean’s method is that Odean neglects all information from days where 
trades do not take place. They use survival analysis to allow this information to be used. 
However, the two-index game also allows all the information available in the trading 
record to be used. 
In this thesis, DE is used to refer to a disposition effect score which has been calculated 
using data from the two-index game. Similarly, PGR and PLR refer to scores from the 
two-index game. The ratio is used since it has a more intuitive interpretation than the 
absolute difference between PGR and PLR. This is especially so in this study: the use of 
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holding time in the denominator makes the absolute figures for PGR and PLR very low 
and not intuitively meaningful. 
PGR and PLR tend to be small, since the holding time figure is much greater than the 
number of trades made in each game. In addition, they are both bounded by zero, so 
their distributions have positive skew; to produce approximately normal distributions of 
PGR and PLR each variable is log transformed. DE is the ratio of the variables; however, 
DE is also log transformed. The terms PGR, PLR and DE refer to the log transformed 
variables unless noted otherwise.  
An investor has no disposition effect where PGR is equal to PLR. Before logging, this 
produced a ratio 1. Since it is a ratio, DE greater than 1 corresponds with a disposition 
effect, and represents how many times more likely it is that a gain is sold compared with 
a loss (after adjusting for the opportunity to realize each type). DE is equal to PGR/PLR, 
so after logging, log(DE) is equal to log(PGR/PLR), which is equal to log(PGR) minus 
log(PLR). This means that an investor with no disposition effect has a DE of zero. 
3.3.3 Participants 
As discussed in the previous chapter, most experimental studies use students as 
participants. Experimental studies of trading decisions implicitly assume that their 
samples are representative of populations who trade on financial markets. To claim 
external validity, one sample must make trading decisions in the same way as the other. 
Studies involving emotion regulation make a similar assumption: the effect of emotion 
regulation on the sample and target population is the same. A contribution of this thesis 
is to increase the external validity of its conclusions by carrying out experiments with 
more representative participants. To achieve this, three samples of participants were 
used in the three studies included. 
The London and Milan studies use retail investors. Retail investors actively trade their 
own capital, and are drawn from the same population studied in field studies of retail 
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investors. They have familiarity with the trading tasks used in these studies compared 
with the novice participant samples usually used in experimental studies. 
A further aim of the thesis is to create interventions which can be used by retail 
investors to improve their financial decisions. So, these participant samples are drawn 
from the very same population of people that we wish to generalise the results to. In 
addition, of course, retail investors are more like the wider population of investors than 
students are. 
The Milan study recruited participants at the trading conference “Trading Online Expo” 
run by Borsa Italiana (the Italian stock exchange) in central Milan. This Expo is aimed at 
private retail investors who trade on the stock market with their own capital. The Expo 
featured two days of parallel sessions of talks and seminars about trading and finance, 
and promotional stands around the main area mostly hosted by trading services 
companies. The Open University Business School also had a promotional stand, where 
participants were recruited and played the game for the first time. 
Participants for the London study were recruited from two similar trade fairs in London: 
the London Investor Show in Olympia, and the World Money Show in the QEII 
conference centre. Both events in London are marketed as educational conferences 
aimed at investors trading privately with their own capital. As with Trading Online Expo 
there are also commercial stands, and a stand was used to recruit participants for the 
study. The stand was only used to explain the study to attendees and recruit 
participants, since the study was conducted entirely online. These participants are only 
used for the first and second research questions. 
The OU study (at the Open University using a non-trader convenience sample) used a 
sample of the adults rather than retail investors.  However, the sample is a moderate 
improvement on the common sample set of undergraduate students, having a broader 
demographic makeup. Participants came from doctoral students, academic staff and 
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non-academic staff from across the Open University campus. This also resulted in a 
broad range of ages. 
3.3.4 Protocols 
In the Milan study, participants initially filled out a short demographics questionnaire and 
gave their consent to take part (all instructions were doubled in English and Italian). 
Participants took an interactive video tutorial about how to play the game, and then 
played the game the first time (plat 1). The aim was that by playing the game once in 
person, it would discourage dropout later. After the Expo, participants were contacted by 
email to complete the study online. Between play 2 and play 3 participants answered the 
disposition effect scale, which is analysed in chapter 5. Further details are provided 
about the Milan study in chapter 6. 
The London study protocol was very similar to the Milan one, except that no participation 
took place at the venues in London. They provided their contact details and were 
contacted online following the trade fairs, when they were prompted to complete the 
entire study. 
The OU study was carried out in person on the Open University campus in Milton Keynes. 
Questionnaires were completed on paper, while temporary “labs” were set up using 
laptops around the campus to play the game. 
Carrying out the study in person with layman was intended to increase sample size, 
improve data quality and reduce (or eliminate) dropout during the study. Compared with 
the other studies this allowed a relatively large sample to be collected, to more robustly 
replicate tests from the Milan study. The study also contained repeated questionnaires 
about emotions experienced. These may have been off-putting for retail investors, but 
were easily administered with the researcher in person. Further details are provided 
about the OU study in chapter 6. 
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A common feature of all 3 studies is that participants played the simulation four times in 
total, with each play generating a record of their trading decisions. Each game lasted 10 
minutes in the Milan and London studies, and 5 minutes in the OU study. Multiple plays 
of the game had several aims.  
The first aim was to allow multiple measurements of trading biases, for use in the first 
and second research questions. The second aim was to allow pre-intervention and post-
intervention measurements, to assess the impact of cognitive reappraisal in the third 
and fourth research questions. The third aim was to give participants time to familiarise 
themselves with the mechanics of the game before they attempted to use cognitive 
reappraisal. This was particularly important for the lay sample in the OU study, who 
were obviously were much less familiar with the process of trading than the experienced 
investor samples. 
After completion, participants were emailed feedback on their performance and 
comparison to the group overall. They were also debriefed on the disposition effect and 
given feedback about their disposition effect too. 
3.3.5 Participant Incentives 
3.3.5.1 Milan and London studies 
Monetary incentives were considered for the Milan and London studies; However, they 
were rejected for several reasons, both theoretical and practical. It was felt that small 
monetary amounts would not be sufficiently large to motivate investors who regularly 
traded much larger amounts of their own capital. 
Providing small incentives may frame participation as “work” for which they were being 
lightly compensated, and it wouldn’t be worth their time to take part. If the purpose of 
taking part was perceived as the chance to win small amounts of money, participants 
may not engage seriously with the game if they feel the amounts at stake are not worth 
worrying about. Finally, providing only small incentives to take part might make the 
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study appear amateur, compared with the much larger amounts being discussed at the 
trading fairs and the professional firms on other promotional stands. 
Instead of monetary incentives, participants were offered feedback on their performance 
in the game, comparing them with other participants. At recruitment, they were told the 
research was about the impact of emotions on their trading (without the detail about the 
disposition effect to avoid influencing outcomes participants). In their feedback, they 
were also de-briefed about true purpose of the study being to study the disposition 
effect, and its potential effect on their trading. 
The studies were promoted as an opportunity to get insight into their own trading 
patterns and emotions during trading. This is often of great interest to retail investors; 
indeed, many were surprised that we weren’t charging anything for the service! The 
prospect of feedback on their performance aimed to encourage participants to take the 
game seriously, despite their being no monetary rewards at stake. By explicitly 
comparing participants with each other, participants were encouraged to engage 
competitively, focus their attention on the game and treat it seriously. 
3.3.5.2 OU study 
The OU study was run more conventionally, providing incentives to take part for about 
an hour on campus. Participants were informed that a virtual lottery would take place 
following the study, and that a £40 voucher was available for every 5 people who took 
part in the study. Tickets to this ‘lottery’ were allocated based on scores for the third and 
fourth plays of the game. 120 participants were recruited; the highest scoring participant 
received 120 virtual “tickets”, the second highest score received 119 tickets, and so on 
until the lowest scoring participant was given 1 ticket. 
This incentive structure was chosen to fulfil multiple aims. Participants were encouraged 
to take the game seriously and try as hard as they could to get a good score. Offering a 
reward achieved this, while simply offering feedback on their trading may not have been 
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as appealing for a lay sample. Running a lottery provided an emotionally salient reward 
of £40, while keeping the average reward per participant affordable (£8). 
Each play lasted for 5 minutes in the OU study. However, it was desirable to keep 
participants motivated through the game. Using a relative ranking to run the lottery 
gave participants this incentive. Even if they were performing poorly halfway through the 
game (or perceived themselves as performing poorly), performing well in the second half 
could still have a significant effect on their chances of winning by raising their relative 
rank. 
Finally, a lottery gave every participant at least some chance of winning, even if they 
performed poorly. Without this, people who did not think they could win (for example if 
only a few prizes were given for the top scores) may have declined to take part. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the research philosophy, research design and some methods 
used in this thesis. This chapter began by discussing the research philosophy adopted. 
Very broadly, research can adopt subjectivism or some form of empiricism. This thesis 
contributes to the literature in behavioural economics and psychological science, and 
adopts an empiricist stance. It is interested in objectively studying trading behaviour, 
rather than studying how people construct their own understanding of trading behaviour. 
It applies the scientific method to carry out experiments, test hypotheses and draw 
conclusions. 
Within an empirical research stance, this thesis adopts realism rather than positivism. 
The research here is interested in making statements about unobservable phenomena, 
by inferring knowledge about them from what can be observed. 
Two methods are adopted. To address the first and second research questions, a 
combination of experimental data and questionnaire data is used. This is based on the 
multitrait-multimethod matrix developed by Campbell and Fiske (1959). Testing of the 
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cognitive reappraisal in the third and fourth research questions is carried with a classic 
intervention versus control experiment, using pre-intervention and post-intervention 
measurements. 
The two-index game the main instrument used to measure the disposition effect. The 
mechanisms of the game were explained, and how Odean’s PGR-PLR method is adapted 
to measure the disposition effect in the two-index game. Finally, details about the 
participants, protocols and participant incentives in the three studies included in this 
thesis were discussed.  
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4 TESTING THE NATURE OF TRADING BIASES USING THE 
TWO-INDEX GAME 
This chapter discusses empirical evidence which concerns the first two research 
questions. Tests in this chapter use data from the two-index game to argue that the 
disposition effect, cutting gains, and holding losses all have trait-like characteristics. It 
does so by establishing: intra-individual stability of all three biases, convergent validity 
of the disposition effect, and discriminant validity between cutting gains and holding 
losses. 
I begin by establishing that all three biases can be reliably measured, by analysing 
repeated measurements of all three biases using trading records from the two-index 
game. Intra-individual stability is assessed in three ways: by assessing patterns of 
bivariate correlations; by showing intra-individual stability in measurement over an 
extended period; and by estimating how much variance in a dataset of repeated 
measurements is attributable to differences between people. These tests are repeated 
for 3 independent samples (from the London, Milan and OU studies), producing strong 
evidence for intra-individual stability of these biases. 
The chapter goes on to test the convergent validity of the disposition effect. Convergent 
validity is established where variables which are theoretically related to each other are in 
fact observed as being related to each other. This is another important piece of evidence 
in establishing that the disposition effect is an underling individual bias, which exists 
independent of the situation it is measured, and influences behaviour across time and 
situations. 
If an underlying bias does drive patterns of behaviour, then it should be possible to 
measure it consistently using different methods. This is demonstrated here by 
correlating scores from the two-index game with disposition effects calculated from retail 
investors’ trading records in financial markets. 
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The chapter concludes by demonstrating that PGR and PLR have discriminant validity. 
Discriminant validity is the property that measurements of variables which are not 
theoretically related to each other are observed as not related to each other. This is 
crucial evidence for the hypothesis that cutting gains and holding losses are independent 
biases that have trait-like characteristics.  
The combination of these two subcomponents, cutting gains and holding losses, defines 
an individual’s disposition effect. However, it is argued not only that these biases have 
intra-individual stability, but that they are independent (or largely independent) biases. 
If they are independent, two individuals presenting the same disposition effect may 
display different levels of cutting gains and holding losses, even though they have the 
same overall disposition effect as other individuals. 
Discriminant validity is assessed by the pattern of correlations between PGR and PLR 
from the two-index, across repeated plays. The pattern is compared to what would be 
expected if the biases were both associated with a unitary underlying disposition effect, 
and what would be expected if they measured different tendencies, and what would be 
expected if they were completely independent. An extension of this method controls for 
the overall frequency of trading as a confounding factor. 
4.1 INTRA-INDIVIDUAL STABILITY OF TRADING BIASES IN THE TWO-
INDEX GAME 
4.1.1 Intra-individual stability of the disposition effect 
4.1.1.1 Intra-individual stability: Correlations between successive plays of the 
game 
If the disposition effect is a stable bias, it should be reliable over time. The disposition 
effect is measured here by the two-index game, whose output is processed to produce 
DE scores. Tables 3.1-3 show correlations for DE scores between successive plays are 
shown below from the London, Milan, and OU studies5. There are 4 plays from the 
                                           
5 Sample sizes were 50, 46 and 103 respectively. Listwise deletion was used. 
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London and OU studies, producing 6 bivariate correlations in each, while there are 3 
plays from the Milan study6 producing 3 bivariate correlations. 
Table 4.1 London study - correlations between DE on successive plays 
  Play 1 Play 2 Play 3 Play 4 
Play 1 Correlation -    
 p-value     
Play 2 Correlation .750 -   
 p-value <.001***    
Play 3 Correlation .669 .798 -  
 p-value <.001*** <.001   
Play 4 Correlation .680 .635 .761 - 
 p-value <.001*** <.001*** <.001***  
 
Table 4.2 Milan study – correlations between DE on successive plays 
  Play 2 Play 3 Play 4 
Play 2 Correlation -   
 p-value    
Play 3 Correlation .849 -  
 p-value <.001***   
Play 4 Correlation .788 .787 - 
 p-value <.001*** <.001**  
 
Table 4.3 OU study – correlations between DE on successive plays 
  Play 1 Play 2 Play 3 Play 4 
Play 1 Correlation -    
 p-value     
Play 2 Correlation .497 -   
 p-value <.001***    
Play 3 Correlation .534 .679 -  
 p-value <.001*** <.001***   
Play 4 Correlation .486 .668 .793 - 
  p-value <.001*** <.001*** <.001***  
The overall pattern is that DE scores are highly correlated over multiple plays, showing 
that DE scores do measure a stable pattern in the way people make trading decisions in 
the game. Cohen (1988) suggested correlation coefficient of 0.1 represented a small 
                                           
6 For the Milan study only plays 2, 3, and 4 are included. There are two reasons for this. 
First, many participants lost data for play 1, because of problems with wi-fi connectivity 
at the trade fair. Including play 1 would greatly reduce the sample size for these tests 
using listwise deletion. Second, participants who did have data for play 1 played this at 
the trade fair in Milan, and had a delay of at least a week before continuing with play 2 
online. Since the timing is qualitatively different from the latter three plays, correlations 
with them are tested as discussed in the following section. 
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effect, 0.3 for a medium effect, and 0.5 for a large effect. The correlations here average 
around 0.7, which might be called a “very large” effect. Any subsequent references to 
the size of effects relate to Cohen’s suggestions, unless otherwise noted. 
Cohen’s suggested benchmarks are often cited as hard rules, yet they were only 
suggestions (much like Fisher’s 0.05 criterion!) which need to be interpreted considering 
the source of the data and the goal of the study. The purpose of these correlations is to 
show that repeated measurements are driven by a shared underlying bias. It is argued 
here that correlations around 0.7 are definitely sufficient to plausibly make a case for 
that.  
In the OU study, correlations between play 1 and the other 3 plays are lower than 
between other pairs. Since play 1 is the first attempt at playing the game, participants 
may have been paid more attention to learning about how the game works, and less 
attention to the positions of their trades (as gains or losses). This would diminish the 
expression of any disposition effect in their DE scores, which could account for the lower 
correlations. However, this effect is not apparent with play 1 in the London study. 
Participants in this study were retail investors, so this suggests they found the game less 
difficult to understand initially, and did not require much practice to play it fluently and 
express their normal patterns of decision-making. 
4.1.1.2 Intra-individual stability over an extended period 
In the London and OU studies, all four plays took place during the same session. 
However, for the Milan study, play 1 was played at recruitment in Italy, while plays 2-4 
were played online a week or more later. This time difference allows testing of the 
stability of their disposition effect over a longer period. While the data is only available 
for 15 participants due to data loss, all these correlations are still strong, shown in table 
4.4. Note that even the correlation with play 4 is still large, despite the additional noise 
generated by the experimental intervention between groups. So, this provides further 
good support that disposition effect scores are reliable over extended periods of time. 
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Table 4.4 Correlations of DE between play 1 with other plays in the Milan study 
 Play 2 Play 3 Play 4 
Correlation .732 .702 .568 
p-value .002** .004** .027* 
4.1.1.3 Variance in DE accounted for by differences between participants 
A complementary analysis of intra-individual stability looks at how variance over 
successive plays can be split into between-participants and within-participants variance. 
High between-participants variance means that most variation in scores is due to 
differences between participants, and low within-participants variance means that each 
individual participant’s scores do not differ much over repeated measurements. If most 
variation in scores is due to differences between participants, we can conclude that 
differences between people are stable and we have evidence for a bias that reliably 
differs between people. 
Intercept-only random models were used to assess this. In this type of model, the total 
variance in a sample around the overall mean is divided into between-participant 
variance, and residual variance. (The overall mean is known as the intercept, thus the 
name of the model). Each participant has an individual mean for their scores (the 
distribution of participants’ individual means is the “random factor” in the model). The 
deviations of individual means from the overall mean of the sample represent the 
between-participant variance. 
Residual variance is calculated from the differences between each participant’s observed 
scores and their individual means. Residual variance means the same here as in any 
regression model; However, since no other predictors are included in the model except 
individual means (the random factor), the residual variance represents all other sources 
of variation in scores. For example, these sources include random variation in an 
individual’s score each time it is measured, and learning effects from playing the game 
multiple times. 
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The between-participants variance, as a percentage of the total variance, approximates 
how much variance in scores can be accounted for by differences between participants. 
The higher this is, the more evidence we have that scores reliably differ between 
participants and those differences represent a continuous distribution in an underlying 
disposition effect bias.  
Table 4.5 below summarizes the results from the 3 studies. The percentage of between-
participants variance varies by sample but the overall pattern is clear: the majority of 
variance in scores is due to differences between participants. This provides good 
evidence that the disposition effect is a stable bias expressed during decision making. 
Table 4.5 Estimates of between-participant variance in DE 
 Between-
participant 
variance 
Residual 
variance 
 % variance  
between-
participants  
London .292 .123 70.3% 
Milan .316 .099 76.1% 
OU .120 .078 60.6% 
4.1.2 Intra-individual stability of cutting gains 
4.1.2.1 Correlations between successive plays of the game 
Like the disposition effect, if cutting gains is a stable bias it should be reliable when 
measured repeatedly. In the two-index game, cutting gains is measured by PGR. As with 
the disposition effect, high correlations are expected between repeated plays of the 
game. Tables 3.6-3.8 show correlations for PGR are shown below for the London, Milan, 
and OU studies7. 
 
 
                                           
7 Sample sizes were 50, 47 and 107 respectively. Listwise deletion was used. As 
discussed earlier, for the Milan study only plays 2-4 are included, and correlations with 
play 1 are analysed separately. 
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Table 4.6 London study – correlations between PGR on successive plays 
  Play 1 Play 2 Play 3 Play 4 
Play 1 Correlation -    
 p-value     
Play 2 Correlation .524 -   
 p-value <.001***    
Play 3 Correlation .380 .572 -  
 p-value .007** <.001***   
Play 4 Correlation .344 .570 .746 - 
 p-value .015* <.001*** <.001***  
 
Table 4.7 Milan study – correlations between PGR on successive plays 
  Play 2 Play 3 Play 4 
Play 2 Correlation -   
 p-value    
Play 3 Correlation .870 -  
 p-value <.001***   
Play 4 Correlation .790 .790 - 
 p-value <.001*** <.001***  
 
Table 4.8 OU study – correlations between PGR on successive plays 
  Play 1 Play 2 Play 3 Play 4 
Play 1 Correlation -    
 p-value     
Play 2 Correlation .719 -   
 p-value <.001***    
Play 3 Correlation .623 .790 -  
 p-value <.001*** <.001***   
Play 4 Correlation .551 .709 .806 - 
 p-value <.001*** <.001*** <.001***  
PGR scores are highly correlated over multiple plays of the games, and all correlations 
are significant. In the London study, correlations are mostly large effects (~.05), rather 
than very large ones, and the correlations are weaker with play 1. However, the overall 
pattern is clear. 
4.1.2.2 Intra-individual stability over an extended period 
As discussed in the disposition effect results above, correlations of PGR between play 1 
and the other plays in the Milan study have been tested separately, since they allow 
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testing of stability over a longer period. Table 4.9 shows these correlations. As with the 
disposition effect results, despite the small sample size of 15 all correlations are 
significant and very large, providing further evidence for the stability and intra-individual 
stability of cutting gains as a bias. 
Table 4.9 Correlations of PGR between play 1 with other plays in the Milan study 
 Play 2 Play 3 Play 4 
Correlation .745 .699 .605 
p-value .001** .004** .017* 
4.1.2.3 Variance in PGR accounted for by differences between participants 
The variance attribution method described earlier for DE scores is also used here for PGR 
scores, and the results are shown in table 4.10. The results confirm that most of the 
variance in PGR scores in the three studies is attributable to between-participant 
differences. This provides good evidence that cutting gains is a stable bias during 
decision making. Between-participant variance in the London study is lower than 
expected, consistent with the lower correlations using play 1; however, it still makes up 
the majority of variance observed in scores. 
Table 4.10 Estimates of between-participant variance in PGR 
 Between-
participant 
variance 
Residual 
variance 
 % variance  
between-
participants  
London  .053 .042 55.8% 
Milan .123 .032 79.4% 
OU .125 .60 67.6% 
4.1.3 Intra-individual stability of holding losses 
4.1.3.1 Correlations between successive plays of the game 
Like the disposition effect and cutting gains, if holding losses is a stable bias then it 
should be reliable when measured repeatedly. In the two-index game, holding losses is 
measured by PLR. Again, high correlations are expected between repeated plays of the 
game. Tables 3.11-13 show correlations for PLR from the London, Milan, and OU 
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studies8. PLR is highly correlated over multiple plays of the game. Correlations are even 
higher than for DE and PGR scores, with most more than 0.7 and many approaching 0.9. 
Overall, scores for PLR are extremely reliable across these 3 independent samples. 
Table 4.11 London study – correlations between PLR on successive plays 
  Play 1 Play 2 Play 3 Play 4 
Play 1 Correlation -    
 p-value     
Play 2 Correlation .785 -   
 p-value <.001    
Play 3 Correlation .712 .852 -  
 p-value <.001 <.001   
Play 4 Correlation .738 .709 .830 - 
 p-value  <.001 <.001 <.001  
 
Table 4.12 Milan study – correlations between PLR on successive plays 
  Play 2 Play 3 Play 4 
Play 2 Correlation -   
 p-value    
Play 3 Correlation .891 -  
 p-value <.001   
Play 4 Correlation .843 .803 - 
 p-value <.001 <.001  
 
Table 4.13 OU study – correlations between PLR on successive plays 
  Play 1 Play 2 Play 3 Play 4 
Play 1 Correlation -    
 p-value     
Play 2 Correlation .661 -   
 p-value <.001    
Play 3 Correlation .668 .802 -  
 p-value <.001 <.001   
Play 4 Correlation .645 .801 .876 - 
 p-value <.001 <.001 <.001  
                                           
8 Sample sizes were 50, 47 and 104 respectively. Listwise deletion was used. As 
discussed earlier, for the Milan study only plays 2-4 are included, and correlations with 
play 1 are analysed separately. 
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4.1.3.2 Intra-individual stability over an extended period 
As discussed, correlations of PLR between play 1 and the other plays in the Milan study 
have been tested separately, since they allow testing of stability over a longer period. 
These results are shown in table 4.14. Again, despite the reduced sample size (n=15), 
all correlations are large and significant, further supporting the stability of holding losses 
over time. 
Table 4.14 Correlations of PLR between play 1 and other plays in the Milan study 
 Play 2 Play 3 Play 4 
r .657 .597 .585 
p .008** .019* .022* 
4.1.3.3 Variance in PLR accounted for by differences between participants 
The variance attribution method described earlier is used here again for PLR scores, with 
the results shown in table 4.15. The high between-participant variance confirms that 
most of variation of PLR scores is also attributable to between-participant differences, 
again providing evidence that scores represent measurement of a stable bias. 
 
Table 4.15 Variance in PLR scores accounted for by differences between participants 
 Between-
participant 
variance 
Residual 
variance 
 % variance  
between-
participants  
London .318 .094 77.2% 
Milan .329 .084 80.0% 
OU .281 .106 72.6% 
 
4.2 CONVERGENT VALIDITY OF THE DISPOSITION EFFECT 
The section above has established that the disposition effect can be reliably measured 
over time. This section tests whether retail investors display a similar propensity for the 
disposition effect when it is measured using different methods. As noted earlier, this 
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tests convergent validity of the disposition effect: if the disposition effect is an 
underlying bias of an individual, it should be possible to measure it in multiple ways and 
still find consistent results. For example, investors who score highly on one measure 
should tend to score highly on another measure. 
Disposition effect scores from the two-index game are compared with disposition effect 
scores from the trading records of retail investors, recording 3 months of activity in 
financial markets. This data was supplied by Saxo bank, who have collaborated 
extensively with the Open University (and Prof. Fenton-O’Creevy), and who developed 
the two-index game. The data analysis was performed by Paul Grayson. 
This correlation is significant, with a medium effect size (r = .271, p =.026, n =68). 
Although this result is brief, it is important in the context of the wider thesis. This result 
demonstrates convergent validity of the disposition effect in two different situations. 
While the two-index game is designed to mimic trading, there are obviously differences 
between a short trading simulation and real-world trading over an extended period. The 
fact that scores from the two methods correlate is strong evidence that a disposition 
effect bias exists. 
In addition, this result supports the use of the two-index game, which is the primary 
method used to measure trading biases in this thesis. Although this thesis carries out 
experimental studies, it is ultimately concerned with the disposition effect as observed in 
real-world trading. By showing that the two-index game correlates with disposition 
effects from real-world trading, its use as an experimental proxy of the bias is justified. 
4.3 DISCRIMINANT VALDITY ACROSS PLAYS OF THE TWO-INDEX GAME 
Discriminant validity is the concept that variables which are not theoretically related to 
each other are also observed as not related to each other. This property relates to the 
hypothesis that cutting gains and holding losses are independent biases.  
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Although the evidence above shows that cutting gains and holding losses are stable 
biases, they may or may not a priori be independent of each another. The stereotyped 
trading pattern of someone with a disposition effect is someone who cuts gains and 
holds losses. This assumes that people will tend to show both behaviours, or express 
neither. 
Anyone with a difference in the likelihood of selling gains and losses has a disposition 
effect (by definition). However, if cutting gains and holding losses are independent 
biases, their contribution to an individual’s disposition effect may vary from person to 
person. For example, someone who sells losses slowly may trade gains similarly to other 
people. In this case they would display a bias for holding losses, but not for cutting 
gains. Conversely, they may sell losses similarly to other people but sell gains more 
quickly, so they would display a bias for cutting gains. 
The two-index game produces data for both PGR and PLR on each play, so it is also 
possible to test discriminant validity between them. The hypothesis being tested is that 
the propensities for cutting gains and holding losses are independent, so if cutting gains 
and holding losses are measured by PGR and PLR, it follows that PGR and PLR should be 
independent of each other. 
4.3.1 Testing discriminant validity with the two-index game 
Discriminant validity is established by using multiple scores from the game for PGR and 
PLR, and comparing them with each other. Each participant generated 3 or 4 scores each 
of PGR and PLR during their participation in the study. These scores can all be correlated 
with each other. The strength of the correlations for different categories of correlations is 
evidence for or against discriminant validity. 
Correlations are within-bias or between-bias. A within-bias correlation measures the 
correlation between two sets of scores for the same bias, for example PGR scores from 
play 2, and PGR scores from play 4. A between-bias correlation measures correlations 
between different biases, so between a PGR score and a PLR score. Within-bias 
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correlations have already been discussed above, when demonstrating intra-individual 
stability of PGR and PLR; however, they are used again now to compare with the 
between-bias correlations. 
Discriminant validity is assessed by analysing the pattern of within-bias and between-
bias correlations. If the biases have discriminant validity, i.e. measure different things, 
then the between-bias correlations will be low, and certainly lower than the within-bias 
correlations. So, the expected pattern is that within-bias correlations should be high, 
while between-bias correlations should be as low as possible. There are no strict cut-off 
points for the interpretation of these correlations matrices; evidence for discriminant 
validity is derived from the overall pattern which emerges from many correlations 
(Campbell and Fiske, 1959). 
Between-bias correlations come in two further subcategories. All the within-bias 
correlations must be from different plays of the game, since PGR and PLR were only 
measured once per game. However, between-bias correlations can be from the same 
play, or different plays. For example, PGR from play 2 can be correlated with PLR from 
play 2, or with PLR from play 4. I refer to these as within-play and between-play 
correlations respectively. 
Within-play between-bias correlations are derived from trading data from the same play. 
Each play may have specific factors that could affect PGR and PLR simultaneously, for 
example level of familiarity with the game (which increases over the study), how the 
player is performing (how much cumulative profit) during the game, etc. These are 
effectively shared noise when trying to measure the latent biases of cutting gains and 
holding losses. So, when PGR and PLR are measured at the same time, they may be 
expected to correlate more strongly than the between-play between-bias correlations, 
because of this “noise”. 
It follows that the strongest test of discriminant validity with this design is comparing 
within-play between-bias correlations (e.g. PGR2 & PLR2), with between-play within-bias 
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correlations (e.g. PGR2 & PGR4). The former category correlates different biases 
measured at the same time, while the latter correlate the same bias at different points in 
time. If within-bias correlations are stronger than the within-play correlations, this would 
provide strong evidence for cutting gains and holding losses being latent biases driving 
scores in PGR and PLR. 
4.3.2 Analysis of correlation matrices from each study 
Correlation matrices for each study are shown and discussed below. Correlation 
coefficients are in the first table for each study, and p-values in the second table9. To 
make the overall pattern easier to see, within-bias correlations have heavy shading, 
within-play between-bias correlations have light shading, and between-play between-
bias correlations have no shading. 
4.3.2.1 London study 
There is a clear pattern that confirms the predictions made. Within-bias and between-
bias correlations have little overlap in the strength of correlations or their significance 
levels. Correlations are much stronger for within-bias correlations, and all within-bias 
correlations are significant. All but two between-bias correlations are lower in strength 
than every single within-play correlation and 12 of 16 are non-significant. 
The shared noise on each play of the game appears to have had an effect, since the 
within-play between-bias correlations are a little stronger overall than the between-play 
between-bias correlations. For example, the highest between-bias correlation for PGR1 is 
with PLR1; the highest between-bias correlation for PGR2 is with PLR2, etc. However, 
they are still clearly much lower in strength when compared to the within-bias 
correlations. 
                                           
9 Sample sizes were 50, 47 and 103 respectively. Listwise deletion was used. 
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Table 4.16 London study - correlation coefficients between PGR and PLR in the two-
index game 
 PGR1 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 PLR1 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
PGR1         
PGR2 .524        
PGR3 .380 .572       
PGR4 .344 .570 .746      
PLR1 .289 .309 .092 .154     
PLR2 .259 .488 .115 .264 .785    
PLR3 .160 .401 .106 .263 .712 .852   
PLR4 .099 .274 .047 .159 .738 .709 .830  
 
Table 4.17 London study - correlation p-values between PGR and PLR in the two-index 
game 
 PGR1 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 PLR1 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
PGR1         
PGR2 <.001        
PGR3 .007 <.001       
PGR4 .015 <.001 <.001      
PLR1 .042 .029 .526 .286     
PLR2 .069 .000 .425 .064 <.001    
PLR3 .268 .004 .464 .065 <.001 <.001   
PLR4 .495 .055 .744 .272 <.001 <.001 <.001  
4.3.2.2 Milan study 
Again, there is a clear pattern that confirms what was predicted. Within-bias and 
between-bias correlations form two groups of correlations, and this time there is no 
overlap in either strength or significance values. Correlations are much stronger for 
within-bias correlations, and all within-bias correlations are highly significant. Every 
between-bias correlation is lower than every within-bias correlation. 
A difference from the London data is that although between-bias correlations are much 
lower in comparison to the within-bias ones, most are significant. This is unexpected 
since if these measures were completely independent, correlations would be close to 
zero and not significant. The overall pattern still provides evidence that PGR and PLR 
have some discriminant validity, with clear differences in strength of correlation between 
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within-bias and between-bias correlations, but they are not completely independent in 
this dataset. 
Table 4.18 Milan study - correlation coefficients between PGR and PLR in the two-index 
game 
 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
PGR2       
PGR3 .870      
PGR4 .790 .790     
PLR2 .408 .344 .424    
PLR3 .317 .280 .326 .891   
PLR4 .271 .200 .358 .843 .805  
 
Table 4.19 Milan study - correlation p-values between PGR and PLR in the two-index 
game 
 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
PGR2       
PGR3 <.001      
PGR4 <.001 <.001     
PLR2 .004 .018 .003    
PLR3 .030 .057 .025 <.001   
PLR4 .065 .177 .013 <.001 <.001  
4.3.2.3 OU study 
The data from the OU study are more mixed. The first thing that stands out is that every 
correlation is significant. This is partly due to the increased sample size, but also 
because the between-bias correlations are higher than previously found. This is certainly 
unexpected, and means the evidence for discriminant validity between PGR and PLR is a 
lot weaker in this dataset. 
Within-bias correlations are still a little higher than between-  correlations. To give an 
idea of the overall pattern, we can look at the average correlation coefficient for each 
category of correlation. This is not a statistical test, but just gives an idea of what’s 
going on. The average PGR-PGR correlation is 0.702, for PLR-PLR is 0.734 and for 
between-bias correlations (PGR-PLR) is 0.566. So, this still provides some evidence for 
discriminant validity, but not as strong evidence. 
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Splitting the between-bias correlations, the average within-play correlation is .673 (not 
much lower than the .702 average for PGR-PGR), while the average between-play 
correlation is .531. So as discussed above, there appears to be some shared variance for 
within-play correlations that is missing for between-bias correlations. 
Table 4.20 OU study - correlation coefficients between PGR and PLR in the two-index 
game 
 PGR1 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 PLR1 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
PGR1         
PGR2 .716        
PGR3 .625 .797       
PGR4 .556 .716 .806      
PLR1 .674 .494 .457 .389     
PLR2 .545 .687 .607 .515 .644    
PLR3 .513 .584 .689 .527 .659 .798   
PLR4 .506 .582 .648 .640 .635 .797 .873  
 
Table 4.21 OU study - correlation p-values between PGR and PLR in the two-index game 
 PGR1 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 PLR1 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
PGR1         
PGR2 <.001        
PGR3 <.001 <.001       
PGR4 <.001 <.001 <.001      
PLR1 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001     
PLR2 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001    
PLR3 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001   
PLR4 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001  
4.3.2.4 Summary of results from all three studies 
In the London study, within-bias correlations are clearly stronger than between-bias 
ones. The majority of between-bias correlations are weaker than every within-bias 
correlation, with a few exceptions. This is consistent with the latent biases driving these 
correlations (cutting gains and holding losses) having discriminant validity. There is 
some evidence of a within-play factor on correlations; However, within-play between-
bias correlations are still lower than almost all within-bias ones, again supporting 
discriminant validity. 
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The Milan study delivers very similar results to the London study, except that 
correlations are stronger across the board. This results in most between-bias correlations 
being significant, though at lower levels than the within-bias correlations. This means 
the data is weaker evidence for independence of cutting gains and holding losses is 
weaker. However, the difference in correlation strength of within-bias and between-bias 
correlations is still strong evidence for discriminant validity. 
The OU study produces results most different to the other two. Every correlation is 
highly significant, regardless of type. There is some evidence for discriminant validity 
between PGR and PLR, since the within-bias correlations are stronger than the between-
bias correlations on average; However, there is considerable overlap in the strength of 
correlations between the two types, so the evidence for discriminant validity is much 
weaker than for the other two studies. There is also evidence for shared within-play 
variance, which is almost as strong as the between-bias shared variance. 
So, there is strong evidence for discriminant validity between PGR and PLR in the London 
and Milan studies, but less evidence for independence of these biases, since there are 
still some significant correlations between PGR and PLR. In the OU dataset between-bias 
correlations are all significant, and almost as large as some within-bias ones, providing 
only weak evidence for discriminant validity. 
4.4 DISCRIMINANT VALDITY CONTROLLING FOR TRADING FREQUENCY 
Trading frequency is a potentially confounding factor when trying to assess discriminant 
validity using the technique above. PGR and PLR are both fractions: the number of sales 
made at a gain/loss, divided by time spent holding gains/losses. So, someone who 
trades a lot will tend to have higher PGR and PLR than average, because there will be 
many gains and losses sold compared with the population average. Conversely a person 
who trades less frequently will tend to have lower PGR and PLR than average, because 
they will sell few gains and losses compared with the population average. 
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This results in PGR and PLR being correlated partly because they are both affected by 
the overall frequency of trading. Some of the shared variance between them will be 
attributable to differences in how many trades someone tends to make, rather than their 
behaviour towards gains or losses specifically. This shared variance will mask the 
contribution of the latent biases we are interested in: cutting gains and holding losses. 
To remove this confounding factor, PGR and PLR are regressed on the number of total 
trades made. This is carried out within each play; for example, PGR2 and PLR2 are both 
regressed on the total number of trades10 from play 2. The residuals of these regressions 
represent the variance in PGR and PLR, after the variance due to the frequency of 
trading has been removed. 
Total number of trades is used for both PGR and PLR, rather than the number of gains or 
losses sold. Using the latter approach would remove information relating to differences 
between gains and losses; how frequently gains and losses specifically are sold is 
informative about differences in behaviour towards gains versus losses. Using the overall 
number of trades removes information about the frequency of trading, without changing 
information about the relative number of gains versus losses sold in each play. 
4.4.1 Analysis of correlation matrices from each study 
The correlation matrices presented in the previous section are now presented and 
discussed again, but using the regression residuals rather than the raw figures11. Again, 
to make the overall pattern easier to see, within-bias correlations have heavy shading, 
within-play between-bias correlations have light shading, and between-play between-
bias correlations have no shading. 
                                           
10 As with PGR and PLR, TNT has been logged before analysis, in order to approximate a 
normal distribution. 
11 As before sample sizes were 50, 47 and 103 respectively. Listwise deletion was used. 
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4.4.1.1 London study 
Controlling for trading frequency reproduces the pattern previously seen in the London 
study, and makes the evidence for discriminant validity much stronger. Most between-
bias correlations are now close to zero, indicating that PGR and PLR residuals are close 
to independent. All but one of the between-bias correlations are not significant. So, after 
controlling for trading frequency, we can say there is little to no association between 
PGR and PLR, which is what would be expected if they measure independent biases. 
In contrast, the within-bias correlations are still strong and significant. In particular, the 
PLR correlations are all very strong. This is good evidence that trading frequency was 
responsible for the between-bias correlations seen previously, but that the latent biases 
of cutting gains and holding losses continue to drive the within-bias correlations even 
after controlling for this. 
Table 4.22 London study - correlation coefficients between PGR and PLR residuals in the 
two-index game of residuals after regression on trading frequency 
 PGR1 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 PLR1 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
PGR1         
PGR2 .596        
PGR3 .395 .597       
PGR4 .323 .596 .770      
PLR1 .057 .219 -.008 .081     
PLR2 .218 .379 .115 .211 .786    
PLR3 -.011 .209 -.054 .133 .680 .709   
PLR4 -.085 .125 -.084 .020 .656 .578 .702  
 
Table 4.23 London study - correlation p-values between PGR and PLR residual in the 
two-index game after regression on trading frequency 
 PGR1 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 PLR1 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
PGR1         
PGR2 <.001        
PGR3 .005 <.001       
PGR4 .023 <.001 <.001      
PLR1 .696 .130 .955 .582     
PLR2 .132 .007 .432 .145 <.001    
PLR3 .940 .150 .714 .361 <.001 <.001   
PLR4 .560 .391 .566 .892 <.001 <.001 <.001  
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4.4.1.2 Milan study 
As with the London study, this confirms the pattern previously seen in the Milan study, 
but makes the evidence stronger. All between-bias correlations are now close to zero, 
and none are significant, so the between-bias correlations can be treated as random 
variation. After controlling for trading frequency then, there is little to no association 
between PGR and PLR, as expected if they measured independent biases. 
In contrast, within-bias correlations are all still very strong and highly significant. As with 
the London study, this is strong evidence that the latent biases of cutting gains and 
holding losses drive the within-bias correlations. Meanwhile, between-bias correlations 
were driven by trading frequency and not a shared disposition effect. 
Table 4.24 Milan study - correlation coefficients between PGR and PLR residuals in the 
two-index game of residuals after regression on trading frequency 
 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
PGR2       
PGR3 .865      
PGR4 .734 .751     
PLR2 .125 .101 .209    
PLR3 .136 .095 .183 .868   
PLR4 .049 -.038 .183 .812 .750  
 
Table 4.25 Milan study - correlation p-values between PGR and PLR residual in the two-
index game after regression on trading frequency 
 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
PGR2       
PGR3 <.001      
PGR4 <.001 <.001     
PLR2 .401 .498 .159    
PLR3 .361 .525 .217 <.001   
PLR4 .744 .800 .219 <.001 <.001  
4.4.1.3 OU study 
The effect of controlling for trading frequency in the OU study is not as stark, but it does 
improve the evidence for discriminant validity. Between-bias correlations are not 
weakened as much as the previous two studies, where most between-bias correlations 
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became non-significant and close to zero. However, a clear pattern in the correlations 
emerges. 
Within-bias correlations are all greater than 0.4, mostly greater than 0.6, and are highly 
significant (p<.001). Before controlling for trading frequency, between-bias correlations 
were of similar magnitude and all highly significant. After controlling for trading 
frequency, all coefficients are lower than 0.4 with an average coefficient of around 0.25, 
and every between-bias correlation is weaker than the weakest within-bias correlation. 
Most are still significant, so cutting gains and holding losses aren’t demonstrated as 
completely independent of one another in this data. However, it is clear that within-bias 
correlations are consistently stronger than between-bias correlations, once we have 
controlled for trading frequency. 
Table 4.26 OU study - correlation coefficients between PGR and PLR residuals in the 
two-index game of residuals after regression on trading frequency 
 PGR1 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 PLR1 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
PGR1         
PGR2 .623        
PGR3 .564 .763       
PGR4 .503 .680 .820      
PLR1 .267 .208 .235 .222     
PLR2 .250 .358 .380 .351 .531    
PLR3 .173 .215 .272 .101 .445 .616   
PLR4 .187 .235 .334 .258 .475 .716 .723  
 
Table 4.27 OU study - correlation p-values between PGR and PLR residual in the two-
index game after regression on trading frequency 
 PGR1 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 PLR1 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
PGR1         
PGR2 <.001        
PGR3 <.001 <.001       
PGR4 <.001 <.001 <.001      
PLR1 .006 .035 .017 .024     
PLR2 .011 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001    
PLR3 .081 .029 .006 .311 <.001 <.001   
PLR4 .059 .017 .001 .008 <.001 <.001 <.001  
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4.4.1.4 Summary of results from all three studies 
The overall pattern across the three studies is that controlling for trading frequency 
substantially improves the evidence for discriminant validity between PGR and PLR. In 
the London and Milan studies, most between-bias correlations are reduced to near zero 
and are not significant. Crucially, within-construct correlations are still high and are all 
highly significant. This difference is strong evidence for discriminant validity of PGR and 
PLR, and therefore the independence of cutting gains and holding losses. 
The OU study is not as conclusive. Within-bias correlations are still strong and all highly 
significant, but most between-bias correlations are still significant too. However, there is 
a clear delineation of strength of correlations, with all between-bias correlations being 
below .4, while most within-bias correlations are above .6. So, this study also provides 
evidence for discriminant validity of PGR and PLR in showing that they measure different 
biases, though it provides weaker evidence for stating that PGR and PLR are completely 
independent of one another. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented evidence relating to parts of the first two research questions. 
Using data from the two-index game it argued for the intra-individual stability of the 
disposition effect, cutting gains and holding losses, and found that all three biases were 
reliably measured. This was demonstrated using three different techniques: strong 
correlations over repeated measurements, stability over an extended period, and 
attributing variance to differences between people’s biases. Similar results were found 
for all 3 independent studies, so this is a strong finding. 
It is also explored the extent to which PGR and PLR show discriminant validity when 
tested with the two-index game. It found good evidence for discriminant validity in the 
London and Milan studies, though the evidence was not as strong in the OU study. After 
controlling for trading frequency, results from the London and Milan studies displayed 
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very clear discriminant validity, or even that PGR and PLR may be completely 
independent. This supports the hypothesis that cutting gains and holding losses are two 
independent biases which combine to produce a disposition effect. After controlling for 
trading frequency result from the OU study supported discriminant validity between PGR 
and PLR but did not support complete independence of the measurements.  
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5 ANALYSIS OF THE TRADING SCALE AND ITS RELATION TO 
SCORES FROM THE TWO-INDEX GAME 
Like chapter 4 this chapter relates to the first two research questions, and continues to 
argue for trait-like characteristics of the disposition effect, cutting gains, and holding 
losses. It builds on the results from chapter 4 by introducing a scale used to measure 
trading behaviour. It uses data from the two-index game again, but combines this with a 
disposition effect scale, which was completed by retail investors in the Milan and London 
studies. This data is used to demonstrate convergent validity and discriminant validity of 
the disposition effect, cutting gains, and holding losses, which in turn supports viewing 
them as possessing trait-like characteristics. 
The chapter begins by describing the scale and how disposition effect scores were 
created from it. Then these scores are correlated with DE scores from the two-index 
game. This is another demonstration of convergent validity of the disposition effect, 
which was also tested in chapter 4. If an underlying behavioural tendency is driving 
behaviour, then it should be possible to measure that tendency consistently using 
different methods.  
The chapter goes on to analyse whether the scale can be split into two factors: one 
representing cutting gains and one representing holding losses. Inter-item correlations 
are explored, and possible groupings between them discussed. Then the scale is split 
into underlying factors using principal components analysis. 
The ability to extract two factors demonstrates that the disposition effect has a dual 
nature, and that this is captured by the scale factors. In contrast, a factor solution that 
extracted only a single factor would suggest a monolithic disposition effect bias. (A factor 
solution producing no common factors would indicate the items do not measure any 
common behaviour and the scale is not a useful measurement of any latent tendency.) 
After showing that two factors can be extracted, the factors are tested for independence. 
This provides evidence for discriminant validity between them: it is conceptually like the 
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tests in chapter 4, showing that cutting gains and holding losses from the two-index 
game do not correlate with each other. So, chapter 5 strengthens the evidence that 
cutting gains and holding losses are essentially separate biases, which in combination 
define a person’s disposition effect. 
Once the scale has been split into two factors, it is possible to test convergent and 
discriminant validity, using factor scores from the scale and two-index game scores 
simultaneously. This is done by correlating PGR and PLR from the two-index game with 
factor scores from the scale. As with the disposition effect, convergent validity can be 
established by testing whether the same bias measured with the two different methods 
produces correlated measurements. PGR is expected to correlate with the gain factor 
extracted, and PLR with the loss factor extracted. 
Discriminant validity is tested in a similar way, but now opposing biases are correlated 
with each other. Since they are expected to measure different biases, correlations are 
not expected to be significant. PGR should fail to correlate with the loss factor extracted, 
and PLR should fail to correlate with the gain factor extracted. If successful, establishing 
convergent and discriminant validity can provide strong evidence for treating cutting 
gains and holding losses as independent biases in their own right, independent of the 
disposition effect. 
5.1 DESCRIPTION AND PREPARATION OF SCALE DATA 
London and Milan participants completed the scale as detailed in chapter 2. This is a 
Likert scale of 10 items that aims to measure common attitudes and behaviours which 
someone trading with a disposition effect may display. The items were picked for their 
face validity of the disposition effect. The scale was originally used during the xDelia 
project, which also researched the disposition effect in retail investors.  
The scale is shown in table 5.1, and shows whether each item relates to gains or losses, 
and the type of trading pattern or attitude which it describes. The grouping of these 
items is discussed later in this chapter. Each item had a response scale from 1 to 5, 
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representing: “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, "neither agree, nor disagree”, “agree”, and 
“strongly agree” respectively. 
Table 5.1 Items in the disposition effect scale 
# Item text Gain/ 
Loss 
Trading 
pattern or 
attitude 
1 If a trade is succeeding I would rather close 
the trade than take risks for the chance of 
further gains. 
Gain Cutting gains 
2 I am usually willing to take some extra risks to 
recover a loss. 
Loss Holding losses 
 
3 I feel the effects of losses more than gains Both Loss aversion 
4 When the value of a trade I have made falls, I 
am usually confident it will rise in value again 
Loss Holding losses 
 
5 When the value of a trade I have made falls, I 
immediately close its position 
Loss Cutting losses 
(reversed item) 
6 When the value of a trade I have made falls, I 
cut my losses without regret 
Loss Cutting losses 
(reversed item) 
7 When the value of a trade I have made rises, I 
wait for it to drop before closing its position. 
Gain Holding gains 
(reversed item) 
8 In trading, you need to take some risk when 
your trade is falling and not abandon it 
immediately. 
Loss Holding losses 
 
9 When the value of a trade I have made rises, I 
always close its position before its value can 
fall again 
Gain Cutting gains 
10 When the value of a trade I have closed rises 
still further, I accept the situation without 
regret. 
Gain Cutting gains 
Briefly grouping the items, there are four items relating to gains, five relating to losses, 
and one explicitly asking about an investor’s loss aversion, which is sometimes 
hypothesised to drive the disposition effect. 
5.1.1.1 Data preparation  
There is no clear answer to what constitutes sufficient numbers for carrying out principal 
components analysis or factor analysis. A common suggestion is that 10 respondents per 
item is a reasonable amount of data, though more is always desirable. A larger total 
sample size is always better, but fewer than 100 (regardless of the number of items) are 
often considered inadequate.  
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The scale data from the Milan and London studies are pooled together for analysis, 
giving a sample of 108 participants in total (1 participant completed the two-index game 
plays but did not complete the scale, so is omitted). Complete data is necessary to carry 
out principal components analysis. Listwise deletion of cases would reduce the sample to 
98, resulting in approximately 10% attrition. However, the amount of data missing is 
relatively small: only 11 responses are missing from a total of 1,080, just over 1% of the 
total information. 
To retain as many cases as possible, these missing responses have been imputed using 
multiple imputation. This is widely considered the new gold standard when dealing with 
missing data (Allison, 2002). Rather than impute a single estimate, as mean imputation 
or regression imputation do, multiple imputation creates multiple complete datasets, 
filling in missing data with new estimates in each dataset. The estimates differ as they 
are drawn from stochastic distributions of the estimated values, rather than the existing 
data in the dataset completely determining the imputed values (as with the mean and 
regression methods). So, creating multiple estimates allows complete datasets to be 
created, while maintaining the error that the data are estimated with. Current thinking is 
that 5 imputations can produce reasonable estimates. To be conservative, 10 complete 
datasets have been imputed. 
5.1.1.1.1 Correlations after using multiple imputation 
Multiple imputation solves the issue of missing data, but it creates the problem of how to 
use multiple datasets to analyse the scale. This is solved by pooling the results of all 
imputations. The best estimate of the true correlation coefficient is simply the average 
coefficient over all imputations. The process for p-values is more complex. The process 
begins with the average p-value, but is adjusted up, to avoid a p-value which is too low. 
The logic behind this is that since missing data are imputed multiple times, an outlier 
estimate in one dataset could produce a particularly low p-value for that imputation, 
which would not be reflective of the true relationship in the data. The mathematics of 
this adjustment are complex, and do not affect the results presented here given the 
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small amount of missing data. So, the full entire technique is not explained here, but can 
be found in Allison (2002). 
5.1.1.2 Creation of disposition effect scale scores 
The disposition effect scale score for each participant is the sum of their responses to all 
10 items. This score has a possible range of between 10 and 50, the actual range being 
18 to 43, and the sample has a mean of 31.2. All imputations are normally distributed 
(Kolomogorov-Smirnov test, all imputation p-values >.100). Figure 5.1 below shows the 
distribution of imputation 1, but all are similar. 
Figure 5.1 Distribution of disposition effect scale scores (imputation 1) 
 
5.2 CONVERGENT VALIDITY OF THE DISPOSITION EFFECT: 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TRADING DATA AND THE GAME 
Now that disposition effect scores have been created from the scale, it is possible to 
compare them with DE scores from the two-index game to test convergent validity. As 
noted earlier, if the disposition effect is a stable bias of an individual it should be possible 
to measure it in multiple ways and still find consistent results.  
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The key strength in establishing convergent validity using these data is that the scale 
and two-index game are very different methods of trying to measure the same 
behaviour. The scale comprises self-reported responses (from memory) about typical 
attitudes and decisions during an investor’s real-life trading. By contrast the disposition 
effect in the two-index game is estimated directly from trading decisions made within its 
simplified trading environment. 
Correlations between the two measures are shown in table 5.2. (A reduced sample size, 
n=96, is because some participants did not complete all plays of the game.) These 
correlations are the result of pooling the correlations from each imputation, as discussed 
in the previous section. The scale score is correlated with plays 2-4 of the game giving 3 
correlations in total. There was little data from play 1 of the Milan study (as discussed in 
chapter 4) so this play is omitted. 
Correlations are positive for all three plays: play 3 is significant, while plays 2 and 4 are 
highly significant. The average effect size is just above 0.3, representing a medium 
effect size. These results provide substantial evidence for convergent validity of the 
disposition effect across different domains. They also constitute prima facie evidence 
that further development of the scale is worthwhile. 
Table 5.2 Correlations between disposition effect scale scores and DE scores 
 Play 2 Play 3 Play 4 
Correlation .332 .231 .369 
p-value <.001*** .023* <.001*** 
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5.3 SPLITTING THE SCALE INTO FACTORS 
5.3.1 Inter-item correlations and possible groups 
The section above analysed scores for the whole scale. To test whether the scale relates 
to cutting gains and holding losses separately it needs to be split into underlying factors. 
A first step in analysing the scale is to look at inter-item correlations. This can give some 
idea of the patterns which may be present in the data. 
10 items produce 45 inter-item pairs, and 15 are significant at the 5% level.12 Table 5.3 
below shows the inter-item correlation matrix. Significant correlations are highlighted, 
and items are grouped together based on patterns of significant correlations. This 
produces one group for holding losses and one for cutting gains, with item 2 cross-
loading on both. 
Table 5.3 Disposition effect scale inter-item correlations 
 
                                           
12 Sample size was 108. After multiple imputation there were no missing data. The 
Bonferroni correction is not used. At a 5% confidence level and 45 correlations, about 2 
false positive correlations would be expected. However, the correlations are not 
independent, so the appropriateness of a Bonferroni correction is arguable. The pattern 
of inter-item correlations provides insight into the underlying structure of the items, 
even if the specific values of each correlation are treated with caution due to the 
possibility of a few false positives. 
Cross - loading Cutting gains
item 4 item 8 item 5 Item 2 item 1 item 9 item 3 item 7 item 6 item 10
r
p
r 0.281
p 0.003
r 0.363 0.332
p 0.000 0.000
item 2 r 0.426 0.391 0.095
p 0.000 0.000 0.331
r 0.071 0.177 0.021 0.364
p 0.467 0.069 0.829 0.000
r 0.154 -0.007 -0.084 0.321 0.460
p 0.112 0.942 0.391 0.001 0.000
r 0.110 0.062 -0.109 0.295 0.252 0.219
p 0.273 0.540 0.285 0.002 0.013 0.027
r -0.026 0.115 0.075 0.008 0.231 0.179 -0.025
p 0.791 0.237 0.444 0.932 0.016 0.065 0.804
r 0.075 0.131 0.291 0.110 -0.056 -0.054 0.120 0.010
p 0.442 0.180 0.002 0.259 0.567 0.580 0.250 0.922
r -0.018 -0.020 0.026 -0.171 -0.071 0.046 -0.291 0.034 -0.190
p 0.852 0.835 0.793 0.076 0.468 0.635 0.003 0.728 0.049
No grouping
item 10
item 3
item 9
item 1
Holding losses
item 4
item 8
item 5
item 6
item 7
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This pattern of inter-item correlations is also shown as a Venn diagram in figure 5.2. This 
shows the two main groups, which include all correlations greater than r = 0.313. 
Correlations greater than r = 0.3 are shown as blue arrows, and ones below r=0.3 are 
shown as clear arrows. The overall picture is that there are two groups, one relating to 
holding losses and one relating to cutting gains; however, not all 10 items are part of 
these groupings, and item 2 unexpectedly cross-loads onto both. 
Figure 5.2 Venn diagram of main groups of inter-item correlations 
 
The largest correlation is between item 1 and 9 which both relate to cutting gains, 
though they are correlated with item 3 which asks about loss aversion rather than 
cutting gains specifically. Item 7 relates to holding gains and is reversed scored. 
Theoretically it should group with items 1 and 9, but its correlations are lower than 
                                           
13 It is useful to note that the Bonferroni correction level would be 0.011 (0.05/45). With 
n=108 this p value is achieved with r = .31, so at this p-value the pattern of significant 
correlations would simply be all the blue arrows in the Venn diagram. This also assumes 
using the more conservative two-tailed test of correlation direction. 
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would be expected: it has a significant but fairly low strength correlation with item 1, 
and only correlates marginally with item 9. 
Items 4 and 8 relate to holding losses, and correlate with each other as well as 5, a 
reversed item about cutting losses. Item 2 also relates to holding losses and correlates 
strongly with 4 and 8, though surprisingly, it also correlates with the items relating to 
cutting gains. 
Figure 5.3 is a Venn diagram including all significant inter-item correlations (p < .05), 
not just only the main groupings. There are a small number of miscellaneous 
correlations, which do not form groupings into 3 or more items. 
Figure 5.3 Venn diagram of all significant inter-item correlations 
 
Items 5 and 6 correlate with each other; these items are both reversed and deal with 
closing losses, but item 6’s only other significant correlation is a negative one with item 
10. This latter correlation appears to describe how accepting losses versus forgoing gains 
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have opposite effects on feelings of regret: the less regret felt when closing losses (item 
6), the more regret is felt when forgoing gains after closing a gain (negative item 10). In 
turn, item 10 correlates negatively with item 3, indicating that higher loss aversion is 
also associated with more regret when forgoing gains after closing a gain. 
The marginal grouping of items 1, 7 and 9 discussed earlier has also been included on 
this diagram. Items 1 and 7 correlate, which is expected since the former asks about 
cutting gains and the latter is a reversed item about holding gains. However, the 
correlation between items 7 and 9 is not significant. It has also been shown on the 
diagram since it is the highest correlation which does not reach significance (p = .065), 
and the three items together make theoretical sense. 
5.3.1.1 Summary of inter-item correlations 
Inter-item correlations show that there are two main groupings of items: items relating 
to holding losses, and items relating to cutting gains. Item 2 cross-loads between the 
groups; this is unexpected since it relates to holding losses. There are a relatively small 
number of solitary correlations which do not fit into larger groups. The grouping of items 
1, 7 and 9 makes theoretical sense but is only supported marginally by the correlations 
found.  
5.3.2 Factor analysis method 
Having explored possible inter-item correlations above, this section uses a series of 
factor analyses to extract underlying factors from the scale, dropping items from the 
analysis progressively to create a better factor solution. If factors for cutting gains and 
holding losses can be found, they may be able to explain the patterns found in responses 
to items in the scale. Clear factors explain the majority of variance in a subset of items, 
while being largely unrelated to variance in other items. This will allow the scale to be 
split into one or more subscales that relate to one factor each. Ideally a subscale can be 
created for each factor, with at least 3 items for each factor, and at least 50% of the 
variance in those items accounted for by the factor. 
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Principal components analysis is used to extract factors since this is an exploratory 
analysis of the scale. Varimax is used after initial factor extraction: varimax attempts to 
create factors which account for as much variance as possible, and again this is 
appropriate for an exploratory analysis attempting to extract independent factors. The 
analysis was carried out using the FACTOR program (Lorenzo-Seva & Ferrando, 2006). 
This program allows the parallel analysis method of factor retention to be used 
(discussed in the factor retention section below). 
Since multiple imputation was used to account for missing data, there are 10 complete 
datasets of the scale data. To allow FACTOR to use the information from all imputations, 
the matrix of the pooled inter-item correlations has been calculated using SPSS, and 
then this data fed into FACTOR. 
5.3.3 Factor loadings and item retention 
Each analysis produces a factor solution with various statistics about how the factors in 
that solution account for the variance in item responses. Factor loadings are the 
equivalent of correlation coefficients between each item and each factor. An ideal 
situation is for each item to load strongly onto only one factor (i.e. have a high factor 
loading), so that each item contributes to the measurement of one factor but not to 
other factors (i.e. have a low factor loading). As factor loadings can be interpreted as 
correlation coefficients, the square of each factor loading represents the % of variance in 
an item which can be explained by that factor, and is analogous to R squared. 
Stevens (1996) suggests this approach is only valid for factor loadings over .4 and 
conventionally only rotated factor loadings greater than .4 are considered when 
interpreting a factor. Since these loadings are analogous to correlation coefficients, this 
means that at least 16% of the variance in an item is shared with the factor. Loadings 
below this are usually ignored.  
Stevens (1996) recommends that for n=100 (a relatively small sample), item loadings 
should be greater than .512 to be accepted, based on the critical values of random factor 
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loadings and a two-tailed confidence level of 1%. However, in the results here, only 
loadings lower than 0.3 are not shown. This is to identify marginal items which load 
strongly enough to suggest the item correlates with a factor above chance (i.e. 0.3 < r < 
0.4), but not strongly to be included in a subscale for that factor.  
The following terminology is used to refer to factor loadings. Brackets indicate that an 
item negatively loads on a factor. 
• Loads strongly - >.600 
• Loads moderately - >.400 
• Loads marginally -  >.300 
The aim of this factor analysis process is to identify items which cluster together and 
appear in combination to measure one underlying factor. So, to achieve this, items with 
no strong factor loadings are dropped from the analysis while those with strong factor 
loadings are retained. In addition, an item which loads strongly onto one factor but 
marginally onto another is less distinctive than an item which loads strongly on to only 
one factor. In trying to find subscales which distinguish between different factors, it is 
better to drop cross-loading items. 
The communality of an item is also a criterion for whether to retain an item. An item’s 
communality represents the amount of variance that an item shares with all extracted 
factors in total. It is in fact the sum of the squares of its loadings on each factor, so it is 
like R2 from the point of view of the item: how much variance in the item is explained by 
the factors extracted. 
The higher this communality the more an item’s variance can be explained by the 
extracted factors. The lower this communality, the more variance an item has that is 
unexplained by any factors in the solution, which is undesirable if the aim of the analysis 
is to select items which can measure latent variables represented by the factors. Items 
with low communalities will be dropped from solutions to increase the fit of the items to 
the factors extracted. 
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5.3.4 Eigenvalues and factor retention 
From each factor analysis, several factors are extracted with associated eigenvalues. As 
well as deciding which items to retain, there are also decisions about which factors to 
retain, and the eigenvalues are used to do this. The eigenvalue for each factor 
represents the total variance from all items combined which each factor can explain. An 
eigenvalue of 1 means a factor explains as much variance as one item. A factor that 
represents an important underlying factor explaining variance in several items will have 
an eigenvalue above 1. 
There are various methods of selecting the number of factors to retain. The traditional 
method is based on a scree plot of eigenvalue size (Cattell, 1966). However, this method 
is only approximately accurate when the sample size exceeds 200 (Stevens, 2002), 
which is not the case here. 
Another popular method is Kaiser’s criterion, where all eigenvalues above 1 are retained 
(Kaiser, 1960). However, there are significant issues with this criterion (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994). As explained above, an eigenvalue of 1 means that a factor only 
explains as much variance as one item; a factor with eigenvalue of 1 is no better at 
explaining variance than an item itself. So, these are not good candidates for factors 
which could represent significant latent tendencies driving responses to the items. 
Instead of Kaiser’s criterion, factors are selected using parallel analysis (Horn, 1965). 
Parallel analysis calculates the mean eigenvalues which would be generated by random 
data using as the same number of items, then calculates the 95% confidence intervals of 
each mean. When an eigenvalue is above the 95% confidence limit, it is retained; when 
it is below this threshold, extraction of factors ceases.  
This technique of factor selection has a similar interpretation as other significance 
testing. If an eigenvalue is higher than its 95% confidence interval, then the chance of 
finding an eigenvalue at least as large as this by chance is less than 5%. The effect is 
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that factors are extracted more conservatively than Kaiser’s criterion, so the number of 
false positives is reduced. The factors extracted are much more likely to be meaningful. 
5.3.5 Item reduction using factor analysis  
This section contains succession of factor analyses on the scale. The aim is to identify 
the main factors underlying responses to the items, and which items load onto which 
factors. Items which do not fit the factor solution well are removed until all items 
remaining load onto one of the remaining factors. 
The reporting of each factor analysis begins with a summary of the factors extracted and 
variance explained. The eigenvalues of the unrotated solution are reported and parallel 
analysis is applied to decide how many factors to retain. The item communalities with 
the retained factors are shown, and then factor loadings for each item onto the rotated 
factors. The reporting of each factor analysis ends with a discussion of the interpretation 
of the factors extracted, and which items will be dropped in the next factor analysis, to 
try and improve the fit of the factor solution. 
5.3.6 10 items 
Entering all 10 items into the analysis extracts 3 factors, which together explain 54% of 
the total variance. The selection of the factors is shown in table 5.4. The 1st and 2nd 
factors are clearly greater than their 95% intervals. The 3rd is just above its interval of 
1.30 and is unlikely to be a random finding (p = .002). The 4th factor is below the 95% 
confidence interval so is not extracted. 
Table 5.4 Eigenvalues and factor retention for 10 items 
 F1 F2 F3 F4 
Factor eigenvalue 2.39 1.65 1.35 1.07 
Eigenvalue 95% 
interval 
1.65 1.45 1.30 1.19 
Eigenvalue p-value - - .002 >.05 
% variance explained 24 16 13  
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Table 5.5 Communalities for 10 items 
Item Communality 
1 0.623 
2 0.623 
3 0.610 
4 0.481 
5 0.656 
6 0.406 
7 0.276 
8 0.509 
9 0.618 
10 0.582 
 
Table 5.6 Factor loadings for 10 items 
Strength All F1 F2 F3 
Good >.6  4  .666 
5  .778 
8  .694 
1  .779 
9  .785 
3  .702 
10  (.759) 
Moderate>.4  2  .472 
6  .427 
2  .514 
7  .406 
 
Marginal  >.3   3  .341 6  .390 
2  .369 
7 (.318) 
Eigenvalue 5.38 1.95 1.93 1.50 
% variance 54 20 19 15 
This solution reproduces the main groupings seen in the inter-item correlations. The first 
factor includes items 4, 5 and 8 which load strongly onto it, and so is easily identified as 
the loss factor. Items 2 and 6 also load moderately on to holding losses, reinforcing its 
interpretation. 
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The second factor has two items (1 and 9) loading strongly onto it. So, the bulk of this 
factor is about cutting gains, but there isn’t a clear third item to add to make a subscale. 
Other items load onto it to a lesser extent. Item 7 makes theoretical sense, since that 
asks about holding gains (reversed item). Item 3 indicates loss aversion, while item 2 is 
about taking risks with losses, so this factor’s interpretation is more mixed but has a 
strong cutting gains element. 
The third factor is more difficult to interpret. It includes two strongly loading items: item 
3 indicating loss aversion, and item 10 indicating not regretting closed items that rise 
further. Item 10 loads negatively, so the two items could be summarised thus: investors 
who feel losses more than gains (high score on item 3) tend to feel more regret when a 
closed gain rises further (low score on item 10).  
Item 6 just misses the .4 criterion for the third factor. It asks about closing losses 
“without regret”, and is reverse-scored. So, people who feel losses more than gains 
(high score on item 3) tend to feel more regret when closing losses (high score on item 
6 after reverse-scoring). 
Feeling more regret when closing losses (items 6) and feeling losses more than gains 
(item 3), are consistent with a disposition effect.  However, the loading of item 10 does 
not seem consistent with representing the disposition effect. Item 10 loads negatively: 
someone with high loss aversion (high item 3) was more likely to cut gains and feel 
regret (low item 10). The usual explanation of the disposition effect is that investors are 
too eager to sell gains. If an investor felt that they were justified in cutting gains to 
avoid an undesirable decrease in value, they would presumably not feel regret.  
Taking these three items together, the factor interpretation for the third factor is that 
investors who feel losses more than gains also feel more regret, both when they close 
losses and when they miss out on further gains. It is possible that the interpretation of 
item 10 in terms of the disposition effect is incorrect. For example, perhaps both 
incurred losses (from selling at a loss), and forgone gains (from selling a gain too early) 
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are both treated as if they are losses by the investor, and both generate regret 
associated with a loss. 
Items 2 and 7 also load marginally onto this factor. However, it is difficult to draw a 
common thread between them and the other items. Factor interpretation should be 
improved by avoiding them loading onto this factor. Item 7 has the lowest communality 
of the 10 items by some margin at .270, i.e. only 27% of its variance is explained by the 
3 factors combined. So, item 7 will be dropped, and the remaining items re-analysed in 
the hope that this improves the factor interpretation. 
5.3.7 9 items (item 7 dropped) 
Dropping item 7 still results in a 3-factor solution, explaining an improved 59% of the 
variance. The 1st and 2nd factors are again clearly greater than their 95% intervals. The 
3rd is again just above its interval of 1.26 so is unlikely to be a random finding (p = 
.005) and is extracted. The 4th factor is below the 95% confidence interval so again is 
not extracted.  
Table 5.7 Eigenvalues and factor retention for 9 items 
 F1 F2 F3 F4 
Factor eigenvalue 2.36 1.64 1.29 .85 
Eigenvalue 95% 
interval 
1.59 1.41 1.26 1.15 
Eigenvalue p-value   .005 >.05 
% variance explained 26 18 14  
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Table 5.8 Communalities for 9 items 
Item Communality 
1 0.579 
2 0.644 
3 0.596 
4 0.525 
5 0.648 
6 0.514 
8 0.503 
9 0.620 
10 0.662 
 
Table 5.9 Factor loadings for 9 items 
Strength All F1 F2 F3 
Good >.6  4  .685 
5  .773 
8  .693 
1  .775 
9  .785 
2.  596 
3  .702 
6  .554 
10  (.811) 
Moderate>.4  2  .473 
6  .368 
3  .445 
 
 
Marginal  >.3     
Eigenvalue 5.28 1.92 1.93 1.43 
% variance 59 21 22 16 
Dropping item 7 leads to a clearer 3 factor solution, explaining 59% of the variance. 
Indeed, the total variance explained, measured by the sum of the eigenvalues (5.28), is 
only a little lower than the total explained with 10 items (5.38). So, a whole item has 
been removed, but the variance explained has only dropped by 0.1, or 10% of the 
variance in one item. 
The interpretation of the factor is largely the same as before, although items 2 and 3 
now load more strongly onto the 2nd factor, while item 6 loads more strongly onto the 
third factor. This improvement with item 6 reinforces its previous interpretation as an 
association between loss aversion and experiencing regret. 
Overall, the fit is much improved from using 10 items. A good percentage of the variance 
is explained with the 3 factors, and the communalities for all 9 items are above 0.500. 
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There are 3 items strongly loading onto each factor, and no marginally loading items on 
any factor. 
However, the aim of this chapter is mainly to find factors that match the cutting gains 
and holding losses biases discussed in the previous chapter. Though the emergence of 
the third factor is interesting, it will not be pursued here. Since item 10 is the only item 
which does not load onto one of the two main factors, it will be dropped. 
5.3.8 8 items (items 7 and 10 dropped) 
Dropping items 7 and 10 results in a 2-factor solution, explaining 49% of the variance. 
The 1st and 2nd factors are clearly greater than their 95% intervals, while the 3rd factor 
now falls below its interval of 1.22, so is not extracted. 
Table 5.10 Eigenvalues and factor retention for 8 items 
 F1 F2 F3 
Factor eigenvalue 2.32 1.63 1.00 
Eigenvalue 95% 
interval 
1.56 1.35 1.22 
Eigenvalue p-value   > .05 
% variance explained 29 20 - 
 
Table 5.11 Communalities for 8 items 
Item Communality 
1 0.563 
2 0.640 
3 0.326 
4 0.485 
5 0.628 
6 0.256 
8 0.486 
9 0.574 
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Table 5.12 Factor loadings for 8 items 
Strength All F1 F2 
Good >.6  4  .645 
5  .772 
8  .672 
 
1  .750 
2.  661 
3  .571 
9  .751 
Moderate>.4  2  .451 
6  .493 
 
Marginal  >.3    
Eigenvalue 3.96 1.92 2.04 
% variance 49 24 25 
Although dropping item 10 simplifies the factor structure, this solution is now a poor fit, 
explaining less than half the variance. The communality for item 6 is particularity low 
(.256) so this item will be dropped and the remaining items re-analysed. 
5.3.9 7 items (items 6, 7 and 10 dropped) 
7 items also produce a 2-factor solution, explaining an improved 55% of the variance. 
The 1st and 2nd factors are clearly greater than their 95% intervals, while the 3rd factor 
still falls below its interval of 1.16 so is not extracted. 
Table 5.13 Eigenvalues and factor retention for 7 items 
 F1 F2 F3 
Factor eigenvalue 2.29 1.54 .86 
Eigenvalue 95% 
interval 
1.51 1.31 1.16 
Eigenvalue p-value   > .05 
% variance explained 33 22 - 
 
Table 5.14 Communalities for 7 items 
Item Communality 
1 0.555 
2 0.642 
3 0.375 
4 0.549 
5 0.612 
8 0.532 
9 0.572 
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Table 5.15 Factor loadings for 7 items 
Strength All F1 F2 
Good >.6  4  .720 
5  .743 
8  .722 
 
1  .738 
3  .612 
9  .756 
2.  611 
Moderate>.4  2  .519  
Marginal  >.3    
Eigenvalue 3.83 1.87 1.96 
% variance 55 27 28 
The two-factor solution is very similar to the previous one, though item 2 has a slightly 
higher loading than before on factor 1 (holding losses). Dropping item 6 is an 
improvement in terms of fit, with the variance explained increasing to 55%. This is 
reflected in the small change in eigenvalues total: the total has fallen from 3.96 to 3.83, 
so a drop of variance representing only 13% of one item, though a whole item (i.e. 
100% variance of one item) has been removed from the analysis.  
The main flaw with this solution is that item 2 still cross-loads on both factors. Since an 
aim of the analysis is to produce distinct factors, it will be dropped and the remaining 
items analysed, leaving 3 items per factor. 
5.3.10  6 items: 4, 5, 8, 1, 3, 9 
As expected, these 6 items produce a 2-factor solution, which explains a slightly 
improved 56% of the variance. The 3rd factor is not extracted. 
Table 5.16 Eigenvalues and factor retention for 6 items 
 F1 F2 F3 
Factor eigenvalue 1.80 1.54 .84 
Eigenvalue 95% 
interval 
1.47 1.26 1.11 
Eigenvalue p-value   > .05 
% variance explained 30 26 - 
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Table 5.17 Communalities for 6 items 
Item Communality 
1 0.622 
3 0.377 
4 0.537 
5 0.661 
8 0.519 
9 0.623 
 
Table 5.18 Factor loadings for 6 items 
Strength All F1 F2 
Good >.6  4  .720 
5  .743 
8  .722 
1  .738 
3  .612 
9  .756 
Moderate>.4    
Marginal  >.3    
Eigenvalue 3.34 1.68 1.66 
% variance 56 28 28 
As expected, dropping item 2 produces two distinct factors, with 3 items each loading 
strongly onto them, and every item loading strongly onto only one factor. The loss factor 
comprises items 4, 5 and 8, and the holding gains factor comprises items 1, 3 and 9. 
Holding losses is conceptually clearer than cutting gains, which includes one item about 
general loss aversion (item 3). Interestingly, loss aversion does not load significantly 
onto the loss factor. If any item was cross-loading onto both factors, it would arguably 
be expected to be this one, since loss aversion should theoretically be linked to both 
biases. 
Communalities are all high, except for item 3. Although item 3 has a factor loading of 
.612, which is far above the .4 criterion, its communality is poor in comparison to the 
other items. So, this seems to indicate that it is not an ideal item to measure cutting 
gains with. 
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5.3.11  Final factors produced 
Overall this iterative factor analysis has demonstrated that two factors can be extracted 
which are representative of cutting gains and holding losses. A single disposition effect 
construct does not emerge from the scale. Instead there are two biases being measured, 
which have discriminant validity with each other. The subscales are as follows: 
Cutting gains: 
• Item 1 - If a trade is succeeding I would rather close the trade than take risks for 
the chance of further gains. 
• Item 3 - I feel the effects of losses more than gains 
• Item 9 - When the value of a trade I have made rises, I always close its position 
before its value can fall again 
Holding losses: 
• Item 4 - When the value of a trade I have made falls, I am usually confident it 
will rise in value again 
• Item 5 - When the value of a trade I have made falls, I immediately close its 
position (reversed-item) 
• Item 8 - In trading, you need to take some risk when your trade is falling and not 
abandon it immediately. 
The next section reinforces this evidence for discriminant validity, by further testing 
whether the extracted factors can be considered independent of one another. 
5.4 TESTING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FACTORS 
An aim of this chapter was to show that two factors could be extracted, corresponding to 
cutting gains and holding losses. There is some evidence of discriminant validity between 
them simply from the fact that it was possible to extract them – the two factors clearly 
measure different behaviours. However, this section will provide stronger evidence for 
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discriminant validity by testing whether the two factors are statistically independent of 
one another. 
The iterative factor analysis above to extract them was carried out using varimax 
rotation. This rotation method extracts factors which are orthogonal to one another (i.e. 
have a correlation of zero). This is the most common rotation used in exploratory scale 
analysis, and tends to produce factors which are more interpretable because there will 
be no shared variance between them. However, a weakness of this method for 
demonstrating discriminant validity is that the factors extracted may have simply been 
forced to be independent by the varimax rotation method. 
In this section, the factor analysis on the final 6 items is repeated but using direct 
oblimin rotation as the rotation method, which allows the factors to correlate freely. To 
show discriminant validity, the correlation between the factors should be as close to zero 
as possible. 
In addition, a factor solution including a second-order factor will also be tested. If the 
first-order factors in the original analysis both load onto a second-order factor, this 
shows that some of the variance in their scores is driven by this higher-order factor. 
Shared variance between cutting gains and holding losses in this scale could indicate 
they are both driven in part by an underlying second-order disposition effect factor, 
contrary to the prediction. 
5.4.1 6 items: 4, 5, 8, 1, 3, and 9, using direct oblimin rotation 
As expected, these 6 items produce a 2-factor solution, which explains a slightly 
improved 56% of the variance. The 3rd factor is not extracted as its eigenvalue p-value 
indicates the factor occurs due to chance. 
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Table 5.19 Eigenvalues and factor retention for 6 items with direct oblimin rotation 
 F1 F2 F3 
Factor eigenvalue 1.80 1.54 .84 
Eigenvalue 95% 
interval 
1.45 1.26 1.12 
Eigenvalue p-value   > .05 
% variance explained 30 26 - 
 
Table 5.20 Communalities for 6 items with direct oblimin rotation 
Item Communality 
1 0.622 
3 0.377 
4 0.537 
5 0.661 
8 0.519 
9 0.623 
 
Table 5.21 Factor loadings for 6 items with direct oblimin rotation 
Strength All F1 F2 
Good >.6  4  .709 
5  .799 
8  .712 
1  .774 
3  .616 
9  .791 
Moderate>.4    
Marginal  >.3    
Eigenvalue 3.34 1.66 1.68 
% variance 56 28 28 
The interpretation of this solution is very similar to the 6-item analysis carried out with 
varimax rotation. It still produces two factors, holding losses and cutting gains, with the 
same 3 items each that load strongly onto them. The crucial difference is that the 
correlation between these factors has been allowed to correlate freely rather than being 
forced to equal zero. However, this correlation is still only r = .073, which for practical 
purposes is still zero. On this basis, there is good evidence for treating these two factors 
as independent (Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 2013). 
The results of the 2nd order factor solution are shown in tables 4.21 and 4.22. The factor 
loading of factor 1 onto the 2nd order factor is very weak, and its communality is almost 
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zero. This finding is reinforced by examining the factor loadings of the individual items 
onto the first and second order factors. The items in factor 1 do not load onto the 2nd 
order factor at all (the loadings for the holding losses items were all below 0.2, which is 
far below the 0.4 criterion considered to be meaningful). Adding the 2nd order factor in 
this solution simply splits variance of factor 2 between itself and the 2nd order factor; the 
factor solution would fit better by omitting the 2nd order factor, since the two first-order 
factors are sufficient to explain variance of the items already. 
What these results demonstrate is that the two factors do not share any significant 
common variance: they have discriminant validity and are in effect independent of one 
another. 
Table 5.22 2nd order factor loadings and communalities 
 Loading onto 
2nd order factor 
Communality with 
2nd order factor 
Factor 1 .100 .01 
Factor 2 .733 .537 
 
Table 5.23 Factor loadings for 6 items with 2nd order factor 
Strength All F1 F2 2nd order factor 
Good >.6  4  .706 
5  .795 
8  .709 
  
Moderate>.4   1  .527 
3  .419 
9  .539 
1  .578 
3  .448 
9  .576 
Marginal  >.3     
5.5 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE SCALE FACTORS AND THE TWO-
INDEX GAME 
The factor analysis of the trading scale has produced two factors, which approximately 
represent cutting gains and holding losses. Having extracted the two factors, it is now 
possible to use data from the two-index game and the scale simultaneously to test 
convergent and discriminant validity of cutting gains and holding losses. 
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To recap the logic of this testing, convergent validity is demonstrated where variables 
which are theoretically related to each other, are found to be related to each other when 
measured. Convergent validity provides evidence that a bias has trait-like 
characteristics, because it shows the same proposed construct can be measured in 
different ways producing consistent results. 
Discriminant validity is the opposite quality to convergent validity: variables which are 
not theoretically related to each other should not be related to each other when they are 
measured. Applied here, discriminant validity would show that cutting gains and holding 
losses are distinct from one another when measured, and ideally are independent of one 
another. 
Convergent validity of the disposition effect has already been tested earlier in this 
chapter, by comparing DE scores from the game with overall scores on the scale. The 
same technique is now applied to cutting gains and holding losses, by comparing each 
bias measured by the game (by PGR and PLR respectively) with each bias measured by 
the scale (gain factor and loss factor scores respectively).  
If convergent validity holds then PGR will correlate positively with the gain factor, and 
PLR will correlate negatively with the loss factor. For cutting gains, higher scores in both 
PGR and the gain factor indicate a greater tendency to sell gains, so a positive 
correlation is expected. The reason for the negative correlation between the loss factor 
and PLR is that a high loss factor score represents a strong tendency to hold onto losses 
longer. An individual who holds losses longer will have a lower PLR score, not a higher 
one. So, the bottom half of the PLR fraction will be larger since it measures the duration 
of time spent holding losses, and this results in lower PLR scores, not higher ones. 
As discussed earlier with the disposition effect, comparing scores from the game and the 
scale is a powerful method to demonstrate convergent validity because the two methods 
are very different ways to measure the same bias. The scale asks for self-reported 
personal reflections on usual trading patterns in real financial markets, while the two-
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index game directly measures trading patterns from a brief period of trading in a 
simulated stock market. 
Discriminant validity has already been tested within the game and within the scale. The 
second half of chapter 4 showed that PGR and PLR are largely independent. Likewise, the 
factor analysis above shows that the gains and losses factors are independent of each 
other. Further evidence for discriminant validity can be provided by comparing scores for 
the two biases across the two methods of measurement. The predictions for discriminant 
validity are that PGR does not correlate with the loss factor, and PLR does not correlate 
with the gain factor. Ideally the correlations should be as close to zero as possible. 
5.5.1 Correlations between factor scores and game scores 
5.5.1.1 Calculation of factor scores 
To correlate PGR and PLR with scores from the scale, participants need to be assigned a 
score for each factor based on their responses to the scale. Two different methods are 
used to create these scores. The first is factor scores: these represent each individual’s 
score on the latent factor which the factor analysis has extracted. These scores are 
calculated by multiplying the factor loadings for each item by the responses participants 
gave for each item. So, it captures how important each item is to a factor, and whether 
a respondent scored low or high on each item. The effect is conceptually similar to using 
a weighted average model. The regression method has been used, as this method allows 
the scores for different factors to correlate. 
These scores were produced using SPSS. Since SPSS does not have the functionality to 
produce these factor scores across multiple imputations, factor scores were created for 
all 10 imputations. The correlations reported below are the results for the pooled results 
of all 10 imputations. Correlations are calculated using a sample size of 96. 
5.5.1.2 Testing convergent validity 
Results for the convergent validity of cutting gains show no significant correlations 
between PGR scores and the gain factor, which is unexpected. The correlation with PGR2 
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is marginal; the three correlations could be taken as a group to show a trend of least 
being positive rather than clustering around zero, however, the effect sizes are too small 
to approach statistical significance, so this is not strong evidence for this conclusion. 
These results are explored further later in this chapter. 
Table 5.24 Correlations between PGR scores and gain factor scores 
 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 
Correlation .189 .121 .050 
p-value .065 .243 .629 
In contrast, results for the correlations between PLR scores and loss factor scores are 
much stronger, and confirm what was predicted. The loss factor correlates significantly 
with every play of PLR, and the average correlation coefficient over the three plays is 
just under r = -0.3, which indicates a medium-sized effect. So, this supports convergent 
validity between the game and scale for holding losses. 
Table 5.25 Correlations between PLR scores and loss factor scores 
 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
Correlation -.300 -.242 -.332 
p-value .003** .017* >.001*** 
5.5.1.3 Testing discriminant validity 
Testing discriminant validity between the gain factor, and PLR scores are more 
consistent with the hypothesized relationship. There are no significant correlations, as 
expected. In fact, not only are these correlations all significant, but they appear to 
cluster around r = 0, suggesting the associations between them is completely random. 
Knowing about a participant’s PGR score tells us nothing about their likely loss-factor 
score. 
Table 5.26 Correlations between PGR scores and loss factor scores 
 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 
Correlation .003 .064 -.083 
p-value .974 .540 .425 
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The failure to find convergent validity between PGR scores and gain factor scores 
suggests that this factor is not been well represented by the scale. However, there is still 
some value in testing for discriminant validity between the gain factor and PLR scores. 
Although PLR correlates with the loss factor, and the gain and loss factors are 
independent, it is still possible that PLR is related to both the gain factor as well. The 
gain factor could measure some aspects of holding losses. 
The results show that this is not the case. As with the correlation between the gain factor 
and PLR scores, the correlation coefficients cluster around zero suggesting random 
association between the two. Knowing a participant’s PLR score tells us nothing about 
their likely gain-factor score. 
Table 5.27 Correlations between PLR scores and gain factor scores 
 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
Correlation -.061 .041 -.024 
p-value .559 .694 .818 
Combining the two tests in tables 5.26 and 5.27, there is strong evidence for 
discriminant validity between cutting gains and holding losses, when measured with the 
scale and the game. 
5.5.2 Correlations between scale scores and game scores 
An alternative method is to identify the items which load strongly onto each factor, and 
sum the responses to those items. So, the sum of items 1, 3 and 9 is the gain factor 
score, and the sum of items 4, 5 and 8 is the loss factor score.  For clarity, these totals 
are referred to as scale scores, rather than factor scores. They may measure the scores 
on the latent factors less accurately, because they treat the 3 items in each cluster as 
equally important (in effect each item is given a 33% weighting towards its factor). 
However, they can be seen as a robustness check on the process of creating factor 
scores. Again, correlations are calculated using listwise deletion and sample size of 96. 
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5.5.2.1 Testing convergent validity 
Results using the scale scores are similar to those using factor scores. Cutting gains 
correlations are still non-significant, while holding losses are still significant, except for 
PLR3 which is now only marginal. However, the overall conclusions are much the same. 
Table 5.28 Correlations between PGR scores and gain factor scale scores 
 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 
Correlation .155 .091 .022 
p-value .133 .382 .830 
 
Table 5.29 Correlations between PLR scores and loss factor scale scores 
 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
Correlation -.266 -.190 -.360 
p-value .009** .064 >.001*** 
5.5.2.2 Testing discriminant validity 
Again, the results are very similar to those using factor scores. The cross-correlations 
between different biases are all close to zero. So, the evidence for discriminant validity, 
and indeed independence between biases, remains very strong. 
Table 5.30 Correlations between PGR scores and loss factor scale scores 
 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 
Correlation -.031 .045 -.106 
p-value .767 .666 .310 
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Table 5.31 Correlations between PLR scores and gain factor scale scores 
 PLR2 PLR3 PLR4 
Correlation -.060 .031 -.035 
p-value .561 .763 .734 
5.5.3 Convergent validity measuring cutting gains 
There was good evidence for convergent validity between the scale and TIG when 
measuring holding losses, and for discriminant validity when measuring cutting gains 
and holding losses. However, the evidence for convergent validity when measuring 
cutting gains was weak. This section discusses this finding, and includes further analysis 
to investigate it. For reference, the items from the scale relating to gains are reproduced 
again in the table below. 
Table 5.32 Items from the scale relating to gains 
# Item text Gain/ 
Loss 
Trading 
pattern or 
attitude 
1 If a trade is succeeding I would rather close 
the trade than take risks for the chance of 
further gains. 
Gain Cutting gains 
3 I feel the effects of losses more than gains Both Loss aversion 
7 When the value of a trade I have made rises, I 
wait for it to drop before closing its position. 
Gain Holding gains 
(reversed item) 
9 When the value of a trade I have made rises, I 
always close its position before its value can 
fall again 
Gain Cutting gains 
10 When the value of a trade I have closed rises 
still further, I accept the situation without 
regret. 
Gain Cutting gains 
The correlations were all positive as expected, however they were not large enough to 
reach significance. The smaller correlations may be caused by too much noise in the 
measurement of cutting gains by either the two-index game or the scale, or the scale 
may not measure cutting gains accurately. The game has been shown to reliably 
measure PGR already; therefore, it is more likely that a failure to find significant 
correlations is due to issues with the gain factor in the scale.  
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5.5.3.1 Issues with item 3 in the gain factor 
The gain factor was extracted from a small sample of scale items. Since there was not a 
wide selection of items from which to pick the best fitting items, this may have limited 
how well the items included in the gain factor (items 1, 3 and 9) measure cutting gains. 
While the loss factor has three items which correlate closely with each other, and all had 
very strong factor loadings, item 3 did not fit as well with items 1 and 9 in the gain 
factor. 
Indeed, prima facie item 3 appears to be about loss aversion. Someone who feels “the 
effect of losses more than gains” should be more likely to hold losses (avoiding the 
negative emotions from selling losses) than cut gains (experiencing the positive 
emotions from selling gains).  Item 1 refers to selling gains while forgoing the prospect 
of further gains, and item 9 refers to selling gains in order not to lose the gains made. 
So, the positive correlation between items 1 and 9 with item 3 could be interpreted as 
some participants thinking about their situation when already holding a gain, and 
weighing a future further gain versus a reversal of the gain they are holding. This would 
explain the non-significant correlations of item 3 with the holding losses items (4, 5 and 
8). With a simpler interpretation of item 3 as representing loss aversion, item 3 was 
expected to correlate with holding losses. 
While the iterative factor analysis above showed that item 3 was the best item available, 
this discussion above does suggest that a future scale would benefit from developing 
from a wider range of initial items to refine measurement of cutting gains and be more 
specific about what situations participants are referring to. In particular, the relationship 
of item 3 to the other gain items, and item 3’s lack of correlation with holding losses, 
need to be studied in more detail. 
5.5.3.2 Gain factor possibly composed of distinct behaviours 
Given the issues with item 3, another interesting avenue to explore the failure to find a 
clear cutting gains factor from the scale involves omitting item 3, and also hypothesising 
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that cutting gains is not a unitary bias either, but has distinct behaviours that contribute 
to it. So, it would be like the disposition effect, which is the combination of cutting gains 
and holding losses. These constituent behaviours may be independent or close to 
independent of each other; if so items measuring those behaviours would not correlate 
with each other, even though they both correlate with the cutting gains factor overall.  
In the 10-item scale there are 4 items which specifically relate to trading behaviour 
towards gains: 1, 7, 9 and 10. (These all related to cutting gains except 7, which was a 
reversed item about holding gains.) Table 5.33 shows correlations between PGR and sum 
of these four items, which I will refer to as the ‘all-gains scale score’. Using this theory-
driven selection of items to produce scale scores produces some evidence for convergent 
validity between the scale and PGR. One correlation is now significant, and the other two 
are marginal. 
Table 5.33 Correlations between PGR scores and all-gains scale scores 
 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 
Correlation .178 .220 .178 
p-value .083 .031* .083 
Continuing this theory-based approach, items that relate specifically to selling gains 
(items 1, 9 and 10) could be grouped together. I will refer to this as the ‘selling-gains 
scale score’. Table 5.33 shows correlations of these scores with PGR. This new subscale 
has reasonable correlation with PGR: all three correlations are significant. The average 
effect size is around r = .250, lower than for holding losses, but still a medium effect 
size. Although this grouping is not supported by the iterative factor analysis earlier in 
this chapter, the theoretical rationale for grouping these items is a clear one. It seems 
unlikely to be a coincidence that the three items that relate specifically to selling gains 
do in fact produce significant positive correlations with a behavioural measure of selling 
gains (PGR). So, the evidence for construct validity of cutting gains is not strong, but it 
is not completely absent. 
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Table 5.34 Correlations between PGR scores and selling-gains scale scores 
 PGR2 PGR3 PGR4 
Correlation .238 .278 .207 
p-value .019* .006** .043* 
If the correlations between the selling-gains scale score and PGR are evidence of a real 
connection, it raises the question why the three items included do not group together in 
the factor analysis. As mentioned above, one possibility is that cutting gains is itself not 
a unitary bias. Perhaps all three items measure some constituent part of cutting gains. 
For example, items 1 and 9 may measure the behaviour ‘cutting gains to avoid risk’, 
while item 10 may measure the behaviour ‘cutting gains without regret’. The result 
would be that all three items correlate with PGR, because the proposed constituent 
behaviours would also both correlate with PGR. However, items 1 and 9 would not 
correlate with item 10, because they measure separate behaviours which are largely 
independent of each other. 
This situation would be analogous to the disposition effect itself and its two constituent 
biases, as argued in this chapter. Items for both cutting gains and holding losses will 
correlate with the disposition effect, because they both measure stable aspects of the 
disposition effect. However, they do not correlate with each other because they measure 
separate behaviours that individually contribute to the disposition effect. 
The correlation between PGR and the single item 10 is obviously not sufficient for a 
useable scale. In the case of item 10, its failure to form a strong cluster of items relating 
to cutting gains and regret could be the absence of related items in the original scale. If 
the disposition effect comprises at least 3 constituent biases (two for cutting gains and 
one for holding losses), then only 10 initial items were not ideal for exploratory factor 
analysis. However, the results here suggest that further development of the scale, and 
especially the gain factor, could be fruitful. More initial items from which to extract 
theoretical factors looks like a promising avenue to develop the scale and better define 
possible constituent biases within the disposition effect. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has aimed to build on the results from chapter 4, by introducing the 
disposition effect scale. Combining this data with data from the two-index game, more 
extensive testing of convergent and discriminant validity has been carried out on the 
disposition effect, cutting gains and holding losses. 
Convergent validity for the disposition effect was successfully demonstrated. DE scores 
and disposition effect scale scores correlate significantly, with an average effect size of 
roughly r = 0.3, a medium sized effect. This supports the disposition effect as a stable 
behavioural tendency which drives both variables, and that the disposition effect scale is 
effective at measuring the disposition effect in investors. 
There was also significant evidence for convergent and discriminant validity when 
measuring holding losses, and some evidence for them when measuring cutting gains. 
Two factors were extracted which appear to approximately represent cutting gains and 
holding losses. These factors were also found to be independent of one another, 
providing evidence of discriminant validity between them. 
Testing these factors in combination with the two-index game, the loss factor correlated 
significantly with PLR, again with an effect size of approximately r = 0.3, demonstrating 
convergent validity. Crucially the loss factor did not correlate with PGR, demonstrating 
discriminant validity. Results for the gain factor were mixed. There was discriminant 
validity between the gain factor and PLR; however, there were no significant correlations 
between the gain factor and PGR. 
To investigate this unexpected result, alternative gain factor scale scores were calculated 
by combining item scores based on theory rather than the outcome of the factor 
analysis. A theory-based ‘selling-gains scale score’ did have significant correlations with 
PGR scores. Why this theory-based scale did not emerge from the factor analysis is an 
open question, though one possibility is that cutting gains is composed of several 
constituent biases itself. These results suggest further work in developing a longer scale, 
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to allow the factors extracted to be refined and capture these behaviours more 
accurately. 
In summary, it has been demonstrated that the disposition effect scale scores have 
convergent validity with the DE scores. Two factors have been extracted from the scale, 
which represent the cutting gains and holding losses, and these have discriminant 
validity (in fact they are independent) from each other. Convergent and discriminant 
validity was also demonstrated between the scale and the two-index game, except for 
convergent validity between the gain factor and PGR. However, a theory-based gain 
scale does produce positive correlations with PGR; this suggests that further research on 
cutting gains may be able to produce a factor structure for cutting gains which does have 
convergent validity with PGR scores.  
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6 THE EFFECT OF REAPPRAISL ON THE DISPOSITION EFFECT 
IN RETAIL INVESTORS 
This chapter presents the experimental results from the Milan study, which used 
cognitive reappraisal as an intervention to change the level of trading biases displayed 
by participants. It relates to the third research question: “Does cognitive reappraisal 
affect the disposition effect and its constituent biases, when tested in experienced 
traders under conditions of greater external validity?” 
The aim to test cognitive reappraisal with greater external validity is motivated by a 
desire to build on previous experimental work, which has shown that cognitive 
reappraisal can reduce trading biases including the disposition effect, but has only done 
so with unrealistic simplified trading tasks, and usually with student samples. The Milan 
study uses the two-index game, which more accurately reflects the trading environment 
that investors make decisions in on financial markets. In addition, participants comprised 
a sample of retail investors, who more accurately represent those who trade in financial 
markets where the disposition effect has been observed. 
As seen in previous chapters, the two-index game produces individual scores of cutting 
gains (PGR) and holding losses (PLR) for each play of the game. This allows the separate 
effects of cognitive reappraisal on these two constituent biases to be tested too, also 
with conditions of greater validity. Testing them separately allows inferences to be made 
about why the disposition effect is affected: whether by a change in cutting gains, or 
holding losses, or both. So, this study aims to test three hypotheses relating to the third 
research question, in an experimental setup, but under conditions of greater external 
validity: 
• Investors will show a disposition effect in the two-index game 
• Cognitive reappraisal will reduce the disposition effect 
• Cognitive reappraisal will reduce holding losses but not affect cutting gains 
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The chapter begins describing the method used in the Milan study, and the techniques 
used in data analysis. Some of this detail has been covered in chapter 3, but details 
specific to the Milan study are covered in this chapter. The overall disposition effect 
displayed by participants is tested first, and then the effect of cognitive reappraisal is 
examined on each bias. The effect of cognitive reappraisal on the disposition effect is 
tested in two ways. First, by testing the change in scores before and after cognitive 
reappraisal is applied. Then, a marginal model is run with data from three plays of the 
two-index game. 
6.1 METHOD OF THE MILAN STUDY 
6.1.1 Experimental design & reappraisal intervention 
The aim of this study was to test the effect of applying a cognitive reappraisal 
instruction. Comparing scores before and after the instruction, and comparing 
reappraisers with a control group that simply repeated the play, would produce greater 
statistical power for the test. So, a repeated measures design was adopted. In addition, 
scores on the two-index game are susceptible to learning effects. People usually need to 
play it a little before they get used to the mechanics of the game. To allow for this, 
participants were asked to play the game four times, with the cognitive reappraisal 
instruction given between the third and fourth plays. 
Play 1 was completed in person at a trade fair; the main value of play 1 was to develop 
familiarity with the game (and it may also have helped as a recruitment tool.) Difficulty 
playing the game could create additional noise in scores, threatening to mask any 
experimental effect. The game can be difficult at first: players perceive the game as 
moving very quickly with much player attention focussed on understanding how to play 
the game. This includes aspects such as understanding game mechanics, and working 
out a trading strategy using the predictor index. 
One consequence of this could be that participants are unable to express their 
disposition effect, because their attention is directed elsewhere. Since the disposition 
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effect is a difference between decisions about gains versus losses, a necessary condition 
for the disposition effect must involve being aware of the current gain or loss, when a 
trading decision is made. If attention is directed elsewhere the measured disposition 
effect may not occur, or could be smaller than it would otherwise be. So repeated plays 
of the game gave participants more time to become familiar with the game, and 
hopefully express any trading biases they are susceptible to. 
The remainder of participation in the study was online, and participants completed plays 
2-4 through personalised links sent by email. Between play 2 and play 3, participants 
completed the disposition effect scale, which was analysed in the chapter 5. Groups were 
randomly assigned when participants signed up to the study, and the sole difference 
between groups was that the experimental group received a cognitive reappraisal 
instruction between plays 3 and 4, while the control group did not. 
As outlined in chapter 2, the theoretical basis for this intervention is the proposal that 
the disposition effect is caused by emotions experienced during trading. Cognitive 
reappraisal is a form of emotion regulation which has been shown in other studies to 
reduce decision-making biases, and to reduce biases linked to negative emotions. 
Therefore, the prediction is that cognitive reappraisal will reduce the disposition effect by 
reducing emotions while making trading decisions. 
The reappraisal instruction used in the Milan study asked participants to imagine they 
were an investment manager, trading on behalf of clients. This reappraisal instruction 
was based on those used Lee et al. (1998) and Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009), which used 
cognitive reappraisal to reduce trading biases (in the former, the disposition effect 
itself). For more details of the instruction given, and the control version, please refer to 
appendix 3.  
6.1.2 Participant recruitment 
Participants were recruited at an Open University stand at the Trading Online Expo 
event. This was held at Borsa Italiana (Italian stock exchange) in Milan. The main 
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purpose of the stand was to recruit participants to sign up to complete the study online, 
and the researchers on site engaged potential participants in conversation about the 
study. The researchers on site comprised Paul Grayson, Mark Fenton-O’Creevy, and Ben 
Hardy. Prof Fenton-O’Creevy spent several hours in talks and presentations at the Expo, 
where he discussed the links between trading and emotions, and promoted the study. 
After giving consent to take part, participants filled out their personal details and took a 
video-based tutorial of how to play the game. All instructions were supplied in both 
English and Italian, which had been professionally translated. Following this they played 
the game for the first time (play 1). Playing the game was intended to engage their 
interest in the study, as well as allowing participants to become more familiar with how 
the game works, as discussed earlier in this chapter.  
Ideally participants would have completed the whole study on site, in a controlled 
environment where they could be overseen by the researchers; however, it was felt 
impractical to do this for several reasons. First, the experimental protocol required some 
researcher time to give and collect forms, check that participants understood the 
tutorial, deal with any questions, deal with internet connections not working, social 
aspects of dealing with people arriving and leaving, etc. To run enough people through 
the study would have required several additional researchers, which were not available. 
Second, participation in the study (including online) took about an hour in total. This 
would have increased demand for using laptops, which again may not have been 
possible to meet. Related to these, recruitment tended to peak during the middle of the 
day, so researcher time and laptop time over the two days was better spent engaging 
and recruiting as many participants as possible during this period, rather than facilitating 
a smaller number of participants through the whole study. 
Third, the stand was next to the main thoroughfare of the exhibition. This was good for 
advertising the study, but not ideal for controlled experimental condition. Finally, at the 
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Expo there is a full programme of talks and events on each day, often running 
concurrently. Attendees have this in advance and presumably plan to attend certain 
events each hour. Some attendees will also have paid for courses which run for part of 
the day. In addition, there are many other stands for attendees to engage with. Asking 
participants for an hour of their time is off-putting for many attendees under these 
circumstances, and was a problem encountered in previous field research with the xDelia 
project. 
After completion of the study, participants were emailed feedback on their performance 
and comparison to the group overall, which had been offered as an incentive to take part 
in the study. They were also debriefed on the disposition effect, and their own 
disposition effect as measured in the game. 
6.1.3 Data analysis 
Data are analysed in three ways. First, the overall disposition effect during the study is 
tested, to establish whether trading during the game produced a disposition effect. One-
sample t-tests are used to test the disposition effect observed, against the null 
hypothesis that there is no disposition effect. 
Second, the effect of cognitive reappraisal was tested with the change in trading biases 
between plays 3 and 4. This produces “change scores” for DE, PGR and PLR, which are 
tested with independent t-tests using group membership as the independent variable. 
Finally, marginal models are used to test the effect of cognitive reappraisal using data 
from plays 2-4. Marginal models are a form of multilevel (hierarchical linear) modelling. 
These statistical models allow data to be analysed in terms of several levels of analysis. 
With this study, each play generates an observation for each trading bias. The play is the 
repeated measure and is the first level of analysis. These plays are clustered together at 
the second level, which in this study is the participant. 
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Multilevel modelling allows complicated models to be tested, but the marginal models 
here are relatively simple, since they comprise only two levels and have no random 
factors. However, mathematically a marginal model still has several advantages to using 
ANOVAs. 
Multilevel models produce estimates of the individual parameters in the model, in 
addition to the overall F tests that ANVOAs supply. In this design, taking the control 
group’s play 2 as the baseline, there are parameters for the effect of: play 3, play 4, 
reappraisal group membership, and the interactions of play 3 and play 4 with reappraisal 
group membership. The effect of cognitive reappraisal is specifically tested by the 
interaction between the reappraisal group and play 4. 
Multilevel models use maximum-likelihood as an estimation method, rather than OLS 
(ordinary least squares). This allows participants with missing data to be included in the 
analysis, whereas ANVOAs require complete data. The sample size for the Milan study 
was not large initially, so data loss from dropping participants is undesirable. Marginal 
models allow the maximum number of participants to be retained. Maximum likelihood 
estimation also makes marginal models more robust to the effects of unbalanced groups, 
which is also a feature of this dataset. 
Finally, multilevel models allow much greater flexibility in choice of covariance structures 
for repeated measures. The covariance structure describes the variance of scores on 
each repeated measure (i.e. play 2, play 3, and play 4) and the covariance between 
them. Traditional statistical methods have only two options available. A repeated-
measures ANVOA assumes compound symmetry; compound symmetry is means the 
variance of each play is expected to be equal, and all correlations between plays are 
equal. Alternatively, a MANVOA assumes the covariance structure is unstructured. This is 
like deciding a priori that the variables are unrelated to each other, and whatever 
covariance parameters happen to occur in the data are adopted in the statistical model. 
In other words, an unstructured covariance matrix used in a MANOVA fits the covariance 
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parameters to the data post-hoc. These two models are not always appropriate for the 
data being analysed. 
6.1.3.1 Missing data 
A small number of participants failed to make any sales for losses on some plays of the 
game. Unfortunately, this produces a PLR of zero, which cannot be log transformed. All 
these participants were verified as having held losses for significant amounts of time 
during the simulation, so they all had the opportunity to sell losses, but chose not to do 
so. Since this indicates a very strong tendency to hold losses, rather than an absence of 
data, these participants were given a PLR score two standard deviations lower than the 
mean on that play. All participants sold at least one gain, so missing data issues did not 
arise when calculating PGR. 
6.2 OVERALL DISPOSITION EFFECT 
Table 6.1 shows the mean disposition effects, on each play and overall. (Play 1 was not 
analysed because an IT meant the sample study was greatly reduced on this play. In 
addition, this play was mainly to familiarise participants with the game, as discussed 
above). Each mean was tested against a null hypothesis of zero. A significant disposition 
effect was observed on play 3, play 4, and overall. Since the DE scores from the two-
index game have been log transformed, a score 0 corresponds to a PGR/PLR ratio of 1 
once exponentiated. Although participants did not show a disposition effect on play 2 
overall, this is consistent with participants gradually becoming more comfortable with 
the game, and paying more attention to the gain/loss information as they did. 
Table 6.1 also shows the equivalent PGR/PLR ratio once the mean DE has been 
exponentiated. The DEs found on plays 3 (2.16) and 4 (1.97) indicate that participants 
were on average around twice as likely to sell gains as they were losses. These are 
within the range normally found in other studies, which tend to find a ratio between 1.5 
and 2. Although play 2 was not significantly different from zero, its mean ratio of 1.29 is 
not too far from the range of disposition effects usually found in field research. 
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Table 6.1 Mean disposition effect overall and on separate plays 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Std. 
Error 
PGR/PLR 
ratio t df p-value 
plays 2-4 151 .246 .643 .052 1.76 4.71 150 >.001*** 
play 2 51 .111 .536 .075 1.29 1.482 50 .145 
play 3 50 .335 .735 .104 2.16 3.225 49 .002** 
play 4 50 .295 .634 .090 1.97 3.285 49 .002** 
6.3 THE EFFECT OF REAPPRAISAL USING PLAYS 3 AND 4  
The aim of the Milan study was to test whether cognitive reappraisal produced a change 
in the trading biases (DE, PGR, PLR) using a control group as a comparison. To do this, 
change scores have been calculated using play 3 (pre-intervention) and play 4 (post-
intervention). These are shown in table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Changes in trading biases by group 
Change in.. Group N Mean change Std. Dev. Std. Error 
DE reappraisal 16 -.271 .582 .146 
DE control 33 .076 .400 .070 
PGR reappraisal 16 -.051 .279 .070 
PGR control 33 .036 .258 .045 
PLR reappraisal 16 .221 .476 .119 
PLR control 33 -.040 .462 .080 
Cognitive reappraisal was expected to reduce the disposition effect, so the change in DE 
is expected to be negative in the reappraisal group, compared with the control group. 
Furthermore, this change was expected to be due to a decrease in holding losses, so PLR 
should increase in the reappraisal group relative to the control group, while the change in 
PGR was not expected to differ between the groups. An increase in PLR indicates more 
losses are being sold, and the tendency to hold losses is decreasing. (Once logged, DE 
equals the logged PGR minus logged PLR. So, an increase in PLR narrows the difference 
between PGR and PLR, and reduces DE). 
Independent t-tests for each bias are reported in the sections below, using group 
membership as the independent variable. The tests for DE and PLR are one-tailed, since 
these directions were predicted in advance, while the test for PGR is two-tailed. 
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6.3.1.1 The effect of cognitive reappraisal on the disposition effect 
DE decreases in the reappraisal group while increasing slightly in the control group, and 
an independent t-test finds that this difference is significant, presented in table 6.3. This 
result confirms the hypothesis that cognitive reappraisal would decrease the disposition 
effect. This is medium effect, r = .34, Cohen’s d = .71, that explains 11% of the 
variance in changes in scores.  
Table 6.3 T-test of mean change in DE by group 
Change in… t df 
p-value 
(1-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. error of 
difference  
DE -2.151 22.1 .021* -.347 .161 
Levene’s test for equality of variances was significant for the change in DE (F=6.125, 
p=.017), so the t-test is reported without assuming equality of variances. The 
unadjusted result was t(47) = -2.45, p=.009). Effect sizes have been calculated based 
on the t-test unadjusted for Levene’s test. Reduced degrees of freedom in the adjusted 
test results in larger effect sizes, so the conservative option has been taken. Levene’s 
test was not significant for the changes in PGR and PLR, tested below. 
6.3.1.2 Interpreting changes in DE 
In the previous section testing overall disposition effects, the mean DE was 
exponentiated to transform it back to its original units, so that it can be interpreted. The 
mean change in DE in each group is shown in table 6.2; however, this also needs to be 
exponentiated to be interpreted. Once exponentiated, the mean change between plays 
represents a multiple applied to each group’s prior mean (on play 3), in order calculate 
their mean on play 4. The reason this is a multiplier rather than an absolute amount 
added or subtracted is that figures which are added or subtracted when logged become 
multiplied or divided once exponentiated. 
So, the mean change for the reappraisal group was -.271. Once exponentiated this 
produces a figure of .54, or 54%. This represents the multiplier applied to the previous 
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DE for the reappraisal group. This means that on play 4, the DE of the reappraisal group 
was on average 54% of DE on play 3, which is a decrease of 46%. 
The mean change for the control group was .076. Once exponentiated this produces a 
figure of 1.19, or 119%. So, DE on play 4 for the control group was on average 119% of 
DE on play 3, an increase of 19%. 
The mean difference between groups in table 6.3 shows the relative change between 
groups. The reappraisal group is lower by -.347. Exponentiated this is 0.45, or a 
multiplier of 45%. This represents the effect of being in the reappraisal group, compared 
to what would be expected to happen if the same participant had been in the control 
group. Relative to control group, the reappraisal group’s DE on play 4, with reappraisal, 
was only 45% of their DE on play 3, before reappraisal. 
To explain how this is produced, we can look at the relative changes for each group 
separately. The control group’s DE on play 3 is multiplied by 1.19 (19% increase) to 
produce their play 4 DE. While the reappraisal group’s DE on play 3 was multiplied by 
0.54 (46% decrease) to get their DE on play 4. 0.55 as a percentage of 1.19 is equal to 
0.45, which corresponds to the 45% multiplier above. This is a relative decrease of 55% 
for the reappraisal group, compared with the control group. 
In slightly less technical language, the average relative effect of being in the reappraisal 
group is that a participant’s DE would be 45% of what it was before the reappraisal 
intervention, a relative reduction of 55%. While this is not an elimination of the 
disposition effect, a relative reduction of 55% is an amount of practical significance. 
This technique can also be applied to the confidence intervals for the difference between 
groups, to produce upper and lower limits of the size of the multiplier. 95% confidence 
intervals for the mean difference between groups in the t-test in table 6.3 are -.062 and 
-.630. Exponentiating the confidence intervals produces multipliers of .87 and .23. These 
represent relative reductions of between 13% and 77% respectively for the effect of 
being in the reappraisal group compared with the control group. 
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6.3.1.3 The effect of cognitive reappraisal on cutting gains 
PGR falls in the reappraisal group, while increasing in the control group. However, the 
differences are smaller than for DE. Table 6.4 shows the independent t-test of this 
difference between groups, which is not significant. So, reappraisal does not reduce 
cutting gains, and therefore reappraisal does not reduce the disposition effect here by 
reducing the tendency to cut gains. 
The change is the in right direction to reduce the disposition effect. A reduction in PGR 
means a participant was less likely to sell gains, so had a reduced tendency to cut gains. 
This is what would be expected to bring PGR and PLR closer together and reduce DE to 
zero. However, in this case the effect size was small, Cohen’s d =.31 and r=.15, 
explaining only 2.3% of the variance in PGR change. This effect was not large enough to 
reach statistical significance as discussed. 
Table 6.4 T-test of mean change in PGR by group 
Change in… t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. error of 
difference  
PGR -1.07 47 .291 -.086 .083 
6.3.1.4 The effect of cognitive reappraisal on holding losses 
PLR increases in the reappraisal group as expected, while decreasing slightly in the 
control group. The independent t-test reported in table 6.5 shows that this difference 
between groups is significant. This represents a medium size effect: Cohen’s d = .54, r = 
.26, explaining 6.8% of the variance in changes in PLR scores. 
This result confirms the hypothesis that cognitive reappraisal would reduce holding 
losses. In addition, we can conclude as predicted that the change in DE scores 
associated with reappraisal is mainly driven by differences in PLR, rather than differences 
in PGR. The reduction in the disposition effect seen earlier is because participants are 
more likely to sell losses. 
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Table 6.5 T-test of mean change in PLR by group 
Change in… t df 
p-value 
(1-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. error of 
difference  
PLR 1.84 47 .036* .261 .083 
 
6.4 THE EFFECT OF REAPPRAISAL USING PLAYS 2-4 
6.4.1 DE tested over plays 2-4 
The t-tests in the previous section used measurements of the disposition effect before 
and after reappraisal was implemented. However, analysing the data from play 2 as well, 
using absolute scores rather than change scores, gives a more complicated picture as 
seen in the figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1 Absolute DE scores over plays 2-4, split by group 
 
It is clear that the reappraisal group has a reduction in DE on play 4, compared with the 
control group. However, the reappraisal group’s DE was initially higher on play 3, and 
this reduction brings the groups’ scores closer together on play 4.  
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There is a trend of increasing DE with each play of the game as expected, except for the 
final play for the reappraisal group, where a decrease due to cognitive reappraisal was 
expected. Scores were expected to increase as participants became more familiar with 
the simulation, when they could focus less attention on the game mechanics and more 
on their gains or losses while trading. Familiarity should allow participants to express 
their own trading behaviour more. 
However, the reappraisal group has higher initial DE on play 3 than the control group. 
This is unexpected since the two groups were randomly assigned, and there was no 
difference in procedure between them until receiving the cognitive reappraisal instruction 
immediately prior to playing the simulation the final time. The experimental design was 
chosen to allow inferences to be drawn from equivalent groups, with the intention that 
the two groups had similar levels of DE prior to the reappraisal intervention being 
applied before play 4. 
The difference between groups on play 3 and the effect of reappraisal seen on play 4 can 
be interpreted in two ways. One is that there was mean reversion between play 3 and 
play 4. Mean reversion occurs when differences at the extremes of a distribution occur 
by chance, and subsequent scores revert to the mean. If mean reversion was 
responsible then the reappraisal group just happened to have high DE scores on play 3, 
and the control group just happened to have low DE scores on play 3. Since these scores 
were both chance events, the differences unwind on play 4, leaving the means of the 
groups more likely to be equal. 
An alternative explanation is that the reappraisal group had a higher intrinsic DE despite 
the random allocation of groups, and this was the reason for that group’s higher mean 
on play 3. Without employing cognitive reappraisal, this group would have been 
expected to maintain their higher DE on play 4; however, the effect of reappraisal 
results in a decrease for this group on play 4. 
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6.4.1.1 Sources of between-participant variation in DE 
These two explanations involve different sources of variation in DE scores between 
participants. Mean reversion invokes non-systematic noise, where each DE score 
observed differs from every other score due to random variation which is added to any 
“real” underlying score. The random component of each score will change every time the 
game is played, so will not persist between participants over time. 
If these random differences happen to align with group membership on one play, such 
that one group happened to have mostly low scores while the other group had mostly 
high scores, then there could a difference between groups. However, on the next play 
the expected difference between groups would still be zero, since these non-systematic 
differences change every time a measurement is taken. This explanation proposes that it 
is within-participant noise (the random variation of each participant’s DE each time it is 
measured), that is responsible for the group differences observed in DE, because of a 
chance alignment of within-participant noise with group membership on play 3. 
The explanation from intrinsic differences invokes systematic variation between 
participants. Participants are assumed to have an underlying DE, which has a distribution 
across the sample of participants. For the difference between groups on play 3 to 
emerge, the participants randomly assigned to the reappraisal would on average have a 
higher intrinsic DE than the control group. Since this is a systematic difference, it would 
be expected to persist on play 4, before the effect of any reappraisal intervention is 
considered. This explanation proposes that it is between-participant differences (the 
intrinsic differences between participants of their disposition effects), that are 
responsible for the group differences observed in DE on play 3, because of a chance 
alignment of between-participant differences with group membership on play 3. 
The latter explanation based on intrinsic difference is supported by two pieces of 
evidence. The first is that in the previous two chapters, considerable evidence was 
analysed for the claim that the disposition effect is a stable bias which differs between 
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people. The second uses evidence from scores on play 2. If differences between 
participants are intrinsic, then those differences would be expected to appear on play 2 
as well (though there may be more noise due to participants being unfamiliar with the 
game, as discussed previously). As expected the reappraisal group is higher than the 
control group on play 2 too, albeit by a smaller amount than on play 3. To statistically 
analyse the effect of cognitive reappraisal using play 2, the next section reports the 
results of a marginal model using all three plays. 
6.4.2 Marginal model of plays 2-4 
A marginal model is used to test cognitive reappraisal while using scores from all three 
plays. Unlike a general linear model, this allows participants with missing data to be 
included in the analysis and is more robust to unequal sizes of groups. It also allows a 
covariance structure to be chosen that best fits the data, giving more reliable results 
from the statistical tests performed with the model. 
Analysis using the marginal model has three stages. First, an appropriate covariance 
structure is selected. Then the fixed effects of the model are tested. A significant 
interaction between group and play order was predicted here, representing the effect of 
cognitive reappraisal. Finally, the individual betas in the model are tested. The 
interaction between group and play 4 was expected to have a negative beta, showing a 
decrease in the reappraisal group versus the control group. 
6.4.2.1 Selection of covariance structure 
A covariance structure was chosen by comparing the fit of each one, using Schwarz’s 
Bayesian criterion (BIC), and the chi-square test between models (based on differences 
in deviance (-2LL), also known as the log-likelihood test). 
A lower BIC indicates better fit. The testing of differences in deviance is more complex. 
Deviance is a measure of absolute fit of a model, and so deviance will always decrease 
when more parameters are added to a model. However, adding more parameters to a 
model may lead to data-fitting, fitting parameters to noise rather than a meaningful 
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underlying structure. The chi-square test for change in deviance judges whether 
additional parameters make a model significantly better fitting than a simpler 
alternative.  
The difference in deviance between two models follows a chi-square distribution, with 
degrees of freedoms equal to the number of additional parameters added to the more 
complex model. A significant chi-square test shows that the additional parameters 
produce a decrease in deviance (indicating a better fit) which is significantly greater than 
would be expected. 
Table 6.6 compares a variety of covariance structures using BIC, deviance, and the chi-
square tests, comparing each one to compound symmetry. Every model makes a 
significant improvement on compound symmetry, based on the chi-square test. 
Compound symmetry makes two assumptions: the same variance for all repeated 
measures (in this model, the repeated measures are DE on plays 2-4) and constant 
correlation between all repeated measures. So, it appears that this combination of 
assumptions is not appropriate. 
Table 6.6 Testing covariance structures for marginal model of DE scores 
Covariance 
structure 
Number of 
covariance 
parameters 
BIC 
Deviance 
(-2LL) 
Deviance 
reduction 
vs CS 
df 
Chi-
square 
p-value 
Compound 
symmetry 
2 213.3 203.3 n/a n/a n/a 
Heterogeneous 
compound 
symmetry 
4 212.2 192.1 11.2 2 .0037** 
Huynh-Feldt 4 211.7 191.7 11.6 2 .0030** 
Heterogeneous 
Autoregressive 
4 216.4 196.3 7 2 .0302* 
Heterogeneous 
Toeplitz 
5 216.3 191.3 12 3 .0074** 
Unstructured 6 220.0 189.9 13.4 4 .0095** 
The latter three covariance structures reduce deviance significantly, but they also result 
in increases in BIC compared with compound symmetry. This shows that the models fit 
better, but that the improvement in fit is probably achieved by overfitting additional 
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parameters to the data. This leaves heterogeneous compound symmetry and Huynh-
Feldt. They perform well, reducing BIC while also achieving the strongest results in 
reducing deviance, measured by the chi-square test p-values. 
Both these structures allow the variances of repeated measures to vary independently. 
Heterogeneous compound symmetry assumes constant correlation between repeated 
measures, while Huynh-Feldt assumes the covariance between measures is equal to the 
average variance of each pair of measures, minus a constant. There are reliable 
correlations between repeated plays of the game, as seen in chapter 4, so 
heterogeneous compound symmetry is more intuitive in this situation. Since there is 
little difference in BIC between the two models, heterogeneous compound symmetry is 
selected for the covariance structure. 
6.4.2.2 Tests of fixed effects 
After selecting a covariance structure, fixed effects are added for play order, group, and 
the interaction between them. The main prediction is that there will be an interaction 
between play order and group: on play 4 the reappraisal group should display a 
significant decrease in DE relative to the control group. Results are shown in table 6.7. 
Table 6.7 Testing fixed effects in marginal model of DE scores 
 Model df Residual df F p-value 
Play order 2 95.7 4.92 .002** 
Group 1 52.4 2.21 .143 
Play order * group 2 95.7 3.29 .042* 
As expected there is a significant interaction between play order and group, consistent 
with an effect of cognitive reappraisal. There is also a significant effect of play order, but 
no significant effect of group. These can be interpreted using figure 6.1 above, which 
plots DE scores: the effect of play order is that scores increase with each play; the 
interaction between group and play order is that the reappraisal group’s DE average 
decreases on play 4. 
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Unlike an ANOVA, marginal modelling also allows estimation and testing of the individual 
betas used to represent the fixed effects. Play 2 of the control group is used as the 
baseline, and there are five betas in total for the model: two for play order (one each for 
plays 3 and 4), one for reappraisal group membership, and two for the interaction 
between play order and reappraisal group (again, one each for plays 3 and 4). The null 
hypothesis is that the beta is zero (i.e. has no effect), tested using one-sample t-tests; 
the results are shown in table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 Testing individual betas in marginal model of DE scores 
effect beta St error t df p 
Play 3 .143 .074 1.91 68.4 .060 
Play 4 .219 .068 3.25 75.4 .002** 
Reappraisal 
group 
.280 .152 1.84 50.8 .072 
Play 3 * 
reappraisal 
group 
.113 .130 .870 71.4 .387 
Play 4 * 
reappraisal 
group 
-.209 .118 -1.77 77.8 .081 
The tests of the betas support the interpretation of the fixed effects made earlier using 
figure 6.1. DE increases significantly over successive plays. Both betas for play 3 and 
play 4 are positive, indicating an increase in score from play 2. The beta for play 3 is 
marginally significant, while the beta for play 4 is significant. The beta for group is also 
positive, indicating a higher score for the reappraisal group, though it is only marginally 
significant. 
The most important test though, is whether the beta for the interaction of play 4 and 
reappraisal group is significantly less than zero. (This represents the change in the 
reappraisal group on play 4 compared with the control group, once the reappraisal 
instruction has been given.) This beta is negative indicating lower scores for the 
reappraisal group as predicted. Although this effect is marginal, if this is treated as a 
one-tailed test (since the direction of the beta was specifically predicted in advance) then 
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it is significant, p=.040. The beta for the interaction between play 3 and group is positive 
indicating higher scores for the reappraisal group on play 3, but this is not significant.  
This marginal model supports the original conclusion which tested the change in DE 
between plays 3 and 4. The differences in DE on play 3 are better explained as intrinsic 
differences, rather than mean reversion. The main driver of the overall interaction 
between group and play order is from the reappraisal group being lower on play 4. 
If mean reversion was responsible for this effect, then including data from play 2 in the 
analysis would be expected to show that play 3 is the anomaly. There would be no 
significant interaction for the reappraisal group on play 4. In contrast, the interaction 
between reappraisal group and play order would be driven by the reappraisal group 
being higher on play 3, represented by a significant and positive beta for this effect. In 
these tests it is positive, but not significant. 
6.4.2.2.1 Interpreting changes in DE 
The estimated beta for the interaction between reappraisal and play 4 is -.209. This term 
can be exponentiated to produce a multiplier representing the effect of reappraisal on 
DE, as was seen earlier in this chapter. Exponentiated this equals 0.62, which equates to 
a reduction of 38%. So, the marginal model shows that the average DE in the 
reappraisal group was reduced by 38% compared with the control group. 
This effect is lower than the relative 55% reduction calculated earlier, from the change 
between play 3 and play 4. This is because some of the decrease in DE between play 3 
and play 4 has now been accounted for by an increase in DE from play 2 to play 3. 
However, the reduction of 38% still l represents an important reduction that can be 
achieved by using reappraisal. 
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6.5 CONCLUSION 
The Milan study supports all three hypotheses set out at the beginning of this chapter. It 
was predicted that there would be a disposition overall, and this was confirmed. In 
addition, the disposition effect, tested separately on plays 3 and 4, was significantly 
greater than zero. Cognitive reappraisal significantly reduced the disposition effect as 
expected, and reappraisal resulted in a relative reduction of 55% in the disposition 
effect. 
This reduction was expected to be driven by an increase in PLR, showing an increased 
willingness to sell losses: this was also supported. At the same time, PGR was not 
significantly different between groups. The experimental demonstration that the effect of 
reappraisal is due to its effect on holding losses is a novel finding. 
There are some statistical caveats which limit the confidence which can be placed in the 
results of the study. A difference between the two groups in baseline scores suggested 
mean reversion might be driving the findings. This was addressed by analysing data 
using DE from plays 2-4 using marginal modelling. The evidence in favour of cognitive 
reappraisal’s effect was not as strong, but still supported the predictions made. 
The Milan study set out to test whether cognitive reappraisal could reduce the disposition 
effect while improving the external validity of the study. These results support that it 
does, verifying previous studies and showing that reappraisal’s effect is not negated by 
more realistic testing environments. 
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7 THE EFFECT OF REAPPRAISAL ON THE DISPOSITION EFFECT 
AND EMOTIONS DURING TRADING IN NOVICES 
The previous chapter presented the Milan study, which related to the third research 
question. It tested the effect of cognitive reappraisal on the disposition effect, cutting 
gains, and holding losses. This was done while also increasing the external validity of the 
test, by using a more realistic instrument to measure trading decisions, and by using a 
sample of retail investors as participants. 
This chapter presents the OU study which relates to the fourth research question. It is 
similar to the Milan study since it also tests hypotheses relating to the effect of cognitive 
reappraisal on the disposition effect. Indeed, part of its aim is to build on the evidence 
about the effect of reappraisal from the Milan study. To this end, the first three 
hypotheses tested are the same as the Milan study: 
• Novices will show a disposition effect 
• Cognitive reappraisal will reduce the disposition effect 
• Cognitive reappraisal will reduce holding losses but not affect cutting gains 
Practical improvements were made to the Milan study, which allowed its previous 
findings to be tested more robustly. For example, this study features larger sample 
sizes, more manipulation checks, monetary incentives for good performance, and closer 
researcher control over participants during the study. 
The cognitive reappraisal instruction may reduce emotions experienced by distancing the 
participant from their decision. This could reduce feelings of responsibility for decisions, 
and thus reducing the intensity of emotions during trading decisions, leading to less bias. 
So, reappraisal’s effect on perceived responsibility is also included as a manipulation 
check of the reappraisal instruction. 
However, the OU study does more than simply make practical improvements on the 
Milan study. This study is also intended to shed light on the mechanism of reappraisal’s 
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effect on decision making. It was suspected that the effect of cognitive reappraisal in the 
Milan study was due to a reduction in emotions during trading, but the Milan study did 
not include variables to test this. 
A mechanism involving emotions makes theoretical sense: cognitive reappraisal is a 
form of emotion regulation, and there is significant evidence that emotions (and 
particularly negative emotions) are involved in producing the disposition effect. So, the 
Milan also aimed to test two further hypotheses: 
• Cognitive reappraisal will reduce negative emotions experienced during trading 
• Changes in emotions during trading will mediate the effect of reappraisal 
The chapter begins by describing methods used specifically in the OU study, including its 
experimental design, questionnaires used, and data management. It proceeds to discuss 
the results of the study in three parts. First, whether there is an overall disposition 
effect, then testing the effect of reappraisal on the trading biases and on emotions 
during trading. Finally, some exploratory analysis is conducted into why results were not 
as expected. 
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7.1 METHOD OF THE OU STUDY 
7.1.1 Experimental design 
The experimental design is similar to the Milan study, incorporating the same basic 
elements: 4 plays of the two-index game, plus questionnaires before and after some of 
the plays of the game. The effect of reappraisal is still tested in the same way, by 
comparing an experimental group to a control group, pre-intervention (play 3) and post-
intervention (play 4). The OU study improved the manipulation checks of the reappraisal 
intervention, which were included in the questionnaires. Figure 7.1 shows an outline.  
The design retains four repeated measures of the trading biases, despite time pressures 
from expanding the scope of the study.  It was important to give participants sufficient 
time to become familiar with the game before reappraisal was tested. This was especially 
Figure 7.1 Experimental design of the OU study 
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the case since this study used novice participants. (Many participants struggled with the 
game initially and commented as such to the researcher. This was not unexpected, since 
many were very unfamiliar with the concepts of trading and stock markets. All 
participants confirmed that they understood the game before progressing to play 3.) 
Since the study was completed in person, the presence of the researcher allowed 
questions to be dealt with in person and further oral explanations were given to 
participants who found it difficult. 
To create time for the emotion scale, while keeping the overall participation time around 
1 hour, the duration of the two-index game was changed from 10 minutes to 5 minutes. 
In the Milan study, the number of options available to each participant increased 
throughout each 10-minute play (options include buying or short-selling, and trading in 
sizes of 1, 3, 5 or 10 shares). This format was only retained for play 1, and plays 2, 3 
and 4 allowed all buying options from the beginning of the game. By allowing all options 
immediately a comparable trading record was produced for each participant in half the 
time. 
A strength of the Milan study is that it used retail investors, rather than laymen or 
students. However, the practicalities of conducting data collection online, to work with 
retail investors, inevitably made it difficult to have tight control over the data. Many 
participants recruited in Milan did not complete the study online, so sample sizes were 
lower than intended, resulting in more noise in the group scores and less certainty about 
the effect of reappraisal observed. Among those that did, there were issues with non-
compliance with the experimental protocol, which both lowered sample sizes further and 
unbalanced groups. 
The OU study was completed in person, in temporary computer labs at the Open 
University. This achieved several practical aims. Since all participants were supervised by 
the researcher, much greater researcher control was possible over operational aspects of 
the study, leading to reduced data loss. Participation in person also allowed the study 
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design to include several long questionnaires (which if included in the online Milan study 
may have exacerbated dropout even more). The compromise for achieving this greater 
control was that the study was not carried out on a sample of retail investors, but on an 
adult sample drawn from staff and postgraduate students at the Open University. 
However, this is considered some improvement on student samples, since it represents a 
broader range of the UK adult population. 
Participants were given a paper booklet on arrival containing instructions and all the 
questionnaires. Appendix 4 is a full copy of this booklet for reappraisal participants (the 
control group booklet omitted sections relating to reappraisal). After a short introduction 
to the study and giving consent, participants completed questionnaire 1, which included 
the PANAS-30 scale. They were instructed to indicate how they felt “right now”, to 
establish their baseline emotional state. 
Participants completed a video-based tutorial of how to play the game and read written 
supplementary information. They could ask the researcher if they had any questions. 
Following this they played the game for the first time (play 1), and then a second time 
(play 2). Again, they could ask questions if they found the game difficult to understand. 
When they were satisfied that they understood the game, they moved to questionnaire 
2, which included the resisting sunk costs scale (not reported, as the scale did not 
produce a consistent factor structure). 
The remainder of the study produced the main experimental data. Participants 
completed play 3, followed by questionnaire 3 which included the PANAS-30 and 
additional emotions questions. Participants were instructed to indicate how they felt 
“when they were making decisions about whether or not to close positions”.  
Questionnaire 3 ended with the reappraisal instruction (or a control instruction for the 
group control), followed by play 4. Questionnaire 4 repeated the PANAS-30 and other 
emotion items, before moving to the manipulation checks (for the reappraisal group) and 
finishing with a few questions about game strategy, financial literacy and demographics. 
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After completion of the study, participants were debriefed on the disposition effect and 
the study’s aims, given performance feedback, and informed of the results of the lottery 
for vouchers. 
7.1.2 Reappraisal instruction 
The full instruction can be found in appendix 4, in the instructions relating to the 4th play 
of the game. However, the main part of the reappraisal instruction is reproduced below: 
When playing the two-index game this time, please imagine you are trading for 
someone else. You could be an investment manager trading on behalf of a client, 
or a pension manager, or simply someone managing investments on behalf of a 
friend or family member. Try to imagine this vividly when you are making 
decisions. 
The control group booklet skipped this instruction, and simply reminded participants that 
their performance would determine their chances of winning a voucher (the reappraisal 
group were given the same reminder before the reappraisal instruction). 
This instruction is similar to the Milan study, where participants were asked to imagine 
they were “in the role of an investment manager who is trading on behalf of a client”. 
However, OU participants also have the option to trade on behalf of a friend or family 
member. The former will be referred to as “professional reappraisal” and the latter as 
“social reappraisal’, and both are referred to as “reappraisal targets”. 
The social reappraisal option was included to help novice participants imagine trading for 
someone else. Novice participants may have little knowledge about what an investment 
or pension manager does, and may struggle to imagine how professionals would make 
trading decisions. This was less of a concern for retail investors, who were expected to 
have much higher financial literacy. 
Reappraisal is suspected to reduce bias by allowing participants to emotionally detach 
from their decisions, and look at them more objectively. So, whether trading for a client 
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of acquaintance, what was thought to matter is that they were not trading for 
themselves. It was it’s better to give novices a task they will be able to engage in as 
asking them to imagine something they had no experience of could invalidate the 
experimental intervention.   
7.1.2.1 Manipulation checks 
The OU study contained manipulation checks and questions about how participants 
employed reappraisal. Participants were also asked about their reappraisal target in 
questionnaire 4. The manipulation from the Milan study was also repeated; immediately 
below the instruction there was the following request: 
Please tick the box to confirm that you have read the instruction in the paragraph 
above, about improving your performance: 
Immediately before play 4 they received the following reminder:  
Remember to imagine trading on behalf of someone else, though your aim is still 
to try to make as much money as possible. Good luck! 
Miu and Crisan (2011) found that success in carrying out reappraisal was associated with 
changes in emotions experienced during reappraisal. To capture this, questionnaire 4 
included some questions about the reappraisal process. Participants were asked how 
easy they found it to imagine trading for someone else. Difficulty of reappraisal was 
measured using a Likert item. 
7.1.3 Questionnaires 
Although the Milan study found an effect of reappraisal, it was not able to directly test 
hypotheses about the role of emotions in trading decisions. To address this, the OU 
study incorporates several emotion scales, duplicated both before and after reappraisal. 
The items aimed to measure emotion constructs which may be related to how the 
disposition effect is affected by reappraisal. 
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An ideal design would measure emotions at the point decisions are made. However, in 
the continuous decision-making environment of the two-index game, this wasn’t 
possible. Participants made many decisions throughout the duration of the game, and 
disrupting this would vitiate the increase in ecological validity with the two-index game is 
intended to produce.  
Participants were reminded immediately before answering the emotion scales that their 
responses should relate to how they felt when they were making decisions about 
whether to close positions or not. Of course, there are practical concerns with this 
approach. There will be memory issues, and participants should give responses which 
summarise their feelings over the many decisions which they have taken during each 
play of the game. 
However, this is the most practical way to administer a questionnaire while also retaining 
features of the two-index which improve the ecological validity of the study. To make the 
game realistic, such as making multiple decisions in each play, making decisions in real 
time and making decisions in response to continuously changing information, the game 
cannot be stopped after each decision answer questionnaires. However, in support of 
this approach, Miu and Crisan (2011) gave participants the PANAS-X scale (discussed 
below) following a reappraisal instruction, and were still able to successfully measure 
changes in emotions. 
7.1.3.1 PANAS items 
The starting point for the questionnaire survey was the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988). 
This comprises 20 items measuring positive and negative affect, listed in table 7.1. This 
is widely used scale in emotion research. For example, Hafenbrack et al. (2014) used the 
PANAS to study effects of emotion regulation (specifically mindfulness) on emotions in a 
study of the sunk cost bias. All 20 items from the PANAS were included in questionnaires 
1, 3 and 4. The exact presentation and instructions for the PANAS can be seen in 
appendix 4. 
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Table 7.1 Positive and negative items in the PANAS 
Positive affect items Negative affect items 
active guilty 
enthusiastic afraid 
attentive nervous 
excited distressed 
determined hostile 
strong jittery 
proud irritable 
alert upset 
interested ashamed 
inspired scared 
7.1.3.2 PANAS-X items 
The positive and negative affect dimensions in PANAS reflect the valence of affect. 
However, emotions driving the disposition effect may be more specific than this, so 
measuring a wider range of emotional states is desirable (Summers and Duxbury (2012) 
made similar arguments, and are discussed in the next section). The PANAS-X (Watson 
& Clark, 1999) adds 40 additional items to the original 20 PANAS items to create 
“specific affect scales”. These subscales are intended to capture the content of emotional 
states, to supplement the two main dimensions which capture the valance of emotional 
states. There are 11 subscales which include negative emotions (fear, hostility, guilt, and 
sadness), positive emotions (joviality, self-assurance, attentiveness) and other affective 
states (shyness, fatigue, serenity, surprise). 
Including all 11 would require all 60 items of the PANAS-X, tripling the length of the 
questionnaire. This might test participants’ patience, since the scale is given three times, 
and would considerably increase the duration of the study. However, as Watson & Clark 
suggest, a questionnaire can be kept to a reasonable size by including a selection of 
PANAS-X subscales. Since the original 20 PANAS items were already being used, some 
subscales from the PANAS-X could be included without adding many additional scale 
items. 
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Fear and hostility are two negative subscales in the PANAS-X which are most relevant to 
trading, the disposition effect, and reappraisal. Fear is associated with withdrawal or 
avoidance, so may promote avoidance of selling losses. Hostility on other hand is 
associated with approach behaviours; it is not expected to correlate with the DE and was 
included as a contrast to the effect of fear. Regret is the emotion most often linked the 
disposition effect, but the PANAS-X does not include subscale for this; regret is discussed 
in the section below. 
There were no specific hypotheses about how positive affect and emotions could affect 
the disposition effect. However, attentiveness and serenity are useful emotions that 
could allow investors to make considered and rational decisions. They are a good 
contrast to the anxious and negative thinking that can result in poor trading decisions, 
which might reappraisal be expected to lessen, so they were also included. 
Adding these subscales required an additional 10 items making a total of 30, more 
manageable than the full 60 items. This is referred to this as the “PANAS-30”, and was 
included in questionnaires 1, 3 and 4. The items and subscales included are shown in 
table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 Selected items from the PANAS-X used in the OU study 
Fear hostility attentiveness serenity 
Afraid disgusted attentive calm 
nervous hostile determined relaxed 
shaky scornful alert at ease 
frightened irritable concentrating  
jittery loathing   
scared angry   
7.1.3.3 Additional emotion items 
Rather than the PANAS or another emotion scale, Summers and Duxbury (2012) include 
different measures of emotions which they relate to “specific, task-related emotions” 
relevant to the disposition effect. They argue following Zeelenberg et al. (1998a) that 
merely experiencing a gain (loss) results in feeling elation (disappointment). However, 
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experiencing a gain (loss) while also feeling responsible for it results in rejoicing (regret). 
These are associated with specific action-tendencies (Zeelenberg et al., 1998b). A 
disposition effect should be produced when someone feels responsible, and thus feels 
regret and rejoicing, but not when they do not feel responsible, and only experience 
elation and disappointment.  
To test whether these facets of participants’ emotion experiences were also affected by 
reappraisal, the OU study measured these specific emotions by adapting the items from 
Summers and Duxbury. Summers and Duxbury use Likert items to measure 
disappointment and regret, taken directly from Zeelenberg et al. (1998a). These items 
were also included in the OU study. However, their specific meanings of “elation” and 
“rejoicing” do not correspond to the normal meaning of these words, nor are there any 
other words that match their intended meaning. 
Elation and rejoicing were measured by asking participants about their satisfaction with 
their trading outcomes (representing elation) and trading decisions (representing 
rejoicing). Unfortunately, this method was not possible in the OU study. To attempt to 
measure similar positive emotions, participants were asked how happy, satisfied and 
proud they felt. 
The reason the original items could not be included was that the design of Summers and 
Duxbury (2012) isolated one decision at a time for participants, allowing participants to 
respond about their feelings when making one specific decision. In the OU study 
participants make many decisions over a 5-minute period, so asking about single 
decisions was not possible. 
The distinction between outcomes of decisions and responsibility for decisions was also 
difficult to incorporate into the OU study. As discussed above, participants are given an 
instruction immediately before completing the emotion questionnaire that they should 
answer with reference to how they felt when they were contemplating selling during the 
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two-index game. So, asking participants to respond about how they felt regarding the 
outcome of the decisions could easily confuse participants. 
Summers and Duxbury also asked participants how responsible they felt for the 
outcomes of their decisions. This was a manipulation check on experimental design, 
which attempted to manipulate feelings of responsibility (and in turn affect the 
disposition effect). So, responsibility was also included in the OU study as a manipulation 
check, to test whether cognitive reappraisal does affect responsibility, which in turn 
affects the disposition effect. 
7.1.4 Data management 
Like the Milan study, the two-index game produced measurements of DE, PGR and PLR. 
Each participant has scale scores for: positive affect (PA), negative affect (NA), fear, 
hostility, attentiveness, and serenity, each measured in questionnaires 1, 3 and 4. The 
items based on Summers & Duxbury are single item variables. “Change scores” were 
created for all these variables, using the difference between play 3 and play 4. 
7.1.4.1 Missing data 
There were many variables and participants missing at least one data point, largely 
because of the large number of items required to be answered over the 4 questionnaires. 
(“Variable” here refers to each piece of information supplied by participants, so each 
item of each questionnaire is a variable). Figure 7.2 and table 7.3 provide a breakdown 
of missing values.  
The first pie chart in figure 7.2 shows that two thirds of variables had at least one data 
point missing, and table 7.3 gives a more detailed breakdown of how many missing data 
points there were across all variables. The second pie chart in figure 7.2 shows that 
slightly less than 50% of participants (“cases”) were missing at least one data point. 
However, overall there was less than 3% of data missing, shown in the third pie chart, 
so the information available in the dataset was high even though the number of 
complete variables and cases was low. 
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Figure 7.2 Summary of missing values 
 
Table 7.3 Number of missing values per variable 
Number of 
missing values 
Number of 
variables 
Cumulative 
variables 
Cumulative % 
variables 
0 50 50 33 
1 40 90 60 
2, 3 or 4 30 120 80 
5 or 6 7 127 85 
10-14 16 143 95 
15-19 7 150 100 
 
7.1.4.2 Multiple imputation 
To create scale scores from the many individual items, complete data is needed. 
However, removing cases with listwise deletion would result in dropping many 
participants, despite the low amounts of missing data in the sample. To solve this, 
missing values were replaced using multiple imputation. (The process of multiple 
imputation was described in chapter 5, when it was applied to the disposition effect scale 
in the Milan and London studies.) 
In the OU study, the number of individual questionnaire items meant many variables 
needed to be imputed; in fact, there are more variables than participants. This can cause 
problems with multiple imputation, so to use multiple imputation within its limitations, 
scale scores from the questionnaires were imputed rather than the individual scale 
items. This drastically cut the number of variables imputed. The items based on 
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Summers & Duxbury are single item variables so they needed to be imputed as single 
items. Trading bias scores from the 4 plays of the two-index game were also imputed, 
although there little missing data for these. 
Multiple imputation also allows other variables to be included as predictor variables. 
These are not imputed themselves, simplifying the mathematical process, but can be 
used to help identify relationships for predicting the imputed variables. Predictor 
variables used included: all the individual PANAS-30 items (30 items each from 
questionnaires 1, 3 and 4); group membership; and the difficulty of reappraisal rating 
for the reappraisal group. 10 imputations were created, and the results below are pooled 
across all 10 imputations, unless noted otherwise. 
7.2 OVERALL DISPOSITION EFFECT 
An overall disposition effect for the two groups combined was observed on each of the 
four plays, and also across the entire study (combining data from the four plays). As 
figure 7.3 shows, the mean disposition was significantly greater than zero (and since DE 
has been logged, a DE of 0 after exponentiation corresponds to a PGR/PLR ratio of 1, i.e. 
losses are as likely to be sold as gains). The plays were not significantly different from 
each other, as seen in the large overlaps in confidence intervals. 
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Figure 7.3 Disposition effect on each play 
 
Table 7.4 details descriptive statistics for the means DE scores, and the PGR/PLR ratio 
from exponentiating DE. This ranges from 1.18 to 1.25, with an average of 1.21, 
meaning that gains were about 20% more likely to be sold than losses. The size of this 
effect is much lower than the Milan study, and also other research on the disposition 
effect; however, it is still a significant effect. So, participants were (statistically) 
significantly more likely to sell losses, but not by as much as usually seen. 
Table 7.4 Disposition effect on each play 
 N 
Mean 
DE 
Std. 
Error 
PGR/PLR 
ratio 
play 1 120 0.192 0.058 1.21 
play 2 120 0.191 0.043 1.21 
play 3 120 0.217 0.042 1.24 
play 4 120 0.155 0.043 1.17 
All plays  0.189  1.21 
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7.3 THE EFFECT OF COGNITIVE REAPPRAISAL 
7.3.1 Manipulation checks 
7.3.1.1 Target of reappraisal and difficulty of reappraisal 
All participants in the reappraisal group checked the manipulation check box to confirm 
they had read the reappraisal instruction. Unfortunately, some responses about their 
reappraisal target cast doubt on whether they had carried out reappraisal properly, so 
they were excluded from the analysis. There was also one participant who did not make 
any trades on plays 3 and 4, so was excluded from analysis.14 
In addition to checking that reappraisal had been carried out, the manipulation checks 
also measured how easily it was carried out. Difficulty was measured out of 5 using a 
self-report Likert item. Participants answering either 4 (hard) or 5 (very hard) were 
excluding from analyses which tested reappraisal, since they were at risk of not having 
carried out reappraisal effectively. These comprise most participants who were excluded 
from the reappraisal group. 
Table 7.5 details the effect of these manipulation checks on the number of participants 
included in the study. The randomisation of participants between groups was weighted 
slightly to reappraisal in anticipation of data attrition from that group. However, it did 
not completely mitigate this, and the control group ended up slightly larger. 
  
                                           
14 This was actually an interesting case of “rationality” in decision making, and whether 
behaviour in experiments can be generalised to real life. After perceiving that they 
performed poorly on plays 1 and 2, the participant decided that their attempts at making 
profitable trades only made things worse, and their best chance of winning a voucher 
would be if they did made no trades and finished the game with zero profit. 
215 
 
Table 7.5 Participants excluded by group 
Category Control Reappraisal 
Included 51 40 
   
Excluded 1 28 
Did not use reappraisal - 4 
Dubious reappraisal 
target 
- 3 
Rated “very hard”  4 
Rated “hard”  17 
Made no trades 1 - 
   
Original total 52 68 
7.3.1.2 The effect of reappraisal on responsibility 
The effect of reappraisal on perceived responsibility was included as a manipulation 
check. In the Milan study, the logic of the reappraisal intervention was that managing 
investments for someone else, rather than for oneself, would reduce perceived 
responsibility for positions. If responsibility was lower, then the intensity of emotions 
experienced was expected to decrease, and result in a lower bias in decision making. 
The reduction in the disposition effect in the Milan study supported this, but it was not 
tested directly. 
The effect of reappraisal was tested in the same way as in the Milan study, using the 
change in score from play 3 to play 4, comparing the reappraisal group and control 
group. Table 7.6 shows the absolute change by group. Contrary to expectations, the 
reappraisal group increases in responsibility, and this difference is significant as reported 
in table 7.7. 
Table 7.6 Change in perceived responsibility by group 
 Group N 
Mean 
change 
Std. Error 
responsible Control 51 -.05 10 
responsible Reappraisal 40 .56 .15 
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Table 7.7 T-test of change in perceived responsibility between groups 
 
Mean 
difference 
Std. 
error 
t df p-value 
responsible .61 .19 3.3315 331 .001** 
The relative change was 0.61 points, which is also of practical importance on a scale 
which only has a range of 4 points (i.e. between 1 and 5). The changes analysed 
separately by group tell the same story: the control group change is not significantly 
different from zero, while the reappraisal group’s increase of 0.56 is significant. Figure 
7.4 illustrates this difference between groups. 
Figure 7.4 Change in responsibility by group 
 
7.3.2 The effect of reappraisal on DE, PGR and PLR 
The effect of reappraisal on the trading biases are tested in the same way as in the Milan 
study, using the change in score from play 3 to play 4, comparing the reappraisal group 
and control group. Reappraisal was expected to decrease DE, by increasing PLR while 
not affecting PGR. 
                                           
15 Levene’s test was significant, so this test did not assume equal variances 
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Table 7.6 shows the absolute changes by group. A brief look at these figures suggests 
that the hypotheses are not supported. Both groups decrease in DE, but the control 
group decreases by more than the reappraisal group. Both groups increase in in PLR, but 
the control group increases by more. Changes in PGR for both groups are close to zero, 
so the null of reappraisal on this score is supported. 
Table 7.8 Change in trading biases by group 
Change in.. Group N Mean change Std. Error 
DE reappraisal 40 -.0685 .0589 
DE control 51 -.0976 .0565 
PGR reappraisal 40 -.0246 .0507 
PGR control 51 -.0156 .0439 
PLR reappraisal 40 .0439 .0646 
PLR control 51 .0820 .0611 
Independentt-tests are carried out for each bias to confirm these findings, using group 
membership as the independent variable. These results are summarised in table 7.7. The 
mean difference is calculated as the change in reappraisal group minus the change in the 
control group. All the differences between groups are small and none are significant, nor 
approach significance. Given that contrary to the hypotheses, reappraisal did not affect 
the trading biases, the mediation of reappraisal’s effect by change in emotions is not 
tested later in this chapter. 
Table 7.9 T-tests of change in trading biases between groups 
p 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. error of 
difference  t df p-value 
DE .0290 .0811 .358 137 .721 
PGR -.0090 .0670 -.134 1902 .893 
PLR -.0380 .0886 -.429 689 .668 
7.3.3 The effect reappraisal on emotions 
The same method is used to test changes in emotions during trading, comparing scores 
on play 3 with score on play 4. Reappraisal was predicted to reduce negative emotions 
during trading. Positive emotions were not expected to be affected, but were also tested 
to rule out the possibility that changes in these emotions could explain reappraisal’s 
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effect on trading biases. Table 7.8 shows the absolute changes by group, and table 7.9 
shows independent t-tests that test the difference between groups (Levene’s test was 
significant, so neither test assumes equal variances). 
Both groups show a small reduction for both positive and negative affect, but there were 
no significant differences between groups. This suggests that both groups simply became 
slightly less emotional when they played the game again. The changes in scores were 
significant for the control group analysed separately. However, as each scale has a 
theoretical range of 10 to 50, the mean changes found are very small in practical terms. 
Table 7.10 Change in positive and negative affect by group 
 Group N 
Mean 
change 
Std. Error 
Positive affect Control 51 -1.19 .51 
Positive affect Reappraisal 40 -1.58 1.03 
Negative affect Control 51 -1.40 .44 
Negative affect Reappraisal 40 -.539 .76 
 
Table 7.11 T-tests of change in positive and negative affect between groups 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. error t df p-value 
Positive affect -.387 1.15 -.337 396766 .736 
Negative affect .861 .834 1.03 34484 .302 
Table 7.10 shows the absolute changes of the PANAS-X scales split by group. The only 
generalization that can be made might be it that all scores (except serenity in the control 
group) tend to decline by a small amount from play 3 to play 4. However, this decrease 
is seen in both groups16 so it is not an effect of reappraisal, but of playing the game or 
responding to questionnaires repeatedly. 
                                           
16 This absolute change, analysed in each group separately, was significant in the control 
group for the decreases in fear and attentiveness, and the increase for serenity. No 
changes were significant for the reappraisal group. However, no hypotheses were made 
about absolute changes in advance, and as noted the difference between the changes by 
group was not significant. 
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Independent t-tests confirm this, reported in table 7.11. There are no significant 
differences between groups, so no effect of reappraisal. Nor is there a clear pattern 
contrasting control and reappraisal groups. The control group decreases more in fear and 
attentiveness, but increases more in serenity. Hostility in both groups is almost the 
same. For all emotions though, the difference between groups are small compared with 
the possible range of scores: all differences between groups were smaller than 1 point 
on a single item. Fear and hostility could range from a score of 6 to 30, attentiveness 
from 4 to 20, and serenity from 3 to 15, so all relative differences were small in practical 
terms. 
Table 7.12 Change in PANAS-X scales by group 
 Group N 
Mean 
change 
Std. Error 
Fear Control 51 -1.19 .33 
Fear Reappraisal 40 -.48 .58 
Hostility Control 51 -.31 .36 
Hostility Reappraisal 40 -.42 .32 
Attentiveness Control 51 -.69 .24 
Attentiveness Reappraisal 40 -.26 .35 
Serenity Control 51 .58 .19 
Serenity Reappraisal 40 -.03 .45 
 
Table 7.13 T-tests of change in PANAS-X scales between groups 
 
Mean 
difference 
Std. 
error 
T df p-value 
Fear .71 .63 1.13 9839 .260 
Hostility -.11 .50 -.22 6875 .826 
Attentiveness .43 .42 1.03 15073 .303 
Serenity -.61 .45 -1.3317 18598 .217 
The additional emotion items are tested in the same way. Table 7.14 shows the absolute 
changes by group, and table 7.15 shows t-tests of the differences between groups. All 
changes are small and none of the differences are significant between groups. 
                                           
17 Levene’s test was significant, so this test did not assume equal variances 
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Table 7.14 Change in other emotion items by group 
 Group N 
Mean 
change 
Std. Error 
regretful Control 51 -.12 .16 
regretful Reappraisal 40 -.38 .15 
disappointed Control 51 -.39 .19 
disappointed Reappraisal 40 -.41 .20 
happy Control 51 -.08 .15 
happy Reappraisal 40 -.06 .17 
satisfied Control 51 .08 .15 
satisfied Reappraisal 40 -.01 .20 
proud Control 51 .14 .13 
proud Reappraisal 40 -.07 .19 
 
Table 7.15 T-tests of change in other emotion items between groups 
 
Mean 
difference 
Std. 
error 
t df p-value 
regretful -.25 .23 -1.10 9527 .270 
disappointed -.02 .28 -.07 59766 .944 
happy .02 .24 .07 5556 .942 
satisfied -.09 .24 -.368 263998 .713 
proud -.22 .22 -.977 9127 .328 
7.4 FOLLOW-UP ANALYSIS TO NULL RESULTS 
Many of the results found were unexpected. Reappraisal did not affect any trading biases 
in the OU study, which directly contradicts the findings of the Milan study, and also the 
findings of Lee et al. (2008). Nor did reappraisal have any effect on any emotions except 
for perceived responsibility, which was the opposite effect to what that expected. To 
investigate this, some follow-up tests are reported using participants’ rating of the 
difficulty of implementing reappraisal, and the reappraisal targets used by participants. 
7.4.1 Effect of difficulty of reappraisal 
In the tests above, the difficulty rating was only used as an exclusion criterion: 
participants who rated reappraisal as hard or very hard were excluded. In the tests that 
follow, all participants are included to try and establish how the effect of reappraisal may 
vary when participants find it easier or harder to implement reappraisal, and what 
effects reappraisal may have on decision making in general. 
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7.4.1.1 Difficulty of reappraisal and perceived responsibility 
There is a marginal negative correlation between change in responsibility and the 
difficulty rating of reappraisal18 (r = -.233, p = .061). As table 7.14 and figure 7.5 show, 
the change is mostly apparent at the extremes of the range: participants who found 
reappraisal “very easy” had larger increases in perceived responsibility while those 
ratings it “very hard” actually decreased in perceived responsibility. 
Table 7.16 Change in responsibility in the reappraisal group split by difficult rating 
Difficulty 
rating 
Change in 
responsibility 
Std. error N 
1 .88 .30 8 
2 .20 .25 10 
3 .44 .21 28 
4 .17 .32 17 
5 -.40 .24 5 
Figure 7.5 Change in responsibility in the reappraisal group split by difficulty rating 
 
                                           
18 This is significant in the raw data (r = -.289, p =.020). In the imputed datasets, 
participants with difficulty ratings of 4 or 5 who had missing data for responsibility had 
comparatively high imputed scores for change in responsibility, moderating the 
correlation. 
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This result is more evidence that reappraisal increases perceived responsibility, and that 
the self-report difficulty measure is a reasonable proxy of how effectively each 
participant implemented reappraisal. The easier participants found it to implement 
reappraisal, the more likely their perceived responsibility was higher. Of course, this 
interpretation is still tentative: splitting the reappraisal group into five groups greatly 
reduces the statistical power achieved by this study, as can be seen by the wide 
confidence intervals in the chart. 
7.4.1.2 Difficulty of reappraisal, and effect of reappraisal on the disposition effect 
The lack of effect of reappraisal on the disposition effect was very surprising. In fact, the 
reappraisal group fared worse than the control group (though this difference was not 
significant). The next test looks at whether the effect of reappraisal was associated with 
participants’ difficulty rating of reappraisal. Table 7.15 reports the changes in DE split by 
rating. 
Table 7.17 Change in DE in the reappraisal group split by difficult rating 
Difficulty 
rating 
Change in DE Std. error N 
1 -.17 .08 8 
2 .02 .17 10 
3 -.07 .08 28 
4 .07 .13 17 
5 .07 .13 5 
There is a rough trend of increasing change in disposition effect from play 3 to play 4, as 
difficulty increases: participants who found it difficult to implement reappraisal tended to 
increase on play 4. However, this correlation is not significant (r = .166, p = .20119). As 
seen in figure 7.6, the change is mostly apparent at the extremes of the range: 
participants who found reappraisal very easy had larger decreases in disposition effect 
                                           
19 Though this is marginally significant in the raw data (r = .210, p =.092). In the 
imputed datasets, participants with difficulty ratings of 2 who had missing data for 
change in disposition effect had comparatively high changes imputed, attenuating the 
correlation. 
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than those who found it very hard. 
 
Looking at the breakdown of DE into PGR and PLR, this trend is driven by a negative 
correlation between difficulty rating and change in PLR: increasing difficulty results in a 
decreased PLR representing an increased tendency to hold losses. For people who rated 
difficulty low, the opposite is true: they tended to have a larger increase in PLR, 
representing a decreased tendency to hold losses, and therefore a lower disposition 
effect. Although this is not significant either (r = -.152, p = .244), the correlation for 
PGR is effectively zero (r = .015, p = .904). So, to the extent that we give any credence 
to the trend between DE and difficulty, it is attributable to the relationship between PLR 
and difficulty. 
As with the results of difficulty on perceived responsibility, the trend is only suggestive. 
The results are not significant, but this is not surprising given the very low power that 
results from splitting the reappraisal group into five groups. However, the results for 
participants rating reappraisal very easy are intriguing. This subset showed a large 
decrease in disposition effect (a decrease of -.17, which exponentiated represents a 
decrease of 32% in the PGR/PLR ratio). This is a greater decrease than the control group 
achieved, shown in the analysis earlier in this chapter (decrease of .10, an 
Figure 7.6 Change in DE split by difficulty rating 
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exponentiated decrease of 20%). So, this is very tentative evidence that reappraisal may 
only be effective for people who find it easy to carry out. 
In fact, the trend in figure 7.6 is evidence to support this view too, regardless of the 
absolute decrease in participants who found reappraisal very easy. Reappraisal had a 
more negative effect on the disposition effect of participants who found it difficult to 
implement, and the reduction in disposition effect from reappraisal improved as 
participants found it easier to perform. The association between change in disposition 
effect and difficulty rating suggests that the experimental intervention in this study may 
have been hindered by other aspects of implementing reappraisal. 
A possible explanation for this is that the cognitive demands of implementing reappraisal 
interfered with decision making: participants who use more cognitive resources on 
implementing reappraisal had fewer available to play the game, and this increased the 
bias they displayed. It is notable that many participants found the game alone taxing, 
without any complications from simultaneously imagining they were taking decisions for 
some other party. 
Combining the correlations of difficulty with changes in responsibility and the disposition 
effect, it appears that an increase in perceived responsibility does not explain the null 
effect of reappraisal on the disposition effect. Participants who found reappraisal easiest 
had the largest increase in perceived responsibility, but also saw the most benefit from 
implementing reappraisal (i.e. the largest drop in disposition effect). Again, these results 
are tentative because of the small samples, but the results which are available do not 
support increased responsibility as an explanation. 
7.4.2 Reappraisal targets used 
Another factor which may have influenced the effect of reappraisal is how reappraisal 
was implemented. As discussed earlier, OU participants had a choice of reappraisal 
target. A manipulation check in questionnaire 4 asked “who did you imagine you were 
trading on behalf of?” Participants fell mainly into professional reappraisal (i.e. as a 
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financial professional) or social reappraisal (for a friend or family member). These 
categories, together with the difficulty rating for each participant, are shown in table 
7.16. 
Table 7.18 Reappraisal targets and reappraisal difficulty rating 
Type Total Difficulty rating 
1, 2 or 3 
Difficulty rating 
4 or 5 
Social reappraisal 25 16 9 
Professional reappraisal 28 18 10 
Anonymous reappraisal 8 6 2 
Reappraisal – dubious  3 n/a n/a 
Reappraisal – blank  4 n/a n/a 
Control 51 n/a n/a 
Control – no trades 1 n/a n/a 
The anonymous reappraisal category is where participants did not give enough 
information in their answer to place them in one of the main categories. “Dubious” and 
“blank” are literal descriptions of those reappraisal participants’ responses about their 
reappraisal target, so they were also excluded from the analysis above. One control 
participant also made no trades, also as discussed above. 
7.4.2.1 Analysis of reappraisal using reappraisal targets 
To test if there were differences between groups, the disposition effect on plays 3 and 4 
was re-analysed, comparing professional reappraisal, social reappraisal and the control 
group. Other reappraisal participants were excluded, as well as those with a 4 or 5 
difficulty rating. Figure 7.7 presents these results. 
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Figure 7.7 DE by group and reappraisal target on plays 3 and 4 
 
The disposition effect increases in the control and social reappraisal groups, and there is 
no significant difference between these two groups. The disposition effect for the social 
reappraisal group is a little higher than the control group, but this difference is present 
on both plays 3 and 4. 
In contrast, the professional reappraisal group is significantly different from both the 
control and social reappraisal groups. Its overall disposition effect was not significantly 
different from zero on either play 3 or play 4. To put it another way, even before 
implementing reappraisal, the professional reappraisal group was just as likely to sell 
losses as sell gains. Therefore, the professional reappraisal group couldn’t reduce their 
disposition effect, as on average they didn’t have one to begin with.  
This is certainly an unexpected finding. It seems that the kind of people who choose to 
implement reappraisal as a professional have a low disposition effect initially. However, 
it still doesn’t provide a clear explanation why reappraisal is ineffective in the social 
reappraisal group, which is statistically the same as the control group. It does suggest 
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though that the exact application of cognitive reappraisal, and the choice of reappraisal 
target, may be more complex than anticipated. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
The OU study was successful in its practical aims, collecting a much larger, balanced 
sample size. There was less missing data, and greater confidence that participants had 
complied with the protocol as a researcher was always present during participation.  
There was a disposition effect overall; however, there was no effect of reappraisal on the 
disposition effect, nor cutting gains, nor holding losses. The only significant effect of 
reappraisal was the manipulation of changes in perceived responsibility for the outcome 
of their decisions, finding reappraisal produced an increase. The null effect of reappraisal 
on emotions is not surprising considering the null effect of reappraisal on the trading 
biases, which suggests that reappraisal was ineffective in general in this study. 
Emotion measures were included to investigate if they mediate the effect of reappraisal. 
There was no effect of reappraisal on emotions, and no effect of reappraisal on trading 
behaviours to mediate, so no firm conclusions can be drawn about whether emotions 
mediate a reduction in DE when one does occur. 
As noted, the only significant effect of reappraisal was an increase in perceived 
responsibility for the outcome of their decisions. However, this was the opposite of what 
was expected. Lee et al. (2008) found that a reappraisal instruction to trade for someone 
else decreased the disposition effect, and speculated that this was the result of enabling 
participants to distance themselves from their decisions. In turn, the hypothesis in this 
study was that an increased distance from decisions should decrease the emotions 
experienced when making those decisions, thus reducing trading biases. Instead, when 
trading for someone else, participants appear to feel more responsible than if they were 
trading for themselves. In retrospect, this reaction by participants is understandable, 
and was probably amplified by the option to trade for a friend or family member, rather 
than an anonymous client. This is discussed more in the limitations section of chapter 9. 
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Follow-up analysis suggests that differences some participants found it difficult to carry 
out reappraisal and that this also interfered with its expected effect. Perceived 
responsibility increased more in participants who rated reappraisal easier to carry out. 
This reinforces the conclusion above that reappraisal had the opposite effect on 
responsibility to the one intended. Note however, that this correlation was only marginal. 
In addition, the disposition effect decreased more in participants who rated reappraisal 
easier to carry out. This effect was strongest for those who rated reappraisal ‘very easy’, 
though the overall correlation is not significant. However, it does suggest that the 
increased responsibility from reappraisal was not responsible for reappraisal not being 
effective at reducing the disposition effect overall. 
For participants who found reappraisal difficult, it is possible that playing the game while 
also attempting cognitive reappraisal was too cognitively demanding, and that the 
emotional impact of gains and losses was crowded out by the cognitive demands of 
simultaneously attempting the game and reappraisal. This would be more likely to occur 
with novices as participants, who are less familiar with trading tasks then retail 
investors. Overall the study suggests that this use of reappraisal in novices is not be 
straight-forward, and this is discussed in the last two chapters. 
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8 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the results of the empirical work in this 
thesis. It clearly sets out and discusses the evidence presented for each research 
question and their associated hypotheses, and whether each hypothesis was supported. 
This allows the contributions, implications and limitations to be discussed in the final 
chapter, without needing to refer to the tests in detail. 
This thesis covers four research questions: 
RQ 1 - Does the disposition effect have trait-like characteristics? 
RQ 2 - Do cutting gains and holding losses have trait-like characteristics? 
RQ 3 - Does cognitive reappraisal affect the disposition effect and its constituent biases, 
when tested in experienced traders under conditions of greater external validity? 
RQ 4 - Does cognitive reappraisal affect the disposition effect and its constituent biases, 
by changing emotions during trading, when tested in novices under conditions of 
greater external validity? 
These questions can be divided into two themes. The first two research questions 
investigate the trait-like characteristics of trading behaviour, while the second two 
research questions explore whether it is possible to change these trading behaviours and 
explore their links to emotions during trading.  
The first research question looks at the properties and measurement of the disposition 
effect. The second research question looks at similar issues about its constituent biases 
(cutting gains and holding losses), with the additional issue of whether those constituent 
biases are independent, and thus the disposition effect is better conceived as the 
combination of these constituent biases. The third and fourth research questions 
examine whether it is possible to change the disposition effect people display when 
making trading decisions, by using cognitive reappraisal in ecologically realistic 
experimental conditions, in both experienced and novice participants. 
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The four sections below recap the hypotheses relating to each research question, how 
they were tested, whether the results support the hypothesis, and the conclusions 
drawn. 
8.1 DOES THE DISPOSITION EFFECT HAVE TRAIT-LIKE 
CHARACTERISTICS? 
This research question examines the disposition effect by looking at two important 
properties. First, is the disposition effect stable when measured: do the same 
participants achieve similar scores when measured repeatedly? Is it meaningful to say 
that a person has a high or low disposition effect, as if it was a stable personality trait?  
Second, does the disposition effect have construct validity: does it correlate across 
measures and situations? If the disposition effect is a stable behaviour that drives 
behaviour, it should have both intra-individual stability and validity. 
If the disposition effect has trait-like characteristics, it should be possible to measure a 
person repeatedly and get roughly the same answer. If this is not the case, it raises 
questions about whether the disposition effect is better seen as a state phenomenon 
rather than a trait-like phenomenon. If this were the case, investors could differ in their 
disposition effects, but this would not be due to differences in an underlying disposition 
effect; it would not make sense to refer to investors as high or low in disposition effect, 
outside of the specific occasion where they were measured. This would nullify the 
rationale of identifying investors prone to the disposition effect, to help them reduce 
their bias. 
One way to investigate construct validity is whether different ways of measuring the 
disposition effect give similar answers, and in particular whether measurements in the 
lab relate to disposition effects in the real world. The assumption here is that studying 
the disposition effect in an experimental setting is ultimately motivated by its occurrence 
in real trading. This is a phenomenon waiting for a definitive explanation: even Shefrin 
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and Statman’s seminal 1985 paper sought to test explanations for its appearance in 
financial markets. 
Table 8.1 shows results for the hypotheses relating to the first research question, and 
then each hypothesis is discussed briefly. 
Table 8.1 Findings for trait-like characteristics of the disposition effect 
 Hypothesis Test Supports 
hypothesis 
Chapter 
1.1 
The disposition 
effect will show 
intra-individual 
stability 
Correlations between repeated plays of 
the two-index game 
Yes 4 
Amount of variance in disposition effect 
scores accounted for mainly by 
differences between participants 
Yes 4 
Test-retest stability (in the Milan study) Yes 4 
1.2 
The disposition 
effect will show 
convergent 
validity across 
multiple 
measures 
Correlation between DE scores from the 
two-index game, and disposition effect 
scores from real-world trading records 
Yes 4 
Correlations between DE scores from the 
two-index game, and disposition effect 
scale scores. 
Yes 5 
8.1.1 The disposition effect will show intra-individual stability  
Participants played the two-index game repeatedly in the same experimental session (3 
or 4 times depending on the study). Strong correlations were expected between 
disposition effect scores (DE scores) on repeated plays. This is strongly supported, with 
all correlations being significant with a typical correlation coefficient of 0.7. The evidence 
is particularly strong because this was done with 3 independent samples, and the same 
relationship holds in all 3 studies. 
Another technique to measure the stability of scores partitioned the variance within each 
sample into within-participant and between-participant variance. If scores are 
expressions of a stable behaviour which differs from person to person, then most 
variance would be expected to be attributable to between-participant differences. Again, 
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this is what was found, with the between-participant variance varying between 60-75% 
depending on the sample. 
Finally, if the disposition effect is a stable behaviour, scores from repeated 
measurements should correlate over extended periods of time. In the Milan study, 
participants had a break between plays of the game of a week or more; however, the 
test-retest correlations are still significant and strong (0.568 < r <.732). This last test 
suggests that the disposition effect is stable not just in the short term (the same hour), 
but also over the medium term (a week or two). 
Based on these results, we can conclude that the two-index game produces reliable 
scores of the disposition effect in the short term, and probably in the medium term also. 
8.1.2 The disposition effect will show convergent validity across 
multiple measures  
If the disposition effect is a stable behaviour of an individual, it should be possible to 
measure it in multiple ways and still find consistent results. The two-index game DE 
scores measure the disposition effect directly from trading decisions made within its 
simplified trading environment. The Saxo trading data measures the disposition effect 
directly from investor’s real-world trading in financial markets. Finally, the disposition 
effect scale completed by Milan and London participants measures the disposition effect 
using self-reported responses about typical attitudes and decisions during an investor’s 
real-world trading, and relies on respondents’ memories.  So, these three methods cover 
a range of measurement types and data sources. 
Despite these differences, all correlations between them are significant. The correlation 
between the DE scores from the game and the Saxo real-world trading is significant, 
with a medium size (r = .271). The correlations between the scale and DE scores from 
the game are also significant, with medium effect sizes (.231 < r < .369). These results 
support convergent validity of these instruments: they are capturing the same variation 
in behaviour. 
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These results support the conclusion that the disposition effect is a stable behaviour 
which differs between investors, and is driving variation in all three measurements. 
Since the three types of measurement are all designed to measure the disposition effect, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the shared variation they are capturing is attributable to 
variation in the disposition effect between participants. The reason the game, scale, and 
real-world trading correlate is because people do differ in their disposition effect bias, 
and this is being successfully measured in these studies. 
8.2 DO CUTTING GAINS AND HOLDING LOSSES HAVE TRAIT-LIKE 
CHARACTERISTICS? 
This research question asks whether cutting gains and holding losses also have trait-like 
characteristics. Therefore, it asks similar questions as the first research question: 
whether these biases are reliable and display construct validity.  These questions are 
important for the same reasons: intra-individual stability shows that the bias persist over 
time, and convergent validity shows that the biases are expressed across different 
situations and methods of measuring it. Intra-individual stability and convergent validity 
are assessed in the same way as for the disposition effect above. 
There is also the additional question of whether the biases are independent of one 
another. This is key evidence for the question of whether the disposition effect is a 
monolithic bias or is better described as two distinct trading biases. This is tested by 
investigating the discriminant validity of cutting gains and holding losses, using the two-
index game, the scale, and both simultaneously. Whereas convergent validity implies 
that the same bias should correlate when measured in different ways, discriminant 
validity implies that independent biases should not correlate with each other. This would 
strongly support the claim that they are both measuring stable and distinct biases. 
Convergent validity is tested in a similar way as the disposition effect, by comparing 
scores on the two-index game with scores from the scale (after two factors representing 
the two biases were extracted from the scale). Discriminant validity is tested in 3 
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different ways. Firstly, by comparing scores for the two biases within the two-index 
game. Secondly, by comparing scores for the two biases within the scale. Finally, by 
comparing scores for the two biases across the game and scale. 
Table 8.2 details results for hypotheses relating to the second research question, and 
then each hypothesis is discussed. 
Table 8.2 Findings for trait-like characteristics of cutting gains and holding losses 
 Hypothesis Test Supports 
hypothesis 
Chapter 
2.1 
Cutting gains 
will show 
intra-
individual 
stability 
Correlations between repeated plays of the 
two-index game 
Yes 4 
Variance in cutting gains (PGR) scores 
accounted for mainly by differences between 
participants 
Yes 4 
Test-retest stability (in the Milan study) Yes 4 
2.2 
Holding 
losses will 
show intra-
individual 
stability 
Correlations between repeated plays of the 
two-index game 
Yes 4 
Variance in holding losses (PLR) scores 
accounted for mainly by differences between 
participants 
Yes 4 
Test-retest stability (in the Milan study) Yes 4 
2.3 
There will be 
discriminant 
validity 
between 
cutting gains 
and holding 
losses in the 
two-index 
game 
Comparing correlations within and between 
PGR and PLR over repeated plays. 
Partially 4 
Correlations between PGR and PLR over 
repeated plays after controlling for number 
of trades 
Yes 4 
2.4 
There will be 
discriminant 
validity 
between 
cutting gains 
and holding 
losses in the 
scale 
Principal components analysis to split the 
scale into factors representing cutting gains 
and holding losses 
Yes 5 
Correlation between the two extracted 
factors – testing that the correlation is not 
significant 
Yes 5 
2.5 
There will be 
convergent 
Correlations between PGR scores and gain 
factor scores 
No 5 
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validity for 
cutting gains 
between the 
two-index 
game and 
the scale 
Correlations between PGR scores and gain 
factor scale scores 
No 5 
Correlations between PGR scores and all-
gains scale scores. 
Partially 5 
Correlations between PGR scores and selling-
gains scale scores. 
Yes 5 
2.6 
There will be 
convergent 
validity for 
holding 
losses 
between the 
two-index 
game and 
the scale 
Correlations between PLR scores and loss 
factor scores 
Yes 5 
Correlations between PLR scores and loss 
factor scale scores 
Yes 5 
2.7 
There will be 
discriminant 
validity 
between 
cutting gains 
and holding 
losses, 
between the 
two-index 
game and 
the scale 
Correlations between PGR and loss factor 
scores, and PLR and gain factor scores. 
Testing that the correlations are not 
significant. 
Yes 5 
Correlations between PGR and loss factor 
scale scores, and PLR and gain factor scale 
scores. Testing that the correlations are not 
significant. 
Yes 5 
8.2.1 Cutting gains will show intra-individual stability  
The same tests carried out to establish intra-individual stability of the disposition effect 
were also carried out for cutting gains. Correlations between PGR scores on repeated 
plays of the game were strong on all 3 studies, and were all significant. All correlations 
exceeded r =.5, except with play 1 on the London study. Typical correlation strength on 
the Milan and OU studies was about r=.7. 
Variance in PGR scores attributable to between-participants differences was between 
55% and 80%, across the 3 studies. This provides strong evidence that a stable bias 
which differs between participants drives these scores. 
Finally, test-retest correlations in the Milan study were all significant with large effect 
sizes (.605 < r < .745). 
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8.2.2 Holding losses will show intra-individual stability 
The same tests were carried out to establish intra-individual stability of holding losses. 
The results were even stronger than for the disposition effect and PGR. PLR scores 
between repeated plays of the game within studies were all significant and very strong, 
with typical correlation coefficients of r = .8. Variance in scores attributable to between-
participant differences was similarly strong (72-80%). Finally, test-retest correlations 
were all significant (.585 < r < .657). 
8.2.3 There will be discriminant validity between cutting gains and 
holding losses in the two-index 
Discriminant validity concerns whether two instruments which should measure different 
biases do indeed measure different biases. Biases which are not theoretically related to 
each other should not be related to each other when they are measured, either with the 
same method or with different methods. Therefore, PGR and PLR should not be related 
to one another. Showing this provides evidence that cutting gains and holding losses are 
two distinct biases which combine to produce an apparent disposition effect. 
Discriminant validity was assessed by analysing the pattern of within-bias and between-
bias correlations in the two-index game. Between-bias correlations were expected to be 
low, and certainly lower than the within-bias correlations. Discriminant validity is not 
tested with a single statistic, but is assessed by the overall pattern which emerges from 
many correlations. 
In the London and Milan studies, within-bias correlations were clearly stronger than 
between-bias ones overall, giving strong evidence for discriminant validity. The OU study 
produced different results to the other two studies as all correlations were highly 
significant, regardless of type. There is still some evidence for discriminant validity 
between PGR and PLR, since within-bias correlations had larger effect sizes than 
between-bias correlations on average. 
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However, the number of trades made is a potentially confounding factor and can lead to 
PGR and PLR being correlated. To remove this variation, PGR and PLR scores were 
regressed on the number of total trades made in each game, and the correlation pattern 
were assessed again when correlating the residuals of these regressions, rather than the 
raw figures. 
After controlling the frequency of trading, between-bias correlations were moderate to 
weak (<.300) and usually non-significant, while within-bias correlations were still strong 
and all highly significant. In the OU study in particular, the differences between within-
bias and between-bias correlations were much clearer after controlling for frequency of 
trading. So, this provides good evidence that stable and distinct biases relating to cutting 
gains and holding losses drive these scores, once the frequency of trading has been 
controlled for. 
8.2.4 There will be discriminant validity between cutting gains and 
holding losses in the scale 
The disposition effect scale, completed by Milan and London participants, has 10 items. 
Some relate to gains and some relate to losses, while some relate to holding positions 
and some relate to closing them. The aim was to show that the scale could be used to 
measure cutting gains and holding losses separately, and provide further evidence that 
they are both stable and distinct biases. It would also establish that further work in scale 
development is worthwhile and likely to produce reliable self-report measurements of 
these biases. 
Initial analysis of inter-item correlations suggested two main clusters of items based 
around behaviour towards gains and losses respectively. Principal components analysis 
formalised this by extracting two distinct factors, one representing each bias. Then 
principal components analysis using direct oblimin rotation tested the correlation 
between these factors by allowing them to freely correlate. The correlation was very low 
(r = .0073) and not significant. In both statistical and practical terms, this can be 
treated as a zero correlation, meaning the two factors are independent of one another. 
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So, the scale analysis works strongly suggests that even a limited scale based on the 
disposition effect can be split into two independent factors for cutting gains and holding 
losses. 
8.2.5 There will be convergent validity for cutting gains between the 
two-index game and the scale 
If cutting gains is a stable bias of an individual, it should be possible to measure it in 
multiple ways and still find consistent results. The two-index game PGR scores measure 
the disposition effect directly from trading decisions made within its simplified trading 
environment. The gain factor scores are the result of principal components analysis 
carried out on the disposition effect scale, completed by Milan and London participants, 
which measures trading behaviours and attitudes with self-reported responses (from 
memory). Gain factor scale scores are the result of adding up the scores from the scale 
items which primarily load onto the gain factor. 
In contrast to the hypothesis, there were no significant correlations between PGR scores 
and gain factor scores, nor between PGR scores and gain factor scale scores. This failure 
may be due to the difficulty of carrying out exploratory principal components analysis 
with a small number of initial items. As discussed in chapter 5.5.3.1, the loading of item 
3 to the cutting gains factor is not intuitive, and may be the result of a limited number of 
initial items to use for the factor analysis. 
However, constructing scale scores a priori on a theoretical basis, rather than those 
extracted using principal components analysis, provides results that suggest further 
scale development could result in a gain factor that shows convergent validity.  
All four items on the scale which relate to gains were summed to produce ‘all-gains scale 
scores’. These scores have marginal or significant correlations with PGR scores from the 
game. In addition, the three items which relate specifically to selling gains (as opposed 
to holding them) were also summed to produce ‘selling-gains scale scores’. These scores 
have significant correlations with all 3 sets of PGR scores. So, there is evidence of a 
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relationship between measuring cutting gains in the two-index game with some of the 
scale items.  
Since the factor analysis did not produce a factor grouping these items, this does not 
demonstrate convergent validity for a cutting gains bias, because the cutting gains items 
cannot be claimed to represent cutting gains when they do not correlate with each other. 
However, it does provide a solid rationale for studying the cutting gains further, for 
example why the ‘selling-gains’ items did not form a factor, and developing the to 
measure the factor structure of cutting gains with more precision. 
8.2.6 There will be convergent validity for holding losses between the 
two-index game and the scale 
The loss factor extracted by principal components analysis was tested in the same way 
as the gain factor above but using PLR scores rather than PGR scores. In contrast to 
cutting gains, correlations provided strong support of convergent validity between the 
scale and game scores. Correlations of the factor scores with PLR on all 3 plays were 
significant with medium sized correlations (-.332 < r < -.242).20 Correlations using the 
scale scores were similar but not as strong, with one marginal and two significant 
correlations, with slightly lower effect sizes. However, overall this is a strong result which 
supports holding losses as a stable bias that drives scores in both the game and the 
scale. 
8.2.7 There will be discriminant validity between cutting gains and 
holding losses across the two-index game and the scale 
Cutting gains and holding losses have already been demonstrated to be distinct within 
the two-index game, and within the scale. The final set of tests in this section sought to 
establish that cutting gains and holding loses were distinct biases across measurement 
                                           
20 The correlations are negative because as the factor scores for holding losses increase, 
the proportion of losses hold should decrease, since losses will be held more and sold 
less frequently. 
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methods. So, PGR from the game should not correlate with the loss factor from the 
scale, and PLR from the game should not correlate with the gain factor from the scale. 
The results strongly supported this. Correlations between PGR and the loss factor scores 
and scale scores were all non-significant with effect sizes around zero. Correlations 
between PLR and the gain factor scores and scale scores were also all non-significant 
and around zero. 
8.3 DOES COGNITIVE REAPPRAISAL AFFECT THE DISPOSITION EFFECT 
AND ITS CONSTITUENT BIASES, WHEN TESTED IN RETAIL 
INVESTORS UNDER CONDITIONS OF GREATER EXTERNAL 
VALIDITY? 
This research question, which relates specifically to the Milan study, set out to test the 
disposition effect and its constituent biases experimentally, with greater external validity 
than has been achieved before. An increase in ecological validity was provided by using 
the two-index game as a trading environment, rather than a simpler trading approach 
such as Lee et al. (1998). In addition, the Milan study recruited experienced traders as 
opposed to novice participants with no experience of trading, increasing the external 
validity of the study in a second way. 
With this increase in external validity, the research question examined several questions. 
Do experienced traders trade with a disposition effect in the lab when measured with 
greater ecological validity? Does cognitive reappraisal reduce the disposition effect under   
these conditions? Finally, does reappraisal achieve its effect by reducing the tendency to 
hold losses as opposed to cut gains? 
Table 8.3 details tests which were carried out to test these hypotheses, and again the 
sections following it discuss the results in more detail. 
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Table 8.3 Findings for the effect of cognitive reappraisal on the disposition effect and its 
constituent biases, tested in retail investors. 
 Hypothesis Evidence Chapter Supports 
hypothesis 
3.1 
Investors will show 
a disposition effect 
in the two-index 
game 
T-tests on level of disposition 
effect on each play 
6 Yes 
3.2 
Cognitive 
reappraisal will 
reduce the 
disposition effect 
T-tests comparing change in 
disposition effect between groups 
6 Yes 
Marginal modelling of 3 repeated 
plays, with effect of reappraisal as 
an interaction 
6 Yes 
3.3 
Cognitive 
reappraisal will 
reduce holding 
losses but not 
affect cutting gains 
T-tests comparing change in 
cutting gains between groups 
(testing null effect) 
6 Yes 
T-tests comparing change in 
holding losses between groups 
6 Yes 
8.3.1 Investors will show a disposition effect in the two-index game 
The disposition effect was shown to be present when tested across the entire dataset.  A 
one-sample t-test, testing whether the overall disposition effect differed from zero (zero 
indicating no bias), was highly significant. Participants sold gains about 75% more 
frequently then losses. The disposition effect was also demonstrated on plays 3 and 4 
analysed separately, with their respective t-tests also highly significant and participants 
about twice as likely (i.e. a 100% increase) to sell gains as losses. The effect was not 
significant on play 2 alone, although participants were still about 30% more likely to sell 
gains than losses. 
8.3.2 Cognitive reappraisal will reduce the disposition effect 
The experimental design used repeated measures and compared an experimental group 
with a control group. As expected, cognitive reappraisal reduced the disposition effect 
relative to the control group. The change in disposition effect between plays 3 and 4 was 
significantly different between groups, with the reappraisal group showing a relative 
reduction of 55%. 
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There were however, potential issues in terms of the initial baseline levels of the groups. 
To address this, data for play 2 was also included so that three repeated measurements 
were analysed. Marginal modelling was used to test the effect of play order and group 
membership across all three plays. The effect of reappraisal was represented in the 
interaction between play order and group, and specifically in the model’s parameter for 
the reappraisal group on play 4. The interaction overall was significant and the model 
parameter for the reappraisal group on play 4 was marginal; however, if this test is 
treated as one-tailed (since it was specifically predicted) then this parameter is also 
significant. 
So, the effect of reappraisal has been tested in two different ways, and found to be 
significant on each occasion. This is good evidence that reappraisal is still effective, when 
improvements are made to the external validity of the test from both increasing 
ecological validity and using representative participants. 
8.3.3 Cognitive reappraisal will reduce holding losses but not affect 
cutting gains 
The effect of reappraisal on cutting gains and holding losses were tested in the same 
way, using repeated measures and comparing the change in an experimental group with 
that in a control group. As expected, reappraisal produced a significant reduction in 
holding losses, i.e. an increased willingness to sell losses. At the same time, it was 
shown that changes in cutting gains were not significantly different between groups.  
The combined effect of these two tests is that the effect of reappraisal on the disposition 
effect can be attributed to a decrease in holding losses, rather than a decrease in cutting 
gains, and the hypothesis is supported. 
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8.4 DOES COGNITIVE REAPPRAISAL AFFECT THE DISPOSITION EFFECT 
AND ITS CONSTITUENT BIASES, BY CHANGING EMOTIONS DURING 
TRADING, WHEN TESTED IN NOVICES UNDER CONDITIONS OF 
GREATER EXTERNAL VALIDITY? 
This final research question was tested by the OU study. It attempted to build on the 
findings of the 3rd research question and the Milan study, and retained the emphasis on 
testing reappraisal with greater ecological validity by using the two-index game to 
measure trading biases. Participants were adults across a range of ages and 
backgrounds, tested on the Open University campus. This relaxation of the requirements 
for participants allowed a larger dataset to be collected, and the greater experimenter 
control of a study completed in person allowed a wider range of questions to be asked. 
Although not using retail investors sacrificed some external validity, it was still 
considered an improvement compared with the narrow cross-section of adults that using 
student samples provide. 
This research question initially covered the same questions as the third question: the 
existence of the disposition effect, and the effect of reappraisal on the disposition effect, 
cutting gains and holding losses. However, in addition, the mechanism of reappraisal and 
its link to emotions experienced while trading was explored. Does reappraisal bring 
about changes in trading biases and experienced emotions simultaneously? If so, can 
changes in emotions mediate the changes observed in trading biases? 
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Table 8.4 Findings for the effect of cognitive reappraisal on the disposition effect and its 
constituent biases, and the role of emotions in reappraisal’s effect, tested in novices 
 Hypothesis  Evidence Chapter Supports 
hypothesis 
4.1 
Novices will show a 
disposition effect 
Confidence intervals for each 
play, testing whether disposition 
effect is different from zero 
7 
Yes, but lower 
levels of DE than 
expected, and 
no overall bias 
in “professional 
reappraisers” 
4.2 
Cognitive reappraisal 
will reduce the 
disposition effect 
T-tests comparing change in 
disposition effect between 
groups 
7 No 
4.3 
Cognitive reappraisal 
will reduce holding 
losses but not affect 
cutting gains 
T-tests comparing change in 
cutting gains between groups 
(testing null effect) 
7 Yes 
T-tests comparing change in 
holding losses between groups 
7 No 
4.4 
Cognitive reappraisal 
will reduce negative 
emotions experienced 
during trading 
T-tests comparing change in 
each emotion between groups 
7 No 
4.5 
Changes in emotions 
during trading will 
mediate the effect of 
reappraisal 
Not tested because there was no 
effect of reappraisal to mediate 
7 n/a 
8.4.1 4.1-4.3 The effect of reappraisal on the disposition effect, cutting 
gains and holding losses, in novices 
As with the Milan study, the existence of the disposition effect during the study was 
established. However, the levels of disposition effect were lower than the Milan study, 
suggesting that novices were not able to express themselves fully in the more realistic 
trading setup. In addition, a subset of participants labelled “professional reappraisers” 
(who chose to carry out reappraisal as some type of financial professional), did not 
display a disposition effect at the group level. 
Contrary to expectations, cognitive reappraisal did not have a significant effect on the 
disposition effect overall. Those who rated reappraisal as less difficult to carry out did 
have a larger decrease in disposition effect compared with the control group. However, 
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splitting the reappraisal group into subgroups based on participants’ difficulty ratings 
reduced sample sizes and statistical power greatly. Consequently, this finding was not 
significant, so is only tentative. 
Since there was no effect of reappraisal on the disposition effect, it was not possible to 
explain changes in disposition effect in terms of changes in holding losses. There was no 
effect of reappraisal on holding losses, and as expected there was no effect on cutting 
gains either. The implications of these results are discussed in the following chapter; 
however, for now, a summary is that there was no effect of reappraisal on any of the 
trading biases when testing novices. 
There was, however, an effect of reappraisal on perceived responsibility (reported in the 
manipulation checks section 7.3.1). However, the effect was to increase perceived 
responsibility when carrying out reappraisal, not decrease it. In addition, participants 
who rated reappraisal as easier to carry out tended to have larger increases in perceived 
responsibility. Though the conclusions that can be drawn from these finding are limited 
by reduced sample size, it would suggest that when participants were able to carry out 
reappraisal as instructed they felt more responsibility for their decisions, not less as 
intended. This was the opposite of what was intended. 
8.4.2 4.4-4.5 The effect of reappraisal on emotions, and mediation of 
its effect on the disposition effect 
Reappraisal did not have any significant effects on any emotions measured. This included 
the PANAS positive and negative affect scales, four specific affect scales from the 
PANAS-X, and five other emotions related to those tested by Summers and Duxbury 
(2012). Since there was no effect of reappraisal on the disposition effect, nor on any 
changes in emotions reported, the mediation of the former by the latter was not tested. 
8.5 SUMMARY OF ALL FOUR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The first research question examined trait-like characteristics of the disposition effect by 
examining its properties. It found that the disposition effect is reliable when measured 
246 
 
experimentally using the two-index game, in the short term and likely the medium term 
too. It displays convergent validity when compared between the scale, the game, and 
trading records from financial markets. This demonstrates that the disposition effect 
does have trait-like characteristics, and can drive variation in individuals’ trading 
behaviour both in the lab and in the field. 
The second research question addressed whether cutting gains and holding losses could 
also be considered as biases, with the additional issue of whether they are independent 
of each other. There was strong evidence for the intra-individual stability of both holding 
gains and cutting losses in the two-index game. There was weak support for convergent 
validity of holding gains, though this may be improved with more extensive scale 
development. In contrast, there was strong support for convergent validity in holding 
losses. Finally, there was strong evidence for discriminant validity between cutting gains 
and holding losses, tested within the game, within the scale, and between the game and 
the scale. 
The third research question asked whether retail investors displayed a disposition effect 
in the lab, whether it was reduced by reappraisal, and if so whether this effect was 
driven by a decreased tendency to hold losses. Not only did the Milan study test these 
hypotheses, but it did so with increased external validity from both the method used to 
measure trading biases and the participants used. All three hypotheses in this area were 
supported. There was an initial disposition effect in participants, it was reduced by 
reappraisal and this was because of the effect on holding losses. So, this research 
question provides good evidence that reappraisal is still effective when external validity 
of experimental setups is improved, and that changing behaviour towards losses is the 
mechanism for reappraisal’s effect. 
The fourth and final research question tested similar issues to the third question with a 
similar design, but using a mixed adult sample of novices rather than retail investors. In 
addition, it sought to test ideas about how reappraisal might affect emotions experienced 
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during trading, and if these could shed light on how reappraisal affects the disposition 
effect.  
In contrast to the previous study, few effects were found. There was still an overall 
disposition effect, albeit much lower than previously. Using novices as participants 
appeared to negate the effects of reappraisal on trading biases. Likewise, there were no 
effects found of reappraisal on emotions during trading, with only an unexpected 
increase in perceived responsibility. Since there were no effects of reappraisal on trading 
biases, nor on emotions during trading, the mediation of the former by the latter was not 
tested. 
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9  CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISCUSSION 
This thesis has examined four research questions, with a series of hypotheses relating to 
each one. In fact, this thesis can be considered as two complementary and contrasting 
themes: whether the disposition effect, cutting gains and holding losses show trait-like 
characteristics, and whether it is possible to change these trading behaviours in novices 
and in experts, while increasing ecologically validity in experimental testing. 
The first two research questions sought to establish whether trading behaviours could be 
considered stable biases. By examining the intra-individual stability and construct 
validity of these trading behaviours, it was established that they had trait-like 
characteristics. In addition, these tests used experimental instruments with improved 
ecologically validity, giving further credence to the view that the trading behaviour 
measured in the lab is representative of trading biases observed in real world trading. 
The latter two research questions attempt to change the expression of those same 
biases using emotion regulation, but increasing the external validity of the experimental 
designs used to test this. External validity was increased by improving the ecological 
validity of the instrument used to be measure trading behaviour, and using retail 
investors as participants in some studies. 
The previous chapter summarised the empirical evidence generated in each of the four 
research questions. This chapter begins by stating the contribution made by this thesis 
for each question. It continues by exploring the implications of these contributions, and 
possibilities for future research. It discusses the limitations of the work, and makes 
suggestions for further future research in response to these limitations. Implications for 
practitioners are suggested. Finally, the overall conclusions of the thesis are laid out. 
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9.1 CONTRIBUTIONS 
9.1.1 Does the disposition effect have trait-like characteristics? 
There are many experimental studies of the disposition effect, and many measures of 
the disposition effect used. In all these studies, the disposition effect is operationalised 
by demonstrating a difference in the likelihood of gains versus losses being sold. While 
this mathematically satisfies the definition of a disposition effect, there is little research 
on the implied claims that these studies make: that the measures in lab studies are 
reliable, and that they valid (i.e. that they relate to disposition effects in the real world), 
and extrapolating from this, that the disposition effect is a stable bias. 
If lab studies do not produce reliable measures, then at best they are measuring the 
disposition effect as state behaviour, rather than trait-like behaviour. If measures are 
not even stable within a session, it is arguable whether they measure anything at all. So, 
establishing reliable measures in the lab is a desirable goal. 
In addition, many studies also only demonstrate a difference between gains and losses 
on a group level, for example Lee et al. (2008), which this thesis specifically sets out 
improve on. These studies are not able to claim they are directly measuring a disposition 
effect for any individual at all, since an individual’s trading behaviour is only measured 
towards gains or losses, but not both. The operationalisation of the disposition effect is 
assumed to be reliable because the gain and loss groups are drawn from the same 
population, and it is assumed the gain would have the same bias towards losses as the 
losses group were they to be tested on losses instead (and vice versa). So, the 
difference in behaviour between groups, and thus the operationalisation of the 
disposition effect, is assumed to be reliable. However, such studies do not assess this 
reliability. To do so, the studies would need to be repeated many times. 
Experimental studies are often justified explicitly by reference to the impact of the 
disposition effect on real-world trading. This follows in the footsteps of the seminal paper 
by Shefrin and Statman (1985), which attempted to produce a theoretical explanation 
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for the phenomenon observed in financial markets. Even if not explicitly justified like 
this, experimental studies on the disposition effect still imply the research is interested in 
disposition effects that occur in real-world decision making. To phrase this another way, 
few research papers claim to be interested only in the disposition effect measured in a 
specific lab setup used in the study. Simplification is usually a practical step to 
experimentally isolate variables of interest. 
This thesis argues that it is justified to treat the disposition effect as a stable trait-like 
bias that determines a person’s trading behaviour in the short term, the medium term, 
and likely the long term. It can be reliably measured in the lab, with a method that 
achieves good ecological validity, and it is still reliable when using actual retail investors 
rather than novices as participants. 
This thesis argues that it is a stable trading behaviour: a persistent feature of a person’s 
trading “personality”. It is not stable only when using one method to measure, but a 
participant or investor scoring highly on one measure of the disposition effect should 
tend to score highly on another. So, the contribution is in demonstrating that the 
disposition effect has trait-like characteristics, varies reliably between people, and affects 
different measures of the same trading behaviour. This is an important contribution to 
the field because previous experimental studies have not established that the disposition 
effect they measure represents a stable trading behaviour. 
Intra-individual stability in the lab has been demonstrated using the two-index game. 
Although this is a simplification of real world trading, it does incorporate many more 
realistic features of trading, and give much greater flexibility to the participant in how 
they make their decisions. Demonstrating intra-individual stability here is a novel finding 
alone. A disposition effect doesn’t need to be measured with the constricted and forced-
choice decisions usually used in the lab; it can still be reliably measured despite the 
random noise that the more realistic features introduce. 
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Not only has intra-individual stability been demonstrated, but it has been demonstrated 
very robustly. Three or four repeated measurements were taken from each participant. 
This was demonstrated convincingly over three independent studies, two studies using 
retail investors and one study using novices. There can be little doubt that the 
disposition effect was reliably measured in these studies. 
The two studies which used retail investors as participants also demonstrated convergent 
validity between a self-report scale, the trading game, and real-world trading: three 
qualitatively distinct types of measure. So, the two-index game combined with the scale 
and real-world trading records provide strong evidence that the disposition effect has 
trait-like characteristics, and that it reliably varies between people. The fact that retail 
investors were used as participants, and that retail investors were also measured trading 
on financial markets, makes this particularly valuable: it makes a link between the 
disposition effect used in the lab and the actual trading behaviour of investors. 
Overall there is strong evidence that the disposition effect is a persistent feature of 
decision-making during trading which can be treated as having trait-like characteristics. 
It can be measured consistently in both novices and experts, with lab measurements, 
self-report scales, and trading in financial markets. 
9.1.2 Do cutting gains and holding losses have trait-like 
characteristics? 
The disposition effect can be operationalised by demonstrating a difference in the 
likelihood of gains and losses being sold. These “two sides” of the disposition effect, 
cutting gains and holding losses, can be measured separately in this study for each 
participant, and the disposition effect is demonstrated by contrasting them. 
However, this thesis argues that these two sides of the disposition effect are also stable 
trading biases in their own right, which determine a person’s trading behaviour towards 
gains and losses independently. They can also be reliably measured in the lab; improved 
252 
 
ecological validity in the instruments used does not vitiate this stability, and they are 
stable when using actual retail investors rather than novices as participants. 
This second contribution is similar to the first contribution in its motivation to establish 
the intra-individual stability and validity of measuring trading biases in the lab. As with 
the first contribution, the claim here is that the biases are not only reliably measured in 
the lab, but that they are persistent features of a person’s trading “personality”. We are 
justified in treating them as biases existing independently of the measure used in any 
one study. This is an important contribution to the field because previous experimental 
studies have not established that these biases have been measured with intra-individual 
stability or validity. 
However, in addition to these points, the second contribution also includes convincing 
evidence that these two constituent biases of the disposition effect are largely 
independent of each other. This is important because it links back to the first 
contribution, and explains why the disposition effect is a stable bias. It is argued here 
that its true nature is actually two stable biases, which correspond to each ‘side’ of the 
disposition effect. Though the disposition effect appears to be stable bias itself, which 
displays convergent validity, the claim here is that this is only the case because its two 
constituent biases are stable biases themselves which display convergent validity. 
To make this contribution, this thesis has demonstrated the intra-individual stability of 
cutting gains and holding losses in the same way it is demonstrated for the disposition 
effect. Repeated measurements of the biases were made using the two-index game. 
Convincing demonstrations of the intra-individual stability of the biases were made in 
three independent studies: two studies using retail investors and one study using 
novices. 
Convergent validity between the game and scale was also demonstrated in a similar way 
(after the scale was split into two factors by factor analysis). Convergent validity was 
strongly demonstrated for holding losses. This was not demonstrated for cutting gains 
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using the scale factor extracted; however, there was good evidence for a relationship 
between the trading game and some of the cutting gains items selected on theoretical 
grounds (rather than statistical grounds). 
The additional analysis for this contribution, to show the biases are independent, 
involved testing discriminant validity. This is the idea that if measures are independent 
they should not be correlated. This was tested in three ways.  
First, using factor analysis the scale was shown to split into two independent factors 
representing these two biases. Second, using scores from the game, there was good 
evidence across the three studies that scores for cutting gains (measured by PGR) were 
correlated weakly with scores for holding losses (measured by PLR). This evidence was 
particularly strong after controlling for frequency of trading.  
Finally, data from the game and scale were used together, as they were for establishing 
convergent validity. However, opposing biases were compared instead of matched 
biases, so cutting gains from the game was compared with holding losses from the scale 
(and vice versa). Using all three methods, the biases were found to be independent of 
one another. 
Overall there is strong evidence that the two sides of the disposition effect are effectively 
separate trading biases, which can be reliably measured in the lab. In most experimental 
work, they have been combined into the disposition effect, since this allows a relative 
score for their ‘disposition effect bias’ to be produced. However, this thesis clearly shows 
that this analysis is incomplete. 
9.1.3 Does cognitive reappraisal affect the disposition effect and its 
constituent biases, when tested in retail investors under 
conditions of greater external validity? 
The first two contributions provided evidence for the trait-like characteristics of the 
disposition effect, cutting gains and holding losses. Having established these, the third 
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contribution is concerns changing the expression of those trading biases using emotion 
regulation, while increasing the external validity of the studies used to test this. 
The two-index game significantly improves on previous lab methods to measure the 
disposition effect, while the use of retail investors demonstrates these effects in retail 
investors, rather than the novices usually featured in experimental work. The Milan study 
employed both improvements to verify that the disposition effect occurs, and that 
cognitive reappraisal can be used to reduce it in retail investors. 
This builds directly on Lee et al. (1998) who used a form of reappraisal to manipulate the 
disposition effect. It also echoes others who have demonstrated the ability of reappraisal 
to change other related biases such as loss aversion (e.g. Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009), 
and it re-affirms the broader literature on reappraisal as an effective tool to improve 
decision-making. However, what previous studies lacked is a demonstration that 
reappraisal can be applied beyond artificial lab environments, and that it can be effective 
with experienced participants rather than novices. 
So, the main contribution here is to demonstrate reappraisal’s effectiveness as a de-
biasing tool, using an experimental setup much closer to real world conditions, with retail 
investors as participants. This reinforces the findings of previous studies: as discussed in 
the first contribution above, most researchers are ultimately motivated to research the 
disposition effect in the lab because of its effect in the real world, starting from the 
seminal work of Shefrin and Statman (1985). 
This motivation also applies to the use of reappraisal. It is interesting to note that 
reappraisal is effective in the lab, but better to demonstrate that it will be effective in the 
real world, and the improvements in external validity provide stronger evidence that this 
is the case. With the current concerns about replicability in psychological science, more 
work showing that psychological manipulations in the lab have external validity is 
welcome. 
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The Milan study also produced a novel finding, beyond its improvements in external 
validity. The experimental design allowed cutting gains and holding losses to be 
measured separately, and the within-participant design allowed changes in each to be 
monitored. The led to the finding that the decrease in the disposition effect, which 
cognitive reappraisal produces, can be attributed to a decreased tendency to hold losses 
(i.e. an increased willingness to sell losses) rather than a decreased tendency to cut 
gains. 
This ties in well with the second contribution which showed that the disposition effect can 
be de-composed into its two constituent biases. In effect, previous studies have not told 
the whole story when focussing on the disposition effect as a difference between 
behaviour towards gains and losses. This thesis fills in the gaps by showing that holding 
losses is a stable bias in its own right, and that it is behaviour towards losses that drives 
the effect of reappraisal on the disposition effect. 
9.1.4 Does cognitive reappraisal affect the disposition effect and its 
constituent biases, by changing emotions during trading, when 
tested in novices under conditions of greater external validity? 
The final contribution of this thesis is to raise interesting questions about the difference 
between studying novices and experts, and how this difference was affected by 
increasing external validity in the studies used. The Milan and OU studies were 
conceptually identical, with very similar procedures which both attempted to increase the 
external validity of previous results. However, they differed in the type of participant 
used and this appears to have produced the contrasting results. 
The Milan study replicated and improved upon previous findings, showing that 
reappraisal reduced the disposition effect by reducing holding losses.  In contrast, the 
OU study demonstrated that if ecological validity is increased when measuring the 
disposition effect, but novices are used as participants, cognitive reappraisal is no longer 
effective in reducing the disposition effect. Nor did the OU study find an effect of 
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reappraisal on the other variables tested, including cutting gains, holding losses, and 
various measures of emotions experienced during trading. 
Given the positive results of the Milan study (and many previous studies) where 
reappraisal was effective, this lack of effect is best explained as the result of the failure 
of reappraisal to have any effect on novices in this setup, rather than the lack of effect of 
reappraisal in general. The same applied to the involvement of emotions during trading 
as a mechanism for reappraisal’s effect, which the OU study sought to test. If reappraisal 
had affected the trading biases but not emotions during trading, this would be evidence 
that emotions are not involved in mediating reappraisal’s effect. However, given the null 
effect of reappraisal on trading biases too, all that can be said is that the expected effect 
of reappraisal did not occur. 
This contribution raises two main issues. The first relates to using novices when 
attempting to study psychological biases with greater ecological validity. While improving 
ecological validity is desirable, novices’ lack of expertise may interfere with their ability 
to carry out tasks in ecologically valid studies, even without the effect of biases. Thus, 
testing the experimental manipulation of biases this way is problematic. 
The second issue concerns generalising from lab studies using novices, to real world 
settings which require expertise or experience. These results suggest that de-biasing 
techniques such as cognitive reappraisal may be less effective when implemented in real 
world settings where expertise or experience are a factor, than they are when 
implemented in the lab using novices. This calls into question the implications of 
previous findings about the effect of cognitive reappraisal on trading biases. It suggests 
caution should be used when extrapolating from positive results in the lab with novices, 
to the same phenomenon in real world behaviour. 
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9.2 IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
9.2.1 Trait-like characteristics of the disposition effect, cutting gains 
and holding losses 
Since the first two contributions are theoretically similar, and share many implications, 
they are discussed together here. The disposition effect has been shown to have trait-
like characteristics, in its stability over time and convergent validity across different 
measures. However, it is also argued that the disposition effect can be decomposed into 
(at least) two constituent biases. The thesis provides strong evidence that cutting gains 
and holding losses have trait-like characteristics too, which can reliably be measured in 
the lab and which drive trading behaviour in the real world. The disposition effect is a 
stable bias, but this is simply the combined result of the first two biases. If cutting gains 
and holding losses are both reliable and both show convergent validity, then so will the 
disposition effect. 
If cutting gains also splits into constituent biases as speculated, then an analogy can be 
drawn with the constituent biases of the disposition effect. Although the two-index game 
does not produce any measurements for constituent biases of cutting gains, if those 
constituent biases are reliably elicited by the game, then the measurement of the 
combination of those behaviours towards gains (measured as PGR) will also be reliable. 
PGR and PLR are measured separately in this thesis, while the proposed constituent 
biases of cutting gains are not. Likewise, in many studies where only the disposition 
effect is measured, PGR and PLR are only measured in combination. However, whether 
underlying biases are measured separately or only in combination, their underlying 
psychometric properties will remain the same. 
The implication of these conclusions about the disposition effect supports existing work 
on the disposition effect, and previous results in the lab. As noted, many experimental 
studies measure ‘the disposition effect’ operationalised in some way, but implicitly (or 
explicitly) aim to measure a stable bias in trading behaviour. This thesis supports the 
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assumption made in these studies: it is justified to study the disposition effect in the lab 
and generalise to real world trading. 
This thesis demonstrates that by using a relatively brief and simple trading task, 
individual disposition effects that relate to real world trading can be reliably measured in 
the lab. Using this kind of instrument (one with greater ecological validity) would 
improve future experimental work on the disposition effect and other biases. In effect, it 
suggests an aspiration for future work to also use more realistic measures of the trading 
biases being studied. 
Although this thesis does give support to other experimental studies of the disposition 
effect, it may be that its success in establishing convergent validity is limited to lab 
measures which have high ecological validity, as the two-index game does. A question 
for further investigation is whether more basic measures of trading decisions also 
capture useful information about trading biases. For example, do the measures used by 
Weber and Camerer (1998) also correlate with real-world trading decisions? Do the more 
simplified ones from Lee et al. (2008)? This could be established by comparing more 
simple measures to the two-index game, to the scale, or to actual trading records. 
Many experimental studies of the disposition effect have assessed the disposition effect 
by comparing groups. However, this thesis has shown that individual disposition effects 
can be reliably measured too. So, another aspiration for future research is to study 
participants’ individual trading behaviour, rather than losing information by inferring 
biases between groups. 
The intra-individual stability of the trading biases established here applies to the short 
term: within the same hour for most of the data, and no more than a few weeks for the 
test-retest data from the Milan study. A wider claim would be that these trading biases 
are stable behaviour much like a personality trait, over much longer durations. The 
convergent validity with the scale provides some evidence that stability is longer term, 
since participants answered this scale in relation to their historical trading patterns. 
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However, longitudinal studies would provide stronger evidence on the persistence of 
individual differences in these trading biases. 
Other research has investigated the link between demographic characteristics and the 
disposition effect, such as Dhar and Zhu (2006). Longitudinal research could answer 
whether it changes as demographic characteristics change, or whether the link with 
demographic characteristics is driven by other factors, and the biases are stable in the 
longer term. For example, perhaps older investors (lower disposition effect) tend not to 
begin trading until a later age, so it appears that disposition effects decline with age. 
However, it is possible that these people would have lower disposition effects if 
measured when they were younger, but they are usually not trading when younger, so 
are not sampled in field research in financial markets. 
In addition to the results about the nature of the disposition effect, this thesis has also 
made important contributions about cutting gains and holding losses being stable and 
distinct biases. The implications for researchers here mirror those of the disposition 
effect. It is important for researchers to use instruments which can measure these 
biases reliably in the lab and realistically, and this is an aspiration for future research. 
In fact, a simple suggestion is simply to ensure these biases are measured at all. The 
distinction found between the two biases means it is important for researchers to 
measure them separately whenever possible. It’s been discussed above that there is no 
disposition effect in reality – it is the product of these two separate and independent 
biases. Therefore measuring only the disposition effect misses information about a 
participant or investor’s trading behaviour: it misses information about how participants 
with similar disposition effects may have quite different trading behaviour when analysed 
as two biases. Therefore, future experiments, both on the nature and manipulation of 
the disposition effect, should aim to measure both sides to understand which is causing a 
difference between participants. 
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This distinction also has implications for explanations of the disposition effect. Shefrin 
and Statman’s proposed explanation based on prospect theory was that being in a gain 
or loss frame changes the subjective utility of further gains or losses. The value function 
from prospect theory is concave for gains and convex for losses (sometimes called the 
reflection effect). This means that changes in subjective utility when moving the position 
back to the reference point are valued more than further losses or gains. In other words, 
there is a diminishing marginal effect of further gains and losses. This results in investors 
preferring to sell gains but hold losses, ceteris paribus. 
The value function in prospect theory transforms a prospect x as follows, depending on 
whether it is framed as a gain or a loss: 
v(x) = xα if x > 0 
v(x) = -λ(-xα) if x < 0 
The difference in steepness between the curves comes from the loss aversion parameter, 
λ. However, the rest of the equation is determined by the single parameter α in the 
equation for the value function (which is why it is a reflection – it has the same shape for 
both gains and losses, but they are the mirror image of each other). Crucially, the 
difference in subjective utility between returning to the reference point, and a further 
gain or loss, is the result of α. So, it is α which should drive the disposition effect on this 
explanation. The lower α is below 1, the greater the deviation in the value function from 
a straight line, and the more biased the investor should be. 
The implication is that cutting gains and holding losses should be correlated within 
individuals, since both biases are driven by the value of α. The second contribution 
relating to the independence of cutting gains and holding losses, shows that this is not 
the case. Therefore, an explanation of the disposition effect based on prospect theory 
does not appear to be consistent with the results found. This supports previous work 
questioning an explanation based on prospect theory, such as Kaustia (2010), who found 
that the probability of selling jumps as at the break-even price. 
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Future research could investigate the failure of prospect theory to account for the results 
here, other explanations which could take the place of prospect theory, and how or if 
they can be reconciled with prospect theory at all. For example, an alternative theory for 
why people hold losses could simply be that people dislike losses compared with gains, 
and combined with mental accounting that does not treat a loss as incurred until it is 
closed, this produces the aversion to close losses. This is consistent with Kaustia’s 
results, which showed that a trading position’s profit or loss is treated more like a binary 
characteristic. People were relatively insensitive to the magnitude of the profit or loss, 
but responded strongly to whether it is a gain or a loss. So, for example, a loss of £100 
is treated similarly to a loss of £500 than a profit of £100, even although in relative 
terms it is £400 different from the former and only £200 different from the latter. 
This kind of explanation would be consistent with the “system 1 / system 2” model of 
how emotions can affect decisions. People are averse to losses. Combined with falling 
prey to mental accounting, perhaps they avoid selling losses simply to avoid the pain of 
psychologically feeling losses. So, investors allow the fact they have a loss per se to 
cloud their judgement, and give this fact more importance than it warrants in objective 
terms. For the other side of the disposition effect, this logic would be reversed: the 
pleasure from selling gains should encourage selling them, over and above the objective 
value of what those gains are worth. This “emotional logic” closely follows the 
explanation tested in Summers and Duxbury (2012). 
The contribution that cutting gains and holding losses are distinct biases also raises the 
possibility that different psychological mechanisms may underlie them. Cutting gains is 
about attraction to positive emotions, whereas holding losses is about avoiding negative 
ones. Put another way, investors who are not biased in either way are able to delay 
gratification from selling gains, and accept the pain of selling losses. 
These seem to be qualitatively different situations, and it is possible that different brain 
mechanisms underlie each behaviour. In fact, put this way, finding that the two biases 
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are independent is not actually very surprising – the two biases can occur in quite 
different situations. Future research can build further evidence that these two biases are 
distinct, for example investigating possible neural or physiological correlates of each 
bias, and the independence these correlates. 
A further implication of this work is that the disposition effect scale is ripe for further 
development. The scale was only 10 items long, yet appears to have validity in 
measuring the disposition effect, without any further selection of items needed. The 
correlations were significant and medium-sized (r~0.3). This kind of effect size 
demonstrates a relationship between two variables, but the amount of shared variance is 
still low (~10%). Constructing a scale with a larger sample of items should produce 
stronger correlations that improve on this by including more detailed items; the results 
so far suggest such work may be fruitful. 
Implications for scale development for the two constituent biases mirror those for the 
disposition effect. Given the initial success of developing two subscales which measure 
one constituent bias each, it appears that there is scope to develop this into a longer and 
more accurate scale. However, for the case for doing so for the constituent biases is 
even greater. Given the 10 initial items, the selection of items for the subscale was very 
limited, and this may have led to the failure to establish convergent validity for cutting 
gains, for example. Further scale development can show whether convergent validity can 
be improved with a more extensive range of gain items. It could also answer the 
question of whether cutting gains is a unitary bias, or has its own constituent biases. 
9.2.2 The effect of cognitive reappraisal on the disposition effect, its 
constituent biases, and emotions during trading. Tested in 
experienced traders and novices under conditions of greater 
external validity 
The second two contributions both deal with the effect of cognitive reappraisal on trading 
biases. In addition, some of the implications are the result of contrasting the two 
studies. Given these points, it makes sense to discuss their implications together. 
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9.2.2.1 Reappraisal as a de-biasing method 
Reappraisal was found to reduce the disposition effect in experienced traders using a 
more realistic method of measuring it. It is plausible that this instruction may work 
differently in students compared with retail investors. However, an aim of this study was 
to explore whether cognitive reappraisal could be used as a technique to help retail 
investors improve their financial decisions, so it was important to test whether people 
experienced in stock market trading would react to such an instruction in the same way 
as naïve participants. The results here suggest that this is the case, and reappraisal can 
have similar effects in both types of participant, as shown in novices in Lee et al. (1998), 
and in the Milan study here. 
We can conclude the previously found effect of reappraisal was not caused by the 
simplicity of the decision-making environment used in that research. The two-index 
game allows much greater flexibility for participants in how and when they make their 
trading decisions. It is more cognitively challenging to play since the price changes 
continuously, there is predictive information about future prices, and this predictive 
information also changes continuously. Despite this, a disposition effect was still found 
and reappraisal reduced this. 
Reappraisal is also effective with retail investors, so a lack of expertise in novice 
participants can also be ruled out as an explanation for reappraisal’s effectiveness. The 
previous effect of reappraisal does not appear to be a product of “naïve” decision-making 
which experts would not engage in. 
The results here suggest that it is worthwhile testing whether this form of reappraisal 
can be effective in real-world trading on financial markets, with experienced participants 
trading their own capital. The Milan study was a compromise between the previous 
experimental tests on the disposition effect and a real-world test. Previous studies have 
been carried out with artificial trading tasks and unrepresentative samples. However, an 
ideal study would use experimental studies of investors’ decisions when trading on 
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financial markets, and randomly allocate retail investors to an experimental (employing 
reappraisal) and a control group. This would be very similar to a field study using 
secondary data, the only difference being the reappraisal instructions given to the 
experimental group. 
Unfortunately, such studies pose significant practical problems. Finding willing 
participants and convincing them to try a technique when trading their own capital, when 
that technique is not already fully tested, may be difficult. The design would also require 
ensuring that investors implementing reappraisal were doing so correctly and 
consistently. This would also have to be maintained for a sufficient period to produce a 
trading record large enough to measure trading biases. Most traders do not trade as 
frequently as in the two-index game, meaning field studies often must draw data from 
many years for trading biases to be detectable over random noise, allowing a disposition 
effect to be accurately measured for participants. Asking investors to persist with an 
experimental approach over long time scales could also be difficult. 
Researchers’ potential liability for any economic losses sustained might be a practical 
constraint issue. Participants may worry that reappraisal could actually worsen their 
trading, and give up if they suspected this. Unfortunately, given a sufficiently large 
number of investors it is inevitable that some of them would lose money during the 
study, and this may attribute this to taking part in the study, rather than themselves or 
simply bad luck. 
Of course, these difficulties were an important consideration in using the two-index 
game in this thesis as a proxy for a trading environment, rather than carrying out a field 
experiment. However, given the results of the Milan study, there is now more evidence 
to justify testing reappraisal in financial markets. 
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9.2.2.2 The role of emotions in the disposition effect, and cognitive reappraisal’s 
effect 
A novel finding in this thesis is that the effect of reappraisal on the disposition effect can 
be attributed to a decrease in holding losses, rather than a decrease in cutting gains.  
Reappraisal had negligible effect on the tendency to close gains. Since the second 
contribution established that cutting gains and holding losses are distinct biases, we can 
state this more succinctly: when testing experts, reappraisal reduces holding losses in 
experts, but does not affect cutting gains. 
The Milan study did not investigate the mechanism of reappraisal, but only the effects of 
its application. However, these results are consistent with the idea that cognitive 
reappraisal is effective because it changes the emotions that participants experienced 
during decision making. This is prima facie how a form of emotion regulation would 
affect a decision-making bias, especially a bias which is suspected to be influenced by 
emotions to begin with. 
Since the Milan study found that changes in holding losses were the main driver of the 
change in the disposition effect, this implies that reappraisal changes or reduces 
emotions associated with losses, rather gains, and these emotions are presumably 
negative ones. If experiencing negative emotions results in holding losses more, then 
any method of reducing or controlling these emotions should result in lower holding of 
losses and a lower disposition effect overall. 
This is consistent with previous research such as Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) who found 
that reappraisal was effective in reducing loss aversion. Summers and Duxbury (2012) 
also found the disposition effect was associated with changes in negative emotions 
(regret), based around the framing of losses. Kaustia (2010) found a qualitative 
difference between how gains and losses are traded. However, this study did not look at 
emotions directly, and could not distinguish between whether it was the negative effect 
of losses, or the positive effect of gains (or both), which was driving this difference. 
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Unfortunately, the Milan study did not provide any direct evidence that reappraisal 
operates by reducing negative emotions toward losses, since measures of emotions were 
not included in that study. These measures were included in the OU study, since that 
study aimed to provide more direct evidence that cognitive reappraisal reduces the 
disposition effect by reducing negative emotions associated with trading losses. 
Unfortunately, the OU study did not find an effect of reappraisal. However, the results of 
the Milan study suggest that further work to investigate the mechanism or mediating 
variables for cognitive reappraisal is worthwhile. Given the results of the OU study, these 
studies could either use simple trading instruments with novices, or more ecologically 
valid ones with experts (this is discussed further below). 
9.2.2.3 The effect of reappraisal on emotions during trading 
The purpose of measuring emotions in the OU study was to investigate if changes in 
emotions mediate the effect of reappraisal; however, since there was no effect of 
reappraisal on trading behaviours, there was nothing for emotions to mediate. In 
addition, there were no effects of reappraisal on emotions, so there were no changes in 
emotions to do the mediating. Therefore, no firm conclusions can be drawn about 
whether emotions mediate reappraisal’s effect. 
The only significant effect of reappraisal was an increase in participants’ perceived 
responsibility for the outcome of their decisions. This was the opposite of what was 
expected. Reappraisal was intended to allow participants to distance themselves from 
their decisions, which should decrease the emotions felt during those decisions and 
reduce trading biases. Instead, when trading someone else’s money, participants appear 
to feel more responsible than if they are trading for themselves. Although there were no 
significant effects of reappraisal on emotions, the direction of the effects was that the 
control group improved relative to the reappraisal group; this is consistent with 
reappraisal making participants more emotionally involved, not less. 
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Further research can attempt to establish the effect of reappraisal on emotions during 
trading. Given the success of the Milan study, it makes sense that reappraisal would 
alter emotions during trading; however, this has not been established directly in these 
studies. In a similar way to the design of Summers and Duxbury (2012), one experiment 
could measure the impact of experimental manipulations on emotions, while another 
could measure its impact on trading decisions. In combination, an effect of emotions on 
trading decisions can be inferred. 
9.2.2.4 The specific reappraisal instruction used 
The results of the OU study also shine a spotlight on the variety of ways in which 
reappraisal can be implemented. Cognitive reappraisal is a technique people can apply, 
but the specific way it is implemented can have dramatically different outcomes. 
Cognitive reappraisal as a technique in general has no predictable effect, but 
qualitatively different methods of reappraisal can produce quite different effects on 
emotions. This was demonstrated by the OU study, where an instruction intended to 
decrease perceived responsibility increased it. 
Furthermore, the relationship between cognitive reappraisal and emotions experienced is 
also complex. While applying cognitive reappraisal was expected to alter the emotions 
experienced, and help reduce bias in trading decisions, this did not occur there. This may 
be related to the increase in perceived responsibility rather than a decease, which was 
expected to mediate the decrease in emotions experienced.  
Another important implication is that the target of reappraisal (i.e. who the participant 
imagines they are trading for) affects their emotional experience during trading. The 
reappraisal instruction used in this thesis was based on the one used by Lee et al. 
(2008) where they asked participants to imagine trading as a broker, for clients. This 
was expected to distance participants from the decisions being made, and in doing so, 
be less affected by emotions when making decisions. However, when trading “for” a 
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family member or acquaintance, emotional experience appears to be increased; this was 
the opposite of the effect intended and may have contributed to the null findings. 
Future research could examine how different types of reappraisal affect emotions 
experienced during trading. For example, Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) used a cognitive 
reappraisal instruction which was also intended to reduce emotions during decisions. 
Indeed, they show that a reduction in skin conductance response (SCR) when exposed to 
losses is correlated with a decreased in loss aversion in decision making. However, their 
instruction focussed more on the attitude toward the decisions being made, rather than 
relying on a change in perspective (i.e. who participants imagined being, and trading 
for). This may have been more effective in changing in the attitude towards decisions, 
and therefore changing the emotions experienced during decision making. It would be 
very interesting to replicate the Milan and OU studies using this kind of reappraisal 
instruction. 
9.2.2.5 The effect of reappraisal in retail investors compared with novices 
Combining the results of the Milan and OU studies, reappraisal reduced the disposition 
effect in the Milan study, but the OU study showed no effects of reappraisal on the 
disposition effect, nor on emotions during trading. This raises the question of what 
difference between the studies resulted in reappraisal working in one but not the other. 
One clear difference is that in the Milan study, the participants were retail investors, 
while in the OU study the participants were novices (a range of adults based on a 
university campus). It is possible that greater ecological validity nullifies the benefits of 
reappraisal for novices, but not for experts. So, this thesis adds to a topical debate on 
replicability of psychological research. It suggests that experimental effects on trading 
biases, found in psychologically simplified and controlled conditions, should be treated 
with caution until further research can test in these effects in more ecologically valid 
settings. 
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If researchers are interested in the validity of those effects in real world settings, which 
is usually the case, then testing in the lab should be only the first step. What appears 
like a robust finding in the lab may be more difficult to implement in real-life, or simply 
in more realistic conditions, or may only generalise to specific populations. 
The results are particularly interesting when compared with existing literature on the 
effect of reappraisal on the disposition effect. Reappraisal previously reduced it, when 
carried out in artificial trading tasks with novices. The Milan study still found a reduction 
when external validity was improved, both in the measurement instrument and 
participants used. However, when ecological validity was improved but the participants 
reverted to novices in the OU study, there was no effect. So, while improving ecological 
validity is desirable, as discussed above, it may make studies using naïve subjects even 
less generalizable to the real-world behaviour of experts, which researches are often 
ultimately interested in. 
This conclusion about the contingent effect of ecological validity also raises the question 
of why this difference would occur. It is well-known that there are systematic differences 
between how novices and experts make decisions. Further studies could examine the 
process of decision-making in experts and novices in trading, and how this might interact 
with the process of reappraisal they were asked to implement. 
Another difference between the studies could be the cognitive load placed on the two 
sets of participants. This difference could arise from the cognitive demands to play the 
trading game, or the cognitive load of carrying out this type of cognitive reappraisal, or a 
combination of both. For retail investors, the two-index game is actually a simplification 
of their usual trading environment. In contrast, for novices the two-index game was a 
significantly challenging task in its own right. (This was noted by the researcher 
speaking to participants during and after participation, and in some of the free-response 
questions at the end of the questionnaire. Unfortunately, there were no quantitative 
measures built into the study about difficulty of playing the game per se, as opposed to 
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the difficulty of reappraisal). So, the two-index game is relatively more difficult for 
novices to play, and places increased cognitive demands on them before any reappraisal 
intervention. 
At the same time, the cognitive reappraisal instruction used in these studies is a 
cognitively demanding task itself. It requires participants to continuously imagine they 
are trading for someone else, or as someone else. Without practising this, cognitive 
reappraisal itself could demand many cognitive resources throughout the duration of the 
game. It is possible that limits in cognitive capacity prevented reappraisal being carried 
out effectively by novices, as they were already struggling simply to play the two-index 
game effectively. 
There is some support for this in the data. The more difficult those participants found 
reappraisal (measured by their rating of its difficulty), the less effective it was. 
Participants who rated reappraisal as hard or very hard had an increase in their 
disposition effect, relative to the control group, while participants rating reappraisal very 
easy did better than the control group. So, this interpretation has some evidence from 
the data, but cannot be held with conviction because of the decreased power from 
splitting the reappraisal group into five subgroups. Replication with increased sample 
size would help clarify these issues. 
Even for those who found reappraisal easy to implement, cognitive load may have put 
limits on how much they could improve, since they had to split their attention between 
implementing reappraisal and playing the game. If this is correct, participants who found 
reappraisal very easy had a lower demand on their cognitive resources, allowing 
reappraisal to have a more obvious beneficial effect on their trading decisions. 
This hypothesis about cognitive load suggests many avenues for future research. Further 
research could investigate the cognitive load of both the instrument used to measure 
decisions, and the form of emotion regulation used by participants. If the novices in this 
study were only impeded because of their unfamiliarity with trading, this could be tested 
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with further research. Reappraisal should become effective once novices can play the 
game easily, which can be investigated by habituating novices to the demands of the 
trading environment. Research using longer duration participant involvement, perhaps 
using longitudinal designs, could test whether this explanation is valid. 
Alternatively, the demands on cognitive load may come mainly from carrying out 
cognitive reappraisal. Cognitive load was not directly measured, only the difficulty of 
implementing reappraisal. Future research could investigate the cognitive demands of 
reappraisal as a primary aim. Perhaps there are other methods of emotion regulation 
which are cognitively less demanding. Other forms of emotion regulation which do not 
require constant attention to apply should be more effective in novices. 
9.3 LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Like the implications section above, the first and second contributions have been 
grouped together, and so have the third and fourth contributions. Since each pair share 
much of the same underlying theory, they share many of the same limitations too, and 
are more parsimoniously discussed together. 
9.3.1 Trait-like characteristics of the disposition effect, cutting gains 
and holding losses 
Playing the two-index game involves a specific type of trading. By necessity it measures 
trading within a brief period, so it can capture trading behaviour within the lab. To 
generate sufficient trades to measure the trading biases of participants, the two-index 
game is designed to elicit rapid decision-making and trading in response to a very 
rapidly changing price index. 
However, many investors trade over much longer periods of time. For example, 
investors may consider selling a stock over days, weeks, or even months. So, there is a 
question about how similar trading behaviour in the two-index game would be to more 
deliberative, long term trading. Of course, the same limitation applies to most 
experimental studies of trading behaviour. Arguably other studies suffer from it more, 
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given the improvements to ecological validity which this thesis makes (discussed early in 
the thesis). 
Regarding the nature of the disposition effect specifically, this thesis provides good 
evidence that the disposition effect as measured by the two-index game is shared with 
investors’ long-term behaviour, from the correlation between the game and trading 
records. In addition, measurements from the game correlate with the self-report scale 
about trading behaviour in financial markets. However, these findings are not definitive 
about the extent to which the two-index game captures other types of trading behaviour. 
In addition, reappraisal was only tested when trading in the game, and not in real-world 
trading. 
What both short-term and long-term trading have in common is that at some point in 
time, investors must consider selling gains and losses. No matter how long a decision 
takes, and the amount of time available to make that decision, there is still a point in 
time where the decision is made. An assumption of all work in this area is that the 
psychological processes which occur when considering selling stocks are the same 
regardless of the timeframe, and this is also the view adopted here. However, future 
research could seek to support this rather than assume it, and build on the conclusions 
here about the duration over which the disposition effect, cutting gains and holding 
losses measured in the lab are representative of trading in other environments. 
 The scale was also limited, since there were few initial items used. Despite this several 
positive results were found, so this seems like more of an opportunity than a limitation. 
Further scale development, for example as described by Hinkin (1998) will hopefully 
produce a scale which is even more closely correlated with the disposition effect seen in 
trading and build on the initial success demonstrating convergent validity here. 
The limitations of the scale were more apparent for the constituent biases rather than 
the disposition effect itself. It is very encouraging that the two subscales demonstrated 
independence from one another, and impressive that convergent validity was 
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demonstrated for holding losses between the scale and the game. However, a longer 
scale would clearly be desirable. 
Compared with the disposition effect, there is more to gain from further scale 
development for the constituent biases. After removing items which did not load clearly 
onto one factor or the other, there were only 6 items remaining, and 3 items in each 
subscale is the very minimum possible to have a scale at all. So, the construct validity of 
these subscales was very likely hampered by a lack of items to construct a scale from. 
Carrying out factor analysis with a larger number of initial items should allow a more 
robust scale to be produced that correlates more strongly with the game. This would 
improve the accuracy of the scale as a diagnostic tool; at present the strength of 
correlations only allows the scale to be indicative of someone who may have a higher 
than average bias. 
The limitations with cutting gains were greater than for holding losses, and suggest this 
bias will especially benefit from further research. It was not possible to establish 
convergent validity between the scale and the two-index game for cutting gains. 
However, the cutting gains component which emerged from principal components 
analysis was not theoretically intuitive, since it included item 3 which relates to loss 
aversion rather than cutting gains specifically. The factor loading of this item was lower 
than the other two items for cutting gains (items 1 and 9), and lower than all 3 of the 
items loading onto holding losses. Given that item 3 appears to describe loss aversion, it 
is also curious that this item did not load onto the holding losses factor. 
In effect, only two cutting gains items clustered strongly (items 1 and 9). So, it is 
possible that the failure to find significant correlations is attributable to limitations in the 
range of items that were included in the original scale. Further research should explore 
self-report scales relating to gains, by including a larger range of items initially. 
An alternative cutting gains scale, using groupings based on theory rather than the 
result of the factor analysis, created a gains scale which did correlate with PGR game 
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scores. However, it cannot be used to support convergent validity, since the items 
chosen did not group together during factor analysis of the initial scale. Why the 
empirical results of the factor analysis did not match the theoretical grouping is an open 
question for further investigation. One possibility discussed in chapter 5 is that cutting 
gains is not a unitary bias but is composed of several constituent behaviours itself. This 
would result in each constituent of cutting gains correlating with cutting gains as 
measured by the two-index game, but those constituents would not correlate with each 
other, and is consistent with what was observed.  
These results again strongly suggest that developing a longer scale from a wider range 
of initial items, to capture these constituent biases, would be a worthwhile next step. 
This has the potential to explore: how participants interpret item 3 and how this item 
relates to both cutting gains and holding losses; why the theoretical grouping of cutting 
gains items did not produce a factor together; and whether the factor structure of 
cutting gains is better represented as two distinct behaviours. 
9.3.2 The effect of cognitive reappraisal on the disposition effect, its 
constituent biases, and emotions during trading. Tested in 
experienced traders and novices under conditions of greater 
external validity 
The third and fourth contributions tested the effect of cognitive reappraisal on the 
trading biases, so are also discussed together. 
As discussed above, the two-index game encourages rapid decision-making to produce 
estimates of a participant’s disposition effect. A limitation is that this may limit the ability 
to generalise from trading in the two-index game, to long-term trading on financial 
markets. It is possible that, if the process of decision-making is qualitatively different 
between short-term and long-term horizons, it is possible that reappraisal could change 
decision making in one context but not another. Therefore, the positive result found in 
the Milan study may not necessarily apply to long-term trading. 
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9.3.2.1 Practical problems in the Milan study  
An unexpected finding in the Milan study was that the reappraisal group had a higher 
disposition effect on play 3 compared to the control group. The two groups were 
randomly assigned, and there was no difference in procedure between them until 
receiving the cognitive reappraisal instruction immediately before play 4. 
One explanation discussed in chapter 5 is mean reversion: within-participant variation in 
scores on play 3 happened to align with group membership. Since it is unsystematic 
variation, it did not appear on play 4 which brought the group means close together. An 
alternative explanation is that the groups differed systematically in their existing 
disposition effect, and that it is the real effect of reappraisal that resulted in the decrease 
in score for the reappraisal group on play 4. 
To address the concerns about mean reversion, the analysis also included data from play 
2 to allow more information about typical disposition effect of each participant. The 
earlier contributions supported this approach, since it has been shown that disposition 
effect scores from the two-index game correlate strongly and are likely to be the result 
of individual differences in trading behaviour. This multilevel model confirmed the 
original result. Although the reduction in DE attributable to reappraisal was smaller than 
when comparing groups using a t-test, the main reason for the interaction between play 
order and group was still the reappraisal group’s reduction in DE scores on play 4. So, 
this provides some support for the explanation based on intrinsic differences in 
disposition effect rather than mean reversion. 
There were some other data issues where mitigation with additional tests was not 
possible, resulting in sample size being lower than planned and group sizes being 
unbalanced. Both small sample size and unbalanced groups were ultimately 
consequences of the study being completed online, and requiring participants to follow 
the instructions sent to them by email. So, a lack of researcher control over how 
participants completed the study had a big effect on the quality of data produced. 
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Although 117 participants were recruited in Milan, just fewer than half this number 
completed the study online. While participants are of course free to leave at any time 
during any experiment, in practice this is much less likely when participants take part in 
person.  
Not all participants who completed the study followed the full protocol, for example not 
completing the surveys in the study. This was especially an issue for the reappraisal 
group, since the requirements for being included in the reappraisal group were more 
stringent than the control group: reappraisal participants needed to complete the final 
survey so that they read the reappraisal instruction. Following the instruction there was 
a manipulation check to ensure that they had read the instruction and were going to 
implement the instruction. Participants who did not follow the protocol were moved to 
the control group, which is why the groups became unbalanced. 
One simple extension of this work would be to replicate the Milan study with larger 
samples or more closely controlled experimental designs, which would hopefully avoid or 
mitigate these problems. A larger sample size would make up for attrition in participant 
numbers over the study, leaving good statistical power despite a reduction in initial 
sample size. In addition, a larger sample should also have limited the impact of random 
differences in baseline: random differences between groups are likely to become trivial 
as sample sizes increase and random differences between specific individuals balance 
out. If possible, a more closely controlled experimental setup would hopefully avoid or 
mitigate the problems of participants not completing studies and not following the 
protocol properly. 
Of course, the difficulties encountered here highlight a persistent problem in 
psychological science. To do lab studies in controlled studies is easier than doing field 
studies. So, we have a situation where studies are usually intended to have external 
validity, but well-controlled research is valued more highly by scientific journals.  
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The Milan study sought to improve external validity by recruiting expert participants, and 
using a more realistic (and subsequently longer) method of measuring trading biases. 
Both these alterations resulted in practical problems obtaining data, and carrying out a 
rigorous experimental study. However, a claim of this thesis is that despite the 
difficulties, this sort of research is still very much worthwhile. Although confidence in its 
results comes with more reservations, the importance of its results is greater. 
9.3.2.2 Contrasting the Milan and OU studies 
The implications of the difference in results are discussed above. The interpretation given 
is that there was some difference between the studies which resulted in reappraisal 
working in one but not the other. However, another interpretation cannot be ruled out, 
which is that reappraisal was not actually effective in either study, meaning that the 
Milan result was due to chance.  
Dismissing the results of the Milan study would support the view that increased 
ecological validity nullifies the effect of reappraisal in general. The OU study could have 
supported the effects of reappraisal in the Milan study, but has instead become a 
contrast to it. So, confidence in the results of the Milan study is not as strong due to the 
failure to replicate them in the OU study. The main motivation for testing reappraisal in 
this thesis was to do so while also improving ecological validity. On this view, the 
decision-making process in complex trading tasks like the two-index game negates the 
effect of reappraisal. 
A related interpretation is that reappraisal may not be powerful enough to exert a 
measurable effect on decision making when the environment decisions are made in a 
more complex situation (i.e. an effect of reappraisal is small compared to the noise in 
the data). So, reappraisal could theoretically have an effect, but would not be practically 
useful for investors. It is likely that the size of the effect of reappraisal changes with 
each experimental setup used and the characteristics of the sample used. As before, 
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further research into typical effect sizes on trading biases when reappraisal is used would 
be valuable. 
9.3.2.3 Measuring effect on emotions 
The OU study found no effect of reappraisal on emotions. However, it appears that 
reappraisal had no effect at all so little can be draw from the potential effect of 
reappraisal if it could be made effective.  
A similar study could investigate alternative methods of measuring emotions. A limitation 
of the OU study, beyond the null effect of reappraisal, was that emotions were measured 
indirectly. The PANAS and other questionnaires were self-report, based on memory 
(albeit only slightly in the past), and summative over the course of a 5 minutes game.  
The protocol directed participants to respond about the emotions they experienced while 
making trading decisions. However, this will include some noise as participants may have 
struggled to separate their experience of emotions when making decisions from their 
experience of emotions in general when playing the game. Participants made multiple 
trades over the game, sometimes dozens, and the protocol required participants to 
generalise over all these decisions, for some 40 different emotion items. This is obviously 
difficult, and may have resulted in recall issues. 
An improvement in measuring emotions would capture the emotions experienced at each 
specific decision point. This was neatly isolated by Summers and Duxbury (2012), who 
measured emotions at the precise moment that participants would be making trading 
decisions. However, the experimental design precluded this in the OU study. To retain 
the greater ecological validity of the game, participants had to be free to trade 
continuously over the course of the game. This meant that participants made many 
decisions over course of each play.  
It would have been very impractical to stop participants playing and report the emotions 
they were experiencing, every time they considered selling a position. Indeed, doing so 
would have vitiated the realistic conditions of the game, which were specifically included 
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in the study to achieve greater ecological validity. So here again, we have a trade-off 
contrast between increasing the ecological validity of the experiment, and the precision 
with which variables can be measured. 
Physiological measures may be an avenue to purse, to allow greater accuracy when 
measuring emotion proxies, while retaining the realistic trading conditions of the two-
index game. Some possibilities are skin-conductance response, heart-rate variability, 
and EEG (since it has greater temporal resolution than other brain imaging methods). 
However, this would create an additional issue from the matching of individual decisions 
with the emotions measured at that time. Summers and Duxbury for example, isolated 
one decision at a time and measured emotions at that point. Whereas participants 
typically made 20 decisions in each play of the two-index game. The emotion 
measurements would have to be matched to each decision, and of course the number 
and timing of decisions would vary for every participant. The complexity of the data 
analysis required is one reason that this approach was not pursued in this study. 
Another consideration when measuring emotions for specific decisions during the game, 
is how to measure situations when a participant considers closing a trade, but not does 
do so. (OU study participants were instructed to consider their emotions at any time they 
were considering closing trades. However, participants may have found it difficult to 
recall every time this happened, and generalise across them to answer.) These situations 
may be just as important as the times when trades are made. The disposition effect 
involves choosing to hold losses more frequently than holding gains. This difference may 
occur when considering holding losses but choosing not to, meaning this behaviour could 
be crucial to understanding how a disposition effect occurs. 
Unfortunately, this information may be more difficult to capture. It would be easy to 
identify the periods relating to when participants sold gains or losses, and compare the 
emotions experienced in each. Researchers would only have to cross-reference the time 
of closing positions with the time of the emotion measurement. Unfortunately, there is 
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no such easy reference for when trades are considered but not made. This emotional 
experience is again much easier to capture when trading decisions are made in an 
artificial experimental design. When participants are told they must decide to trade or 
not at specific times, then a researcher can be confident that the emotions experienced 
at that point relate to making a decision. Then it is easy to analyse these emotions 
based on the type of position (gain / loss) and decision made (hold / sell). The lack of 
ability to do this, because of using a more realistic trading environment, is another 
compromise here associated with greater ecological validity. 
9.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTIONERS 
This section discusses the implications for practitioners – people connected with the 
finance industry, trading and investing. This includes traders and investors themselves, 
as well as others in the related activities such as investment management, trading 
supervision, and trading platform design. 
The first contribution provides robust evidence that the disposition effect is a bias which 
differs between investors. Since the disposition effect is detrimental to trading 
performance, investors can be tested for this bias and made aware of it. Since the 
disposition effect is stable, investors who present a disposition effect on one occasion are 
likely to retain it over time. If an investor has a disposition effect, this is something both 
worth knowing and worth addressing: investors to have a high disposition effect can 
attempt interventions to reduce this bias. 
The second contribution allows more insight into someone’s trading patterns. The 
disposition effect alone doesn’t capture the whole story – bias could be due to behaviour 
towards gains, or losses, or both. When investigating an investor’s trading patterns, 
practitioners should want to measure behaviour towards gains and losses individually, as 
well as the overall disposition effect. This will give a more detailed account of how they 
trade, how they differ from other investors, and how they may deviate from optimal 
trading patterns and strategies. 
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When investors demonstrate a bias towards gains or losses, interventions could be 
attempted to target behaviour specifically towards gains or losses, depending on which 
bias appears to be responsible for the disposition effect in that scenario. Investors will be 
empowered by knowing that it is specifically gains, or specifically losses, which are 
causing them problems when trading. 
The success of the self-report scale will also interest practitioners. A scale that has a 
strong correlation with actual trading behaviour could be very useful in quickly 
identifying potential issues in a trader’s psychology. Even in its current form, the scale 
and subscales are indicative of someone’s potential trading biases. However, the scale 
has a lot of potential for further development, as discussed above in the implications 
section. If successful, this could make it an accurate diagnostic tool for trading biases 
without even needing access to trading records. This use could be particularly interesting 
to those in trading education, who are trying to build awareness of trading biases and 
identify investors who could benefit from their courses. 
The Milan study found that cognitive reappraisal can reduce the disposition effect (by 
reducing holding losses) in expert investors. So, a straight-forward implication for 
investors is to use this de-biasing technique during their own trading. Similarly, those 
responsible for managing or advising investors could pass on this technique to others.  
In a wider sense, the success of the Milan study suggests that it may be possible to 
change the disposition effect using psychological techniques such as emotion regulation. 
More generally, it suggests that psychological techniques may be useful to help change 
financial behaviour and decisions. This supports many studies in recent years in the 
growing field of behavioural economics and behavioural science, and many practitioners 
will be interested to know that this has been successfully applied to decision-making 
biases in trading. 
However, the contrasting results of the OU study put limits on how far these 
psychological techniques might be applied. The Milan and OU studies combined produced 
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an unexpected conclusion: reappraisal is still effective in reducing trading biases when 
tested with greater ecological validity, but only when tested with experts.  
This is not terrible news for de-biasing techniques to improve financial decisions. Most 
people who trade on financial markets should eventually gain the experience required to 
become experts (the reasons for why there might be differences between novices and 
experts are discussed earlier in this chapter). So, reappraisal should still be useful for 
regular and experienced investors.  
However, cognitive reappraisal does not appear to be an appropriate strategy for novices 
who make infrequent financial decisions: using it may reduce their performance, rather 
than improve it. Those interested in giving advice to the wider public should not advise 
the adoption of cognitive reappraisal. Likewise, individuals looking to improve their 
financial decisions but who have little experience of financial markets would be better to 
not adopt cognitive reappraisal, until they have gained some expertise with the trading 
environment. 
Novices may also benefit from being sceptical about psychological techniques aimed at 
changing financial decision making in general. The results of these studies suggest that 
psychological techniques which are effective in the lab may not be with novices, when 
transferred to real-world setting and the cognitive load produced by the real-world task 
is high. So, this gives pause for thought about the implications of the wider behavioural 
economics literature. It may not be so easy for the general population to apply and 
benefit from psychological interventions found in the lab. 
9.5 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has been successful in demonstrating properties of the disposition effect and 
its constituent biases (cutting gains and holding losses). All three have been shown to be 
reliably measured using a sophisticated trading game in the lab, and this has been 
demonstrated for all three biases in three separate studies. 
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Convergent validity has been demonstrated between the trading-based measure of the 
disposition effect and a self-report scale. This supports the status of the disposition 
effect as a persistent feature of trading behaviour, and supports the value of further 
development of the self-report scale. One major limitation of this work is the extent to 
which decision-making differs in short-term versus long-term trading situation; however, 
convergent validity with the self-report scale partly mitigates this uncertainty. 
Convergent validity has also been demonstrated convincingly for holding losses between 
the trading game and the scale. There is some evidence that convergent validity for 
cutting gains could be achieved with further development of the self-report scale. 
There is good evidence that cutting gains and holding losses are independent biases, this 
being demonstrated in both the trading game and the scale independently. This reveals 
that the disposition effect is not actually a unitary bias at all, but it is the sum effect of 
these two independent trading behaviours. 
Having made these contributions about the nature and measurement of the disposition 
effect and its constituent biases, this thesis investigated the effect of reappraisal while 
improving external validity when in testing it. It also investigated possible mechanisms 
for the effect of reappraisal in the emotions experienced while trading. 
One study using experts (retail investors) found that reappraisal was still effective with 
improvements in external validity. Although issues with the dataset from this study limit 
the confidence that can be placed on those findings, if true the findings from this study 
suggest reappraisal could be a simple yet powerful technique for improving decision 
making in trading. 
A second study with novices failed to find an effect of reappraisal on trading behaviour, 
or on the emotions experienced during trading. Given that reappraisal failed to influence 
trading behaviour, no strong conclusions can be drawn about the effect of reappraisal on 
emotions, nor about the mechanism that may produce reappraisal’s effect. 
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There are two main interpretations of the result of the second study: either the first 
study’s result was spurious, or some difference in novices (as opposed to experts) 
nullified the effect of reappraisal. Based on the latter type of interpretation, further 
research could examine: differences in the process of decision-making between experts 
and novices, the cognitive load placed on experts and novices, and whether other types 
of cognitive reappraisal or emotion regulation are more effective as de-biasing strategies 
for novices. 
The results of this thesis for the nature of trading biases are very encouraging, in 
establishing these biases as stable determinants of trading behaviour that can be 
reproduced in the lab. The results for the effect of cognitive reappraisal are more 
complicated. It was effective for experts in ecologically valid experimental settings, but 
no longer effective for novices. 
Cognitive reappraisal has the potential to be a simple method to help the public improve 
their financial decisions, by giving them just a few sentences of instructions about 
changing their mind-set. As noted by Odean and others, investors with a disposition can 
incur substantial reductions in returns. However, using cognitive reappraisal to improve 
decisions this has turned out to be more difficult to achieve in practice. The failure to 
replicate the effect here in novices is a reminder that ecological validity is paramount. 
When we want to generalise promising results from the lab to the field, demonstrating 
these results again with increased ecological validity is an essential test of their 
robustness in the real world. 
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APPENDIX 1: A MATHEMATICAL EXPLANATION OF THE DISPOSITION 
USING PROSPECT THEORY 
1. The value function v(x) for a gain or loss position is not a linear function of x, but 
is transformed for gains using the equation v(x) = xα  (or for losses v(x) = -λ(-
x)ß. α (and ß) relates to the diminishing marginal effect of increases (or 
decreases) in wealth on expected utility as the price moves away from the 
reference price (i.e. the purchase price),  and takes values between 0 and 1. λ 
refers to loss aversion – the preference for a loss over a gain of equal value, 
which will be referred to later. Both α and ß have been estimated at 0.88 and λ at 
2.25 (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). 
2. When making decisions about whether to buy or sell, the external variables 
considered are: x and its transformation into v(x); h, a further movement from 
this position that will happen if the stock is held, and which could be positive or 
negative; p, the probability of h being positive, and 1 – p, the probability of h 
being negative.  
3. In the basic explanation, h is considered equal to or less than x, such that the 
investor will not switch from a gain position to a loss position, and vice versa; at 
best, they can get back to break-even. The only possibilities are an increase of h 
or a decrease of h. 
4. For the simplified model explanation, p and 1 – p are both fixed at 0.5. 
5. The value function produces asymmetric changes in expected utility when a 
movement of h or -h is considered on top of an existing gain or loss position of x 
or –x. For gains (x > 0) the value function is concave due to operation of α, such 
that the first derivative is always positive and the second derivative is always 
negative. Thus, as x increases, a positive movement of h will always produce a 
magnitude of change in v(x) smaller than a negative movement of h. The average 
of these values will be lower than the expected utility with no movement, i.e. 
selling when the price is x, where v(x) = xα. So, given a 0.5 probability of h and 
0.5 probability of –h, expected utility when gambling is negative compared to 
immediately selling. Selling will be preferred to holding when: 
xα > 0.5((x+h)α - xα ) + 0.5(xα  - (x-h)α 
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→ 2xα > (x+h)α + (x-h)α 
which ceteris paribus will always be true, thus the stock will be sold. 
For losses (x < 0) we see the reverse: ß causes the value function to be convex, 
such that first derivative is always positive and the second derivative is always 
negative. The basic shape of the curve is the same of that for gains if it were 
rotated 180° around the origin. An increase of h will always produce a greater 
positive change in v(x) than a decrease of h. Thus, if there is an equal likelihood 
of an increase or decrease, the expected utility of holding is greater than selling 
immediately. Selling will be preferred when: 
-λ2(-x)ß > -0.5λ((-x+h)ß + (-x-h)ß) 
which ceteris paribus will never be true, thus the stock will be held. 
To show the effect of the value function without a graph, we can differentiate. 
The value function for gains is v(x) = xα, where 0 < α < 1. Thus dv(x) / dx = αxα-
1 and will always be positive), but d2v(x) / dx2 = α(α-1)xα-2 thus will always be 
negative, so the slope starts out positively and then flattens out as it tends to a 0 
gradient. For losses, we have v(x) = -λ(-x)ß, dv(x) / dx = -λß(-x)ß-1, d2v(x) / dx2 
= -λß(ß-1)(-x)ß-2, which are effectively the same as the function for gains except 
that they begin with a minus sign so the first derivative is always negative and 
the second derivative is always positive. 
6. The above model only takes situations where the probabilities of a gain or loss 
are both 0.5. Dacey and Zielonka (2008) develop this model further by allowing 
the probability of a gain or loss to vary, though they keep the binary possible 
outcomes as a positive or negative movement of h. With this revision, if the 
probability of a positive movement equals p and a negative movement equals 1 – 
p, then selling will be preferred to holding in a gain position if: 
xα > p(x+h)α + (1-p)(x-h)α 
They demonstrated that this still produces a disposition effect. This extension still 
only considers movements of h which do not cause the mental account to change 
from gain to loss or vice versa, and where there are only two outcomes, either a 
positive or negative movement of h. 
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APPENDIX 2: RISK AVERSION AND LOSS AVERSION DEFINED 
MATHEMATICALLY 
Loss-framed risk propensity and gain-framed risk-aversion are the results of a 
systematic difference between losses and gains in the expected utility of holding or 
selling. This difference is caused by parameters α and ß in the value function of prospect 
theory, which in turn lead to decisions which appear to involve changes in the appetite 
for risk. For example, given a choice between £100 for certain (analogous to selling a 
gain), and a 0.5 probability each of £200 or £0, they will usually opt for the former. The 
expected values of these options are the same while they differ in the risk involved; 
however, the expected utility according to prospect theory is higher for the certain gain. 
For a certain loss of £100 or a 0.5 probability of losing £200 people will choose the 
reverse, taking the risky option over the certainty of a £100 loss. Again, the expected 
values of the options are the same and differ only in risk involved, but the expected 
utility is higher for the risky option. Investors are sometimes said to be “averse” to 
taking the certain loss, and willing to take on additional risk for the chance of avoiding it. 
In contrast the greater weighting of losses versus gains, defined by loss aversion in the 
main text), is represented in the value function by the parameter λ. This has been 
estimated to have a value of 2.25. That is, after the expected value has been 
transformed into expected utility using xα  or (-x)ß, the provisional expected utility for a 
loss is to be multiplied by 2.25 to arrive at its final expected utility. Put another way, a 
transformed gain needs to be 2.25 times the transformed loss for them to be considered 
equal. Thus, most people refuse a bet of a 0.5 probability of a £110 gain and a 0.5 
probability of a £100 loss, despite the expected value clearly being positive. 
In summary, reference to diminishing marginal utility is unnecessary to explain why 
investors refuse a gamble of positive expected value (such as a 50/50 chance for £110 
or -£100. This can be explained using only this loss aversion, where the value function is 
v(x) = x for gains and v(x) = λx for losses, and λ > 1. Conversely the disposition effect 
can be explained by risk appetite and the stock position being framed with reference to 
the purchase price, and does not need to refer to loss aversion.  
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APPENDIX 3: REAPPRAISAL INSTRUCTION FROM THE MILAN STUDY 
The reappraisal group received the following instruction prior to the last play of the 
simulation: 
“You will now play the Two Index Game for the final time. Prior research into the 
psychology of trading has found that mentally distancing yourself from decisions can 
sometimes improve them. Now that you have played the Two Index Game several times 
and become familiar with how it works, it should be possible for you to try a strategy to 
help improve your performance. 
When playing the Two Index Game this time, please imagine yourself in the role of an 
investment manager who is trading on behalf of a client. Please still aim to make as 
much money as possible, this time for your client.” 
This was followed by a manipulation check, to ensure that participants had in fact read 
this instruction, and not simply tried to click through to the next page. They were asked 
“How will you play the Two Index Game this time?”, followed by checkboxes for “As 
myself” and “As an investment manager on behalf of a client”. 
After the manipulation page, a final page read: 
“Thank you for completing the survey! You will now play the Two Index Game for the 
final time. As with your previous attempts at the game, please try to make as much 
money as possible, this time for your client. Please click "done" and return to the "How 
to participate" email you have been sent. Continue to the next section and play the Two 
Index Game for the 4th time, taking on the role of an investment manager working for a 
client, as described on the previous page.” 
The control group had no reappraisal instruction, and the final page read: 
“Thank you for completing the survey! You will now play the Two Index Game for the 
final time. As with your previous attempts at the game, please try to make as much 
money as possible. Please click "done" and return to the "How to participate document" 
email you have been sent.”  
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APPENDIX 4: PARTICIPANT BOOKLET FROM THE OU STUDY (FOR 
REAPPRAISAL GROUP PARTICIPANTS) 
 
ID NUMBER:   
 
Thank you again for participating in this study today. This 
booklet will tell you how to complete each part of the study, 
and also includes the questionnaires to answer. Please feel free 
to ask the researcher if you have any questions. 
 
OUTLINE 
As a reminder, the study outline is as follows, with approximate 
times given: 
# Study component Approx. 
minutes 
 Introduction  and consent form 4 
1 Questionnaire 1 2 
2 Two-index Game Tutorial and 1st play of 
the game 
14 
3 2nd play of the game 5 
4 Questionnaire 2 5 
5 3rd play of the game and questionnaire 3  6 
6 4th play the game and questionnaire 4 7 
7 Debrief 2 
 Total 45 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 1 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different 
feelings and emotions. Read each item and then circle the appropriate answer. 
PLEASE INDICATE TO WHAT EXTENT YOU FEEL THIS WAY RIGHT NOW (this is, 
at the present moment) 
Please answer quickly with your first impression – the questionnaire should 
only take a minute or two. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a 
bit 
Extremely 
________________________________________________________________ 
1. Active  1  2  3  4  5 
2. Disgusted  1  2  3  4  5 
3. Calm  1  2  3  4  5 
4. Guilty  1  2  3  4  5 
5. Enthusiastic 1  2  3  4  5 
6. Attentive  1  2  3  4  5 
7. Afraid  1  2  3  4  5 
8. Nervous  1  2  3  4  5 
9. Distressed 1  2  3  4  5 
10. Shaky  1  2  3  4  5 
11. Excited  1  2  3  4  5 
12. Determined 1  2  3  4  5 
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 1 2 3 4 5 
 Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a 
bit 
Extremely 
________________________________________________________________ 
13. Strong  1  2  3  4  5 
14. Hostile  1  2  3  4  5 
15. Frightened 1  2  3  4  5 
16. Scornful  1  2  3  4  5 
17. Proud  1  2  3  4  5 
18. Relaxed  1  2  3  4  5 
19. Alert  1  2  3  4  5 
20. Jittery  1  2  3  4  5 
21. Interested 1  2  3  4  5 
22. Irritable  1  2  3  4  5 
23. Upset  1  2  3  4  5 
24. Loathing  1  2  3  4  5 
25. Angry  1  2  3  4  5 
26. Ashamed 1  2  3  4  5 
27. Inspired  1  2  3  4  5 
28. At ease  1  2  3  4  5 
29. Scared  1  2  3  4  5 
30. Concentrating 1  2  3  4  5 
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TWO-INDEX GAME TUTORIAL AND 1ST PLAY 
 
Entering your player name in the game  
When asked for Player Name at the start of the game, please use the ID you 
have been given by the researcher.  
On each play of the game, please enter your ID with a suffix as follows: 
• for the tutorial and first play, Player Name = xxx-1 
• for the second play, Player Name = xxx-2 
• for the third play, Player Name = xxx-3 
• for the fourth play, Player Name = xxx-4 
 
Tutorial 
As well as the tutorial, there are written notes to help you understand how the 
game works. You may wish to read these after the tutorial, before continuing 
to the first practice game. You may also refer to these notes during the study 
to remind yourself of anything you have forgotten. 
Open the folder named “Tutorial and Play 1” on the desktop, and double click 
on “TwoIndexGame”.  
When asked for your Player Name, enter your ID followed by “-1”, so:   
xxx-1. 
When asked if this is the first time you have played, click “Yes” to enter the 
tutorial. 
Note that there are a couple of short practice sessions at the end of the 
tutorial itself. Sometimes, a box will pop up telling you the level has changed. 
Simply click the button “Continue Playing” to continue. 
During the tutorial, text will often pop up accompanied by an “Ok” button. 
Before carrying out any action that the text prompts you to do, please click 
the “Ok” button first. This helps the game to not crash! (Otherwise you will 
need to start the tutorial again). Click “Ok” on the welcome pop-up box then 
click “Start Game” in the bottom right corner to begin the tutorial. 
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Once the tutorial is over, a pop-up box says ‘You have completed the tutorial.  
Please click “Ok”, but do not click “start game” yet. 
 
1st play of the game 
You now may wish to read the additional notes written about how to play the 
Two-Index Game, before continuing to the first practice game. However, if you 
feel confident in how the game works, and particularly in how the “sell” 
buttons work, there is no need to. 
If you need a break for the bathroom, please do so either now, or in the gaps 
following the Questionnaires, rather than during the game. 
When you are ready press “Start Game” again in the bottom right corner. This 
will begin your first full play of the game, and your first full practice, which will 
last 5 minutes in total. There are four levels in this practice.  
Each time a pop-up box tells you the level has changed, simply click “continue 
playing” to continue. 
 
2nd play of the game 
This is your second practice, and will last for 5 minutes. This 2nd play only 
involves level 4 of the game, meaning you can use all the buttons from the 
beginning of the game. 
Open the folder on the desktop named “Play 2”, and double click on 
“TwoIndexGame”.  
For your Player Name, enter your ID followed by “-2”, so:  xxx-2. 
When asked if this is the first time you have played, click “No” to skip the 
tutorial. 
At the end of the game, please close any positions you are holding before the 
time remaining runs out and the game ends (this simplifies data analysis). 
Click “Start Game” in the bottom right corner to begin the game. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 2 
 
Each of the following problems presents a choice between two options. Each problem is presented 
with a scale ranging from 1 (representing one option) through 6 (representing the other option). 
For each item, please circle the number on the scale that best reflects your relative preference 
between the two options. Please answer quickly with your first impression. 
 
Problem 1  
 
You have paid a non-returnable deposit on a gold ring for someone special. It costs £200 and you 
have already paid £100 on it, so you owe another £100. One day, you see in the paper that a new 
jewellery store is selling the same ring for only £90 as a special sale. The new store is across the 
street from the old one. If you decide to get the ring from the new store, you will not be able to get 
your money back from the old store, but you would save £10 overall.  
 
Would you be more likely to continue paying at the old store or buy from the new store?  
 
1  2   3  4  5  6  
 
Most likely to          Most likely to 
continue paying at the old store      buy from the new store 
 
Problem 2  
 
You enjoy playing tennis, but you really love crown green bowls. You just became a member of a 
tennis club, and of a bowls club, both at the same time. The membership to your tennis club costs 
£200 per year and the membership to your bowls club £50 per year. During the first week of both 
memberships, you develop an elbow injury. It is painful to play either tennis or bowling. Your doctor 
tells you that the pain will continue for about a year.  
 
Would you be more likely to play tennis or bowling in the next six months?  
 
1  2   3  4  5  6  
 
Most likely to          Most likely to 
play tennis          play bowling  
 
Problem 3  
 
You have been looking forward to this year’s Halloween party. You have the right cape, the right wig, 
and the right hat. All week, you have been trying to perfect the outfit by cutting out a large number 
of tiny stars to glue to the cape and the hat, and you still need to glue them on. On the day of 
Halloween, you decide that the outfit looks better without all these stars you have worked so hard 
on.  
 
1  2   3  4  5  6  
 
Most likely to          Most likely to 
wear stars         not wear stars  
Problem 4  
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After a large meal at a restaurant, you order a big dessert with chocolate and ice cream. After a few 
bites you find you are full and you would rather not eat any more of it.  
 
Would you be more likely to eat more or to stop eating it?  
 
1  2   3  4  5  6  
 
Most likely to          Most likely to 
eat more         stop eating 
 
Problem 5  
 
You are in a hotel room for one night and you have paid £6.95 to watch a film on pay TV. Then you 
discover that there is a film you would much rather like to see on one of the free TV channels. You 
only have time to watch one of the two films.  
 
Would you be more likely to watch the film on pay TV or on the free TV channel?  
 
1  2   3  4  5  6  
 
Most likely to          Most likely to 
watch pay TV         watch free TV 
 
Problem 6  
 
You have been asked to give a toast at your friend’s wedding. You have worked for hours on a story 
about you and your friend taking cooking lessons, but you still have some work to do on it. Then you 
realize that you could finish writing the speech faster if you start over and tell the funnier story 
about the dance lessons you took together.  
 
Would you be more likely to finish the toast about cooking or rewrite it to be about dancing?  
 
1  2   3  4  5  6  
 
Most likely to          Most likely to 
write about cooking        write about dancing 
 
Problem 7  
 
You decide to learn to play a musical instrument. After you buy an expensive cello, you find you are 
no longer interested. Your neighbour is moving and you are excited that she is leaving you her old 
guitar, for free. You’d like to learn how to play it.  
 
Would you be more likely to practice the cello or the guitar?  
 
1  2   3  4  5  6  
 
Most likely to          Most likely to 
play cello         play guitar 
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Problem 8  
 
You and your friend are at a the cinema together. Both you and your friend are getting bored with 
the storyline. You’d hate to waste the money spent on the ticket, but you both feel that you would 
have a better time at the coffee shop next door. You could sneak out without other people noticing.  
 
Would you be more likely to stay or to leave?  
 
1  2   3  4  5  6  
 
Most likely to          Most likely to 
stay           leave 
 
Problem 9  
 
You and your friend have driven halfway to a resort. Both you and your friend feel sick. You both feel 
that you would have a much better weekend at home. Your friend says it is "too bad" you already 
drove halfway, because you both would much rather spend the time at home. You agree.  
 
Would you be more likely to drive on or turn back?  
 
1  2   3  4  5  6  
 
Most likely to          Most likely to 
drive on         turn back 
 
 
Problem 10  
 
You are painting your bedroom with a striped pattern in your favourite colours. It takes a long time 
to do. After you finish two of the four walls, you realize you would have preferred one solid colour 
instead of the striped pattern. You have enough paint left over to redo the entire room in the solid 
colour. It would take you the same amount of time as finishing the striped pattern on the two walls 
you have left.  
 
Would you be more likely to finish the striped pattern or to redo the room in the solid colour? 
 
1  2   3  4  5  6  
 
Most likely to          Most likely to 
finish striped pattern       redo with a solid colour 
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3RD PLAY OF THE GAME & QUESTIONNAIRE 3 
 
3rd Play of the game 
 
This is your 3rd play of the game, and will last for 5 minutes. You can use all the 
buttons from the beginning of the game. 
Remember that your performance on this play will determine your chances of 
winning a voucher in the raffle. Your chances of winning are directly 
proportional to how well you do compared to other participants. 
 
Open the folder named “Play 3”, and double click on “TwoIndexGame”.  
For your Player Name, enter your ID followed by “-3”, so:  xxx-3. 
When asked if this is the first time you have played, click “No” to skip the 
tutorial. 
 
At the end of the game, please close any positions you are holding before the 
time remaining runs out and the game ends (this simplifies data analysis). 
Click “Start Game” in the bottom right corner to begin the game. 
Remember to try to make as much money as possible. Good luck! 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 3 
Part 1 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different 
feelings and emotions. Read each item and then circle the appropriate answer. 
PLEASE INDICATE TO WHAT EXTENT YOU FELT THIS WAY WHEN YOU WERE 
MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT TO CLOSE POSITIONS IN THE 
GAME 
Please answer quickly with your first impression. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a 
bit 
Extremely 
_______________________________________________________________ 
1. Disappointed 1  2  3  4  5 
2. Regretful  1  2  3  4  5 
3. Happy  1  2  3  4  5 
4. Satisfied  1  2  3  4  5 
5. Proud  1  2  3  4  5 
 
How responsible did you feel for the profits and losses which you made, when 
you took the decision to close positions? 
   1  2  3  4  5 
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Part 2 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different 
feelings and emotions. Read each item and then circle the appropriate answer. 
PLEASE INDICATE TO WHAT EXTENT YOU FELT THIS WAY WHEN YOU WERE 
MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT TO CLOSE POSITIONS IN THE 
GAME. Please answer quickly with your first impression – the questionnaire 
should only take a minute or two. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a 
bit 
Extremely 
________________________________________________________________ 
1. Active  1  2  3  4  5 
2. Disgusted  1  2  3  4  5 
3. Calm  1  2  3  4  5 
4. Guilty  1  2  3  4  5 
5. Enthusiastic 1  2  3  4  5 
6. Attentive  1  2  3  4  5 
7. Afraid  1  2  3  4  5 
8. Nervous  1  2  3  4  5 
9. Distressed 1  2  3  4  5 
10. Shaky  1  2  3  4  5 
11. Excited  1  2  3  4  5 
12. Determined 1  2  3  4  5 
13. Strong  1  2  3  4  5 
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 1 2 3 4 5 
 Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a 
bit 
Extremely 
 
14. Hostile  1  2  3  4  5 
15. Frightened 1  2  3  4  5 
16. Scornful  1  2  3  4  5 
17. Proud  1  2  3  4  5 
18. Relaxed  1  2  3  4  5 
19. Alert  1  2  3  4  5 
20. Jittery  1  2  3  4  5 
21. Interested 1  2  3  4  5 
22. Irritable  1  2  3  4  5 
23. Upset  1  2  3  4  5 
24. Loathing  1  2  3  4  5 
25. Angry  1  2  3  4  5 
26. Ashamed 1  2  3  4  5 
27. Inspired  1  2  3  4  5 
28. At ease  1  2  3  4  5 
29. Scared  1  2  3  4  5 
30. Concentrating 1  2  3  4  5 
PLEASE TURN OVER AND READ THE NEXT SECTION BEFORE PLAYING THE 
GAME THE FINAL TIME 
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4TH PLAY OF THE GAME & QUESTIONNAIRE 4 
4th Play of the game 
This is your last play of the game, and will last for 5 minutes. You can use all 
the buttons from the beginning of the game. 
Remember that your performance on this play will determine your chances of 
winning a voucher in the second raffle. Your chances of winning are directly 
proportional to how well you do compared to other participants. 
 
Now that you have played the Two-Index Game several times and become 
familiar with how it works, you can be given a strategy to try and improve your 
performance. 
When playing the two-index game this time, please imagine you are trading for 
someone else. You could be an investment manager trading on behalf of a 
client, or a pension manager, or simply someone managing investments on 
behalf of a friend of family member. Try to imagine this vividly when you are 
making decisions. 
Please tick the box to confirm that you have read the instruction in the 
paragraph above, about improving your performance: 
 
Open the folder named “Play 4”, and double click on “TwoIndexGame”.  
For your Player Name, enter your ID followed by “-4”, so:  xxx-4.  
When asked if this is the first time you have played, click “No” to skip the 
tutorial. 
At the end of the game, please close any positions you are holding before the 
time remaining runs out and the game ends (this simplifies data analysis). 
Click “Start Game” in the bottom right corner to begin the game. 
Remember to imagine trading on behalf of someone else, though your aim is 
still to try to make as much money as possible. Good luck! 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 4 
Part 1 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different 
feelings and emotions. Read each item and then circle the appropriate answer. 
PLEASE INDICATE TO WHAT EXTENT YOU FELT THIS WAY WHEN YOU WERE 
MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT TO CLOSE POSITIONS IN THE 
GAME 
Please answer quickly with your first impression. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a 
bit 
Extremely 
_______________________________________________________________ 
1. Disappointed 1  2  3  4  5 
2. Regretful  1  2  3  4  5 
3. Happy  1  2  3  4  5 
4. Satisfied  1  2  3  4  5 
5. Proud  1  2  3  4  5 
How responsible did you feel for the profits and losses which you made, when 
you took the decision to close positions? 
   1  2  3  4  5 
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Part 2 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different 
feelings and emotions. Read each item and then circle the appropriate answer. 
PLEASE INDICATE TO WHAT EXTENT YOU FELT THIS WAY WHEN YOU WERE 
MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT TO CLOSE POSITIONS IN THE 
GAME 
Please answer quickly with your first impression – the questionnaire should 
only take a minute or two. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a 
bit 
Extremely 
________________________________________________________________ 
1. Active  1  2  3  4  5 
2. Disgusted  1  2  3  4  5 
3. Calm  1  2  3  4  5 
4. Guilty  1  2  3  4  5 
5. Enthusiastic 1  2  3  4  5 
6. Attentive  1  2  3  4  5 
7. Afraid  1  2  3  4  5 
8. Nervous  1  2  3  4  5 
9. Distressed 1  2  3  4  5 
10. Shaky  1  2  3  4  5 
11. Excited  1  2  3  4  5 
12. Determined 1  2  3  4  5 
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 1 2 3 4 5 
 Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a 
bit 
Extremely 
 
13. Strong  1  2  3  4  5 
14. Hostile  1  2  3  4  5 
15. Frightened 1  2  3  4  5 
16. Scornful  1  2  3  4  5 
17. Proud  1  2  3  4  5 
18. Relaxed  1  2  3  4  5 
19. Alert  1  2  3  4  5 
20. Jittery  1  2  3  4  5 
21. Interested 1  2  3  4  5 
22. Irritable  1  2  3  4  5 
23. Upset  1  2  3  4  5 
24. Loathing  1  2  3  4  5 
25. Angry  1  2  3  4  5 
26. Ashamed 1  2  3  4  5 
27. Inspired  1  2  3  4  5 
28. At ease  1  2  3  4  5 
29. Scared  1  2  3  4  5 
30. Concentrating 1  2  3  4  5 
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Part 3 
Finally, please give brief answers to the following questions about you and how 
you found the study. 
1. How easy did you find it to imagine you were trading for someone else 
during the 4th play, following the instruction given after questionnaire 3? 
Please circle the best option: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very easy Easy With some 
success 
Hard Very hard 
OR: I didn’t use the 
instruction 
 I didn’t read 
the instruction 
 
 
2. Who did you imagine you were trading on behalf of? 
 
 
3. How did you find playing the Two Index Game in general?  
 
 
4. Did you have a strategy for using the predictor index? 
 
 
5. What is your best guess of how the predictor index is connected to the 
value index? 
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6. How familiar are you with the stock market? For example do you actively 
your own shares?  
 
7. How familiar are you with financial investments in general? For example, 
do you manage your own investments, or pension? 
 
8. What is your profession? 
 
9. Which age range do you belong to? (circle as appropriate) 
Under 25   25-39    40-54   Over 55 
 
10.  Do you have any other comments about the study? 
 
 
DEBRIEF 
Many thanks for participating in this research. If you enjoyed the study, please 
tell your friends and colleagues! The researcher can give you some flyers to 
pass on.  
However, until the study is complete, please don’t discuss the specifics of the 
study with people who haven’t taken part yet, for example specific instructions 
given during the study. This is stop participants knowing exactly what to expect 
when they come to take part, and because different groups receive slightly 
different instructions. 
This research is being carried out during Sept and October. If you would like be 
emailed a summary of the findings of the research once the study is complete 
(in late 2014), please tick the box:  
